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ISSN 0265-2897

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*Buddhist Studies Review* is the semi-annual journal of the UK Association for Buddhist Studies and is sponsored by the Institut de recherche bouddhique Linh-Sơn

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為 離 如 彼  
天 我 御 諸  
人 慢 者 根  
所 無 調 寂  
慕 漏 馬 靜



*On inh*  
*oxf.*

*Edbd + Advr Bol.*

Frontispiece: the calligraphy in seal  
script by Shi Weimiao, translated into  
Chinese by Shi Liaocan, reads:

*Whose senses have gone to rest,  
like horses well tamed by a charioteer,  
who has abandoned pride and has  
no āsavas, him, being of such a kind,  
even the gods envy.*

Dhammapada VII, v.94 (tr. K.R. Norman)  
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## LEGEND AND CULT – CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE HISTORY OF INDIAN BUDDHIST STŪPAS PART 1: THE ‘STŪPA OF KANIṢKA’

MAX DEEG

In the last few years the original ritual monument of Buddhism, the stūpa, has attracted attention on several levels of research and interpretation<sup>1</sup>. Beyond the purely archaeological area<sup>2</sup>, where a

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<sup>1</sup> Heinrich Gerhard Franz, *Pagode, Turmtempel, Stupa: Studien zum Kultbau des Buddhismus in Indien und Ostasien*, Graz 1978; A.H. Longhurst, *The Story of the Stūpa*, New Delhi 1979; Giuseppe Tucci, *Stupa, art, architectonics and symbolism*, New Delhi 1988; Johannes W. Glauche, *Der Stupa, Kultbau des Buddhismus*, Cologne 1995; Pema Dorjee, *Stūpa and its Technology: a Tibeto-Buddhist perspective*, New Delhi 1996. Cf. also the important articles by André Bareau, ‘La construction et le culte des stūpa d’après les Vinayapīṭaka’, *BEFEO* 50 (1962), pp.231-745, and Akira Hirakawa, ‘The Rise of Mahayana Buddhism and its Relationship to the Worship of Stupas’, *Memoirs of the Research Department of the Toyo Bunko* (The Oriental Library) 22 (1963), pp.57-106; Gregory Schopen, ‘The Stūpa Cult and the Extant Pāli Vinaya’, orig. in *Journal of the Pali Text Society* 13 (1989), pp.83-100, repr. in G. Schopen, *Bones, Stones and Buddhist Monks – Collected Papers on the Archaeology, Epigraphy, and Texts of Monastic Buddhism in India*, Honolulu 1997, pp.86-98.

<sup>2</sup> Only a few titles may suffice: Anna Libera Dallapiccola, Stephanie Zingel-Avé Lallement (ed.), *The Stūpa: its religious, historical and architectural significance*, Wiesbaden 1980; Mireille Bénisti, *Contributions à l’étude du stūpa bouddhique indien: les stūpa mineurs de Bodhi-Gaya et de Ratnagiri*, 2 vols, Paris 1981; Sujata Soni, *Evolution of stupas in Burma: Pagan period: 11th to 13th centuries A.D.*, New Delhi 1991; Bernhard Kölver, *Re-building a stūpa: architectural drawings of the Svayambhunath*, Bonn 1992; Robert Knox, *Amarāvati: sculpture from the great stūpa*, London 1992. Gregory Schopen has drawn attention to the position and function of the stūpa for the monastic community in a number of articles. On the excavation of one of the oldest stūpas at Gotihawa in Nepal, probably dedicated to a Buddha of the past (Krakuc-

considerable amount of knowledge has also been gained, scholars working on the stūpa, in general and specific cases, have to take account of research works that emphasise the symbolism<sup>3</sup> and (even spiritual<sup>4</sup>) function of the stūpa in the development of Buddhism as a religion.

Viewed from the standpoint of general religious studies, the stūpa is not only an interesting religious monument for the cult which underwent changes in form, function and symbolism, but in some cases also gives us information about what the Buddhists thought the cause for its construction to have been. The overt reason is, of course, the enshrinement of a relic (Skt. *śarīra*, Chin. *sheli* 舍利), but often we do not have a relic in the stūpa and, in these cases, the monument was rather a caitya in the direct sense of the word<sup>6</sup>, a memorial building which reminds the Buddhist of

chanda?) see Giovanni Verardi, *Excavations at Gotihawa and Archaeological Survey in the Kapilbastu, District of Nepal, A Preliminary Report*, Lumbini 2002.

<sup>3</sup> A.K. Coomaraswamy, *Symbolism of Indian architecture: the skambha and the stūpa*, Jaipur 1983; Adrian Snodgrass, *The symbolism of the stūpa*, Ithaca 1985; Heino Kottkamp, *Der Stupa als Repräsentation des buddhistischen Heilsweges: Untersuchungen zur Entstehung und Entwicklung architektonischer Symbolik*, Wiesbaden 1992.

<sup>4</sup> Lama Anagarika Govinda, *Psycho-cosmic symbolism of the Buddhist stūpa*, Emeryville 1976.

<sup>5</sup> Cf. Jan Fontein, 'Relics and reliquaries, texts and artefacts', in K.R. Van Kooji & H. Van der Veere, *Function and Meaning in Buddhist Art (Proceedings of a seminar held at Leiden University 21-24 October 1991)*, Groningen 1995, pp.21-31. See also the study by Kevin Trainor, *Relics, Ritual, and Representation in Buddhism. Rematerializing the Sri Lankan Theravada tradition*, Cambridge 1997.

<sup>6</sup> I am not talking about strict etymology here, which sometimes connects the word with the root *ci-* (*cinoti*), 'to heap', but about the traditional explanation according to which a caitya (or cetiya) derives from the root *cit-*, 'to think (of), to consider'; cf. Tucci, *Stupa...* *op. cit.*, p.XI ff.; Kottkamp, *Der Stupa...* *op. cit.*, p.15 ff. According to the MPS [see next note] there are three types of stūpas called *śarīraka*, containing an enshrined relic in the sense of the word *paribhojika*, containing objects used by the Buddha, and *uddeśika*, commemorating places where the Buddha had stayed; cf. Mireille Bénisti, 'Étude sur le stūpa dans l'Inde ancienne', *BEFEO* 50 (1960), p.50.

an event in the 'history' of Buddhism. The *Mahāparinirvāṇasūtra* (MPS)<sup>7</sup> informs us that, immediately after the Buddha had been cremated, his remains were distributed – not without conflicts arising among the parties wanting to obtain them – to several groups or persons who then enshrined them in stūpas, those being the first eight buildings of its kind according to the Buddhist legend<sup>8</sup>; in MPS(S) there is even an episode where the Buddha prophesies to Ānanda that these stūpas will be built and he praises the venerability of his relics<sup>9</sup>. This and the depiction of stūpa veneration on early Buddhist reliefs, such as those at Sāñchī, show that the adoration of relics and those at stūpas belongs to an early phase of the Buddhist cult.

The Buddhist legends also give us an aetiological story which is supposed to explain how these primary stūpas were multiplied: the different stories of King Aśoka relate how the famous monarch took the relics out of the original stūpas, divided them and constructed 84,000 stūpas – the so-called dharmarājikās – over them, which were spread across the whole realm (Jambudvīpa)<sup>10</sup>. The pragmatic background for such an account was of course to explain the fact that some centuries after the Buddha's death a

<sup>7</sup> Hereafter abbreviated to MPS(S) standing for the Sanskrit Sarvāstivādin version reconstructed by Ernst Waldschmidt from Central Asian manuscript fragments, and MPS(P) for the Pāli version found in the *Dīgha-nikāya* of the Sutta-piṭaka.

<sup>8</sup> Cf. Ernst Waldschmidt, *Das Mahāparinirvāṇasūtra*, Berlin 1950/51, p.450, MPS(S): *tena kha(lu samayena jām)budvīpe bhagavato 'ṣṭau śarīrastūpā abhūvan n(avamāś ca kumbhastūpo daśamaś cā)ṅgarastūpaḥ* ('Then there were eight stūpas with the relics of the Venerable in Jambudvīpa, the ninth being the stūpa of the urn, the tenth being the stūpa of the ashes'); cf. also Waldschmidt, *Die Überlieferung vom Lebensende des Buddha. Eine vergleichende Analyse des Mahāparinirvāṇasūtra und seiner Textentsprechungen*, Göttingen 1944 & 1948, p.328 ff.

<sup>9</sup> Cf. E. Waldschmidt, 'Der Buddha preist die Verehrungswürdigkeit seiner Reliquien, Sondertext I des Mahāparinirvāṇasūtra' in id., *Von Ceylon bis Turfan. Schriften zur Geschichte, Literatur, Religion und Kunst des indischen Kulturraumes*, Göttingen 1967, pp.412-27 (orig. in *NGAW*, 1961, pp.375-85).

<sup>10</sup> For a discussion of this tradition see e.g. Trainor, *Relics...*, *op. cit.*, p.39 ff.



huge number of stūpas already existed<sup>11</sup>, each claiming to contain a relic of the Master, a conception leading to the discovery of 'original' Aśoka-stūpas containing the 'authentic' relics of the Buddha in medieval China.

Another possibility to justify the establishing of 'authentic' stūpas with *sarīras* was to substantiate the Buddha's having paid visits even to places where he could not have been during his lifetime. This was especially the case in the Indian North-west, in the areas of Swāt<sup>12</sup> and Gandhāra<sup>13</sup>, which were known in later texts through the conversions of human beings, yakṣas and nāgas. In order to prove the truth of the legend, the Buddha was often said to have left his footprints<sup>14</sup> or nails and hair which he was believed to have cut after the relevant event and over which a stūpa was built (*nakhakeśastūpa*). At the same time an extended cult of relics seems to have developed: not only parts of the body of the Buddha (*sarīra* in a stricter sense) but also objects which were said to have belonged to the Buddha came to be venerated.

Moreover, even for places where it was not at all possible to trace an event in the life of the Buddha, commemorative stūpas

<sup>11</sup> Cf. Kottkamp, *Der Stupa... op. cit.*, p.3, n.2: 'daß eine forcierte stupa-Bautätigkeit in der Śunga-zeitlichen Epoche (ab ca. 150 v.Chr.) einsetze.'

<sup>12</sup> The most famous of these sites being the place where the Buddha converted the *nāga* Apalāla and left his footprints and the mark of his garment on a stone, a story which is reported by the Chinese pilgrims but is also found in several Buddhist texts.

<sup>13</sup> In Puruṣapura, the present Peshawar, e.g. the Buddha's bowl (*pātra*) was shown, and another centre of relics was Nagarāhāra (in present Afghanistan) with the cave in which the Buddha had left his shadow to tame a *nāga*, and – last but not least – there is the Kaniska-stūpa discussed below. That the 'production' of such a sacred site was connected with the Kuṣānas, probably especially with Kaniska, was already stressed by Étienne Lamotte (tr. Boin-Webb), *History of Indian Buddhism from the origins to the Śaka era*, Louvain-la-Neuve 1988, pp.336-7.

<sup>14</sup> Probably the most famous example is the footprint on Adam's Peak in Sri Lanka. For an extensive discussion of these *buddhapadas*, see Anna Maria Quagliotti, *Buddhapadas. An Essay on the Representations of the Footprints of the Buddha with a Descriptive Catalogue of the Indian Specimens from the 2nd Century B.C. to the 4th Century A.D.*, Kamakura 1998.

(strictly speaking, caityas) were claimed by localising events pertaining to one of the former lives of the great Teacher. In this way, even later rulers could claim an encounter with the Buddha.

In the present work I will try to explain – in two parts – the names and aetiological stories of famous stūpas found in the Buddhist literature of India and China. These stories represent the two types of aetiology developed in later periods for an explanation of the existence of a certain type of stūpa as mentioned above.

The first of these two stūpas is found in the northwest of India, in the region called Gandhāra, famous for its Buddhist art. It is the so-called Kaniska-stūpa, which has been identified with the stūpa of Shāh-Ji-Kī-Dherī<sup>15</sup>. This identification is definitely correct even if the inscription of a relic (or incense) basket found in the stūpa is not attributed to Kaniska as seems to be the accepted opinion now<sup>16</sup>. The monument was supposed to be one of the largest stūpas in the Buddhist realm<sup>17</sup>, mentioned in almost all the Chinese pilgrim records<sup>18</sup>, viz. in those by Faxian 法顯, Song Yun 宋雲, Huisheng 慧生, Xuanzang 玄奘, Huichao 慧超<sup>19</sup> and

<sup>15</sup> See the study by Shōshin Kuwayama, *The Main Stupa of Shāh-Ji-Kī-Dherī. A Chronological Outlook*, Kyoto 1997. An older study of the stūpa and its tradition is by K. Walton Dobbins, *The Stūpa and Vihāra of Kanishka I*, Calcutta 1971.

<sup>16</sup> See the summary of the discussion in Kuwayama, *The Main Stupa... op. cit.*, p.2 f.

<sup>17</sup> See also the relatively late reference to the stūpa (Kaniska-caitya) in the Tibetan Buddhist historiographical work known as the 'Blue Annals' (15th C.): see George N. Roerich, *The Blue Annals*, Calcutta 1949, repr. Delhi 1976, p.25.

<sup>18</sup> Translations of the relevant passages in these texts are the present author's. References to the older French and English translations are omitted because these works will be listed in the author's forthcoming "*Dharmasucher*" – *Reliquien – Legenden. Der älteste Bericht eines chinesischen buddhistischen Pilgermönchs über seine Reise nach Indien: Das Gaoseng-Faxian-zhuan* 高僧法顯傳 als religionsgeschichtlich Quelle, Wiesbaden 2004.

<sup>19</sup> See Shōshin Kuwayama (ed.), 'Huichao's Wang Wu Tianzhuguo zhuan, Record of Travels in Five Indic Regions, Translation and Commentary, Kyoto 1992 (in Japanese) 桑山正進編・慧超往五天竺國傳研究・京都, p. 21, line 128 f.: 'Three days' travel from this city (Puṣkalāvati) to the west, there is a great monastery. This is the monastery where the Bodhisattva Vasubandhu and



Wukong 悟空<sup>20</sup>. Some pieces of information repeated in genuine Chinese historiographical<sup>21</sup> and Buddhist<sup>22</sup> texts are referred to in texts found in Central Asia<sup>23</sup> (see also below) and even the Muslim observer, Al-Bīrūnī, still deemed the site to be worth mentioning in his description of India<sup>24</sup>.

There are several texts giving the legend of the foundation of

the Bodhisattva Aśaṅga resided. This monastery is called Kanīṣka(-monastery) (Chin. *Genuoge*). There is a great stūpa which usually sends out rays of light. It was King Kanīṣka who in former times built this monastery and this stūpa. Because the king erected the monastery it was called (after him).'

<sup>20</sup> T 2089, p.980a22 f.復有...王聖塔寺... ('There is also... the monastery of the sacred stūpa of King Kanīṣka...'). While in Huichao's report the monastery is mentioned first, the compound in Wukong's account still seems to suggest that the stūpa was considered more important than the monastery which is not even mentioned by the earliest pilgrims Faxian, Song Yun and Huisheng.

<sup>21</sup> See *Weishu* 魏書 p.102 (text after Kuwayama, *The Main Stupa... op. cit.*, p. 66 f.): 'From this city (Puruṣapura) ten miles to the east, there is a Buddha-stūpa, 350 paces in circuit and eighty *zhang* high. It is said that since the first erection of the Buddha-stūpa until the 8th year of the (era) Wuding 842 years have passed, and that it is called the "Stūpa of 100 *zhang*" (*Baizhang-futu*). It is not easy to imagine what the Indian name of the stūpa should have been: \**Śatavyāmastūpa* (?); because there are no such Indian names indicating measures, the name could just be a Chinese invention. However, due to a contradiction found in the *Weishu* (80 *zhang* vs. 100 *zhang*) it can be inferred that the number 100 stands for the extraordinary height of the building (see the discussion in Kuwayama, *ibid.*, p.73 ff). In the same chapter of the same text is found another, slightly different description: 'Seven miles southeast where the capital is, there is a Buddha-stūpa, 70 *zhang* high and 300 paces in circuit. This is the so-called Queli-stūpa.'

<sup>22</sup> The Buddhist encyclopedia *Fayuan-zhulin* 法苑珠林 of 668 by the monk Daoshi 道世 just repeats the text of Song Yun (T 2122, p.589a19 ff.).

<sup>23</sup> In the Sogdian *Āryāvalokiteśvarasya-nāmāṣṭasatakastotra* (cf. David A. Utz, *A Survey of Buddhist Sogdian Studies*, Tokyo 1980, p.10, no.II.2) the line: *namācū Baram awēn akanīṣk astūp Barxār farn* ('We bring homage to the farn [majesty] of Kanishka's stūpa and vihāra', cited after Dobbin, *The Stūpa and Vihāra... op. cit.*, p.44).

<sup>24</sup> See Edward C. Sachau, *Alberuni's India*, London 1910, repr, Delhi 1992, I, p.11.

the stūpa through King Kanīṣka<sup>25</sup> with a few variations of which the first Indian version in the *Bhaiṣajyavastu* of the Mūla-sārvastivādin Vinaya (MSV(S)) is cited:

'The Exalted One came to Kharjūrikā<sup>26</sup>. In Kharjūrikā he saw little boys playing with small stūpas made of dirt. After having seen the little boys playing with small stūpas made of dirt he said to the yakṣa Vajrapāṇi: "Do you see, O Vajrapāṇi, the little boys playing with small stūpas made of dirt?" "Indeed, O venerable one." "There will be, 400 years after my Nirvāṇa, a king called Kanīṣka. He will erect a stūpa in this area, the name of which will be stūpa of Kanīṣka, and he will perform what should be performed for the Buddha after I have entered Nirvāṇa."'<sup>28</sup>

<sup>25</sup> The disputed date of Kanīṣka has recently been determined with the help of new inscriptional material; cf. Nicholas Sims-Williams, J. Cribb, 'A New Bactrian Inscription of Kanīṣka the Great', in *Silk Road Art and Archaeology* 1 (1995/96), pp.75-142. The texts – except for the Vinaya passages and the Central Asian texts referred to below – are collected and translated in Kuwayama, *The Main Stupa... op. cit.*, p. 62, in Appendix A.

<sup>26</sup> The context shows that the Buddha moved northwards to Swāt and that the Kharjūrikā mentioned actually was in the area of Gandhāra. Obviously the name was supposed to be the old one known in the Buddha's lifetime.

<sup>27</sup> On the construction of sand- and mud- or dirt-stūpas, cf. Kottkamp, *Der Stupa... op. cit.*, p.151 ff, n.4; one *locus classicus* is found in the second chapter of the Lotus Sūtra (*Saddharmapuṇḍārikasūtra*) which could be a cross-reference to our story, because it explicitly mentions children erecting stūpas of sand: T 262, 8b24 乃至童子戲 聚沙為佛塔... up to children playing and collecting sand to make stūpas for the Buddha. This kind of miniature stūpa made of earth or mud (*mṛtipiṇḍā... stūpaṃ pratiṣṭhāpayet...* 'should erect a stūpa from a ball of mud') for the sake of gaining merit (*puṇya*) seems to have been quite popular at least in the north-western area, as can be seen from certain passages in the Gilgit mss; see Gregory Schopen, 'Two Problems in the History of Indian Buddhism: The Layman Monk Distinction and the Doctrines of the Transference of Merit' in *Studien zur Indologie und Iranistik* 10 (1985) pp.9-47, repr. in (and quoted after) *id.*, *Bones, Stones and Buddhist Monks*, *op. cit.*, pp.23-55, here p.50, n.61.

<sup>28</sup> *Bhaiṣajyavastu*, ed. Bagchi, *Mūlasarvāstivādinayavastu* I, Darbhanga 1967, pp.10, 13 ff. See Jampa Losang Panglung, *Die Erzählstoffe des Mūlasarvāstivādinayana analysiert auf Grund der Tibetischen Übersetzung*, Tokyo 1981, p.28.

In the Chinese version of the same Vinaya (MSV(C)), translated by the famous Chinese pilgrim Yijing and sometimes differing considerably from the Indian text, it is only one boy who is playing with a stūpa<sup>29</sup>.

The other versions of the story differ in one main point from the MSV in that they focus – following the prophecy of the Buddha – on the story of the erection of the stūpa, Kaniska being told the prediction of the Buddha after having seen a little boy building a stūpa made of dirt or manure.

The earliest remarks on the stūpa are found in Faxian's pilgrim account, *Gaoseng-Faxian-zhuan* 高僧法顯傳 (GFZ; or *Foguo-ji* 佛國記, 'Records of the Buddhist Countries'), in the region around Puruṣapura / *Falousha* 弗樓沙:

'Once the Buddha and his disciples travelled in this kingdom. He said to Ānanda: "When I will have entered Nirvāṇa there will be a king called Kaniska. He will erect a stūpa here." Later, when Kaniska was born, he was once out on a trip and the ruler of the gods, Śakra, wanted to awaken his faith. He transformed himself into a shepherd boy and built a stūpa on the road. The king asked: "What are you doing?" he answered: "I am making a

<sup>29</sup> T. 1448, p. 41b25 ff., *Genben-shuo-yiqie-youbu-pinaie-yaoshi* 根本說一切有部毘奈耶藥事: 'Then the Venerable One came to the village of Kharjūra. In this village there was a child who built a stūpa of dirt and played with it. When the Venerable One saw that he said to Vajrapāṇi: "Do you see that child building a stūpa of dirt and playing with it?" Vajrapāṇi said to the Buddha: "I have seen him." The Buddha said: "After I have entered Nirvāṇa, King Kaniska (that means: pure gold) will erect a great stūpa at the place where (now) this child is playing and building a stūpa. (That stūpa) will be called Kaniska-stūpa (and Kaniska) will further Buddhism".' Cf. the French translation by Jean Przyluski, 'Le nord-ouest de l'Inde dans le Vinaya des Mūla-Sarvāstivādin: et les textes apparentés', in *JA* (1914), p. 517, who gives a different transcription for the place-name: *Youshulo* 游樹羅, which does not agree with the Indian name Kharjūra (Kharjūrikā; cf. *Mañāvūtpatti*, ed. Sasaki, *Honyaku-meigi-daiji*, Tokyo 1962, no. 4212: *pinḍa-kharjūra-vṛkṣaḥ*) and is certainly a mistake, the T. giving the right form *Keshuluo* 渴樹羅: \**kʰat-shyc'-la* (reconstruction according to Edwin G. Pulleybank, *Lexicon of Re-constructed Pronunciation in Early Middle Chinese, Late Middle Chinese, and Early Mandarin*, Vancouver 1991).

stūpa of the Buddha." The king exclaimed: "How meritorious!" Then the king erected a stūpa directly above the boy's stūpa, more than 40 *zhang* high and adorned with several precious things. All stūpas and temples which were seen hitherto were not comparable with its splendour, beauty, majesty and dignity. It is said that in Jambudvīpa only this stūpa can be called high. After the king had finished his stūpa the little stūpa emerged (again) from the southern side of the big stūpa, about 3 *chi* high.<sup>30</sup>

The pilgrim Song Yun, who visited the northwestern regions as an unofficial envoy of the Empress-Dowager Hu 胡, and whose account is preserved in the 'Records of the Monasteries (in the capital) Luoyang', *Luoyang-jialan-ji* 洛陽伽藍記 (LJJ), then gives the whole story of the foundation of the stūpa by Kaniska<sup>31</sup>:

'Seven miles to the east of the city (Gandhāra = Puruṣapura) there is the Queli-stūpa. The account by Daoyao says: "Four miles to the east of the city." Now if one is to trace the origin of this stūpa it is where the Tathāgata, when he was living in the world and travelled this region together with his disciples, pointed to the east of the city and said: "300 years<sup>32</sup> after my Nirvāṇa there will be a king in this country called Kaniska. He will build a stūpa at this spot." (And) indeed, 200 (300) years after the Nirvāṇa of the Buddha there was a king in the country who was called Kaniska. (Once when he was) leaving the town he saw in the east four boys collecting cow-dung and building a stūpa about three *chi* [Chinese feet] high and suddenly dis-

<sup>30</sup> T 2085, p. 858b12 ff.

<sup>31</sup> Song Yun's co-traveller Huisheng 慧生 only says that Kaniska built the stūpa without giving any hint of the story: 'There is the Queli-stūpa built 200 years after the Buddha's Nirvāṇa by the king Kaniska...' (*Beiwei-seng-Huisheng-shi-xiyu-ji* 北魏僧慧生使西域記, T 2087, p. 8687b3 f.)

<sup>32</sup> Yi-t'ung Wang, *A Record of Buddhist Monasteries in Lo-yang, by Yang Hsüan-chih*, Princeton 1984, p. 239, n. 177, emends to *erbai* '200' with the quotation from the 7th-cent. encyclopedia *Fayuan-zhulin* 法苑珠林, for which I do not see any need, because most Chinese texts referring to the date of Kaniska in relation to the Parinirvāṇa of the Buddha do give higher numbers, Song Yun's 300 years being the lowest; cf. Mizutani Shinjō, *Daitō-saiki-ki*, Tokyo 1971: 水谷真成, 大唐西域記, 東京 (中國古典文學大系), 85b f., n. 3.



appeared. The account by Daoyao says: "The boys (hovering) in the air addressed the king with verses (*gāthā*)." Astonished at the boys' (action) the king built a stūpa to shelter (the little stūpa). The stūpa built of dung extended and grew high out (of the king's stūpa), 400 *chi* above the earth – then it stopped. The king broadened the foundation of (his) stūpa to about 300 paces. The account by Daoyao says: "about 390 paces." From there on the constructed tree [= pillar] began to match (the little stūpa). ... After the donation (of the king's stūpa) was accomplished, the dung-stūpa stayed three paces<sup>33</sup> to the south of the large stūpa (in the same way) as at the beginning.<sup>34</sup>

The most extensive version is – as usual – found in Xuan-zang's 'Records of the Western World', *Xiyu-ji* (XJ) 西域記:

'King Kaniṣka, in the fourth century after the Parinirvāṇa of the Tathāgata, ascended the throne and ruled over Jambudvīpa. He did not believe (in the retribution of) wrong and right deeds (and) scorned the Buddha. Once, when he was crossing a grass(-covered) marsh, he saw a white hare. He followed it but when he had almost caught up with it (the hare) disappeared. (Then the king) saw a little shepherd-boy who built a stūpa between the trees, about three *chi* high. The king said: "What are you doing (there)?" The shepherd-boy answered: "Formerly, the Śākya-(muni) Buddha with his sacred wisdom made the following prophecy: There will be a king in this country who will construct a stūpa on this blessed land, collect a lot of my relics and will enclose them in the (stūpa). The great king in his former existences had amassed much merit. (He) has really met (the right) time. Therefore I tell you now (of what the Buddha has said) before." After having spoken (the boy) suddenly disappeared. The king, having heard those words, was more and more delighted (and was) proud that his name was in the great sacred prophecy. So deep faith arose (in him) and he revered

<sup>33</sup> Again, there is no need to follow the emendation to *sanbai-bu* '300 paces' (*Fayuan-zhulin*) made by Wang, *A Record... op. cit.*, p.240, n.183; Faxian and Xuanzang do not give distances but emphasise that the little stūpa was adjacent to the large one.

<sup>34</sup> T 2092, p.1021a25 ff. [details of the construction omitted].

highly the Buddhist Dharma. He built a stūpa of stone around the small stūpa and wanted to close it with force over (the small one). (However,) adapting (its size) exactly (to the large stūpa) the small (stūpa) stood always three *chi* higher (than the large one). Through (continuous) heightening (the stūpa) grew up to 400 *chi*. At the foundation (the stūpa) measured one and a half *li* in circumference. (When the stūpa) had reached five storeys (and every storey was) 150 *chi* high, (the king finally) succeeded in covering the small stūpa. ... When the construction work was finished half of the body of the small stūpa appeared at the southeast corner of the big foundation. The king was displeased and had it destroyed. Thereupon they stopped at the second level of the (large) stūpa, (but) half the small stūpa appeared again at its former place. Then the king refrained (from trying to destroy the small stūpa) and sighed: "It is easy to fault in human matters, (but) divine powers are difficult to resist. How should (I) be annoyed?" After that he repented, resigned and went back to the capital. The two stūpas are still visible to this day.<sup>35</sup>

That this legend was not restricted to the Chinese pilgrims' accounts – creating the possibility that one pilgrim had copied the story from another and eventually embellished it – and to the region of the site of the stūpa proper is shown by the fact that even a Khotanese version with a Sanskrit introduction was found in a manuscript which Paul Pelliot had acquired in Dunhuang 敦煌 (P.2787) and had been translated and published by H.W. Bailey<sup>36</sup>. This version runs almost parallel to that reported by Xuanzang except for the number of boys, being four as in the account by Song Yun. The two accounts probably date from the same time, showing that the legend was known beyond the boundaries of India.

The differences in the three (respectively four) versions are due to a process of extension which I have labelled elsewhere as 'inflating legends' (*Schwelllegende*)<sup>37</sup>, which means that in some

<sup>35</sup> XJ 2, ed. Ji Xianlin et al., *Datang-xiyuji-xiaozhu*, Beijing 1985 季羨林, 大唐西域記校注, 北京, p.238 f.

<sup>36</sup> H.W. Bailey, 'Kaniṣka', in *JRAS* (1942), pp.14-28; the stūpa here is called *phāṇinai sthūpa*, 'stūpa of mud', and Kaniṣka-stūpa (*kaṇai'ska stūpa*).

<sup>37</sup> See my forthcoming translation and study of the GFZ (cf. n.18).



cases we can observe the addition of motives and details to one and the same legend reported in sources – mainly the Chinese pilgrim records but also translations of the legends into languages other than Indian – over the course of a few centuries. In the case of the Kaniṣka-stūpa most of the features of the legends are already there in the oldest version reported by Faxian. However, he does not indicate the material with which the little boy constructed his small stūpa-model. Moreover, since a source like the *Shuijing-zhu* 水經注<sup>38</sup>, the ‘Commentary on the Water Classics’ by Li Daoyuan 酈道元, itself depending heavily on the GFZ and other itineraries and works earlier than the GFZ<sup>40</sup>, does mention the material, it seems unlikely that this theme was not yet part of the legend. Xuanzang’s version relies heavily on Song Yun which becomes even more evident when clear references to Daosheng and Song Yun are made in the biography of Xuanzang in the *Xugaoseng-zhuan* 續高僧傳 (ZGSZ)<sup>41</sup>.

<sup>38</sup> ‘There is also a country Puruṣa(pura). The lord of the gods, Śakra, took the shape of a little cowherd boy, amassed earth and built a Buddha-stūpa. According to it the king of the law (*dharmarāja*: Kaniṣka) made a large stūpa, which is called (one of the) four “Great Stūpas” [?].’ (ed. Wang Guowei, *Shuijing-zhuxiao*, Taipei 1987, p.31 王國維, 水經注校, 台北). Luciano Petech, *Northern India According to the Shui-Ching-Chu*, Rome 1950, p.59, thinks that this passage is an abridged version of Faxian’s account, but this cannot be for two reasons: it differs from the GFZ in the detail of indicating the material and the *Shuijing-zhu* continues with a direct and marked-as-such (法顯傳曰: ...) citation from the GFZ on the Buddha’s alms bowl at Puruṣapura.

<sup>39</sup> Died 527; cf. William H. Nienhauser (ed.), *The Indiana Companion to Traditional Chinese Literature*, Taipei 1988, s.v., p.710 ff.

<sup>40</sup> On these sources, see Petech, *Northern India... op. cit.*, p.4 ff. The passage cited could be a paraphrase from the lost *Shishixiyu-zhi* 釋氏西域志, attributed to the famous Shi Daoan 釋道安, which, after the GFZ, is the main source of the *Shuijing-zhu*.

<sup>41</sup> T 2059, p.448c: ‘To the east of the city, there is the great stūpa of King Jiani (Kaniṣka). The foundation measures one *li* and a half in circumference. In the stūpa is one *hu* of bone-relics (*śarīra*) of the Buddha... This (stūpa) is known in the world as the Queli-stūpa. Empress-Dowager Hu of the North Wei (dynasty) in deep belief despatched the śramaṇa Daosheng and others, gave them a large banner, about 700 *chi* long, to go there and hang it on (the stūpa). This is

Consequently, two main versions of the legend of the stūpa can be discerned: the one found in the MSV which only relates the prediction of the Buddha<sup>42</sup>, and others (Faxian, Sung Yun, Xuanzang) focusing on how the stūpa was actually built by Kaniṣka. To decide which is the original version and which has been changed later, it would be instructive to think about the function of the legend. Why was it important that Kaniṣka built a stūpa<sup>43</sup> (and a vihāra), and why did this have to be foreseen by the Buddha? What is the role of the stūpa, and why did it have to be connected to the episode of the stūpa built of mud by boys or a boy?

To begin with an answer to the first question: building a stūpa was important because this was what the prototype Buddhist ruler

exactly the stūpa (described). It is not possible to give the reason for the name Queli.’ The biography of Xuanzang, the *Datang-Daci'en-si-sanzang-fashi-zhuan* 大唐大慈恩寺三藏法師傳, does not give any further details on the stūpa: ‘8 or 9 *li* outside the city [Puruṣapura], there is a Pipal-tree... Beside it there is another great stūpa, which is the one King Kaniṣka had built’ (T 2035, p.230a).

<sup>42</sup> This is also the version of the legend which was transposed to the famous Indo-Greek king Menandros / Milinda by Kṣemendra, the Kāśmīrian author of the *Avadānakalpalatā*: chapter 57; (*Stūpāvadānam*, ‘Legend of the Stūpas’, cc. P.L. Vaidya, *Avadāna-Kalpalatā of Kṣemendra*, Darbhanga 1959, II, p.341 f., l.28 f.): ‘13. Then the “Well-gone” (*sugata*: the Buddha) with his followers reached the village of Patala and delivered a noble speech on the Law to a householder called Potala. 14. He reached purification through the attainment of the moral commandments accepted by the “Well-gone” and had a stūpa of his (the Buddha’s) hair, nails and small portions of the body erected. 15. The Venerable said to Indra, who had come to see the place: “In this region a king called Milindra will construct a stūpa”.’ Cf. Lamotte, *History... op. cit.*, p.426. This shift from Kaniṣka to Menandros shows how constant and virulent these patterns and clichés of ‘Buddhist rulership’ were: they could even be shifted from a more recent king to a former one.

<sup>43</sup> The importance of constructing a stūpa is also indicated by the episode of Kaniṣka venerating the stūpa of the heretics (*nirgrantha*) in the *Sūtrālaṃkāra / Da-zhuangyan-lunjing* 大莊嚴論經 ascribed to Aśvaghōṣa and translated into Chinese by Kumārajīva: T 201, p.287a22 ff.; see the French trans. by Édouard Huber, *Aśvaghōṣa – Sūtrālaṃkāra*, Paris 1908, p.158 ff.; studies of the text by Entai Tomamatsu, *JA* (1931), pp.135-74, 245-337; Biswanath Bhattacharya, *Aśvaghōṣa: A Critical Study*, Santiketan 1976, pp.167-93.



had done: Aśoka. It is quite clear from the evidence of the legends<sup>44</sup> that Kanīṣka was at least seen by the Buddhists – not referring to what he considered himself – as a second Aśoka<sup>45</sup>. To become a Buddhist cakravartin or a world-ruler<sup>46</sup> he had to act according to the patterns of the Aśoka legend and that is how he is actually described: like Aśoka he first does not follow the Buddhist Dharma, like Aśoka he had a famous Buddhist teacher, the bodhisattva-poet Āśvaghoṣa. Consequently he also had to start his Dharma-reign by doing what Aśoka had done as a cakravartin: by building a stūpa<sup>47</sup>. The difference between the two rulers – at least for the tradition – is that Aśoka erected 84,000 stūpas and Kanīṣka built only a single one<sup>48</sup>, but a great one<sup>49</sup>. That the actual

<sup>44</sup> Unfortunately, no *vita* or partial *vita* of the Kuṣāna king has survived in an Indian language – if there was one at all. All our major sources are in Chinese with some minor ones in Tibetan.

<sup>45</sup> Succeeding rulers of the northwest area (Gandhāra) even claimed him as their ancestor, as can be seen in the report by Wukong: 王即王古爾賦吒王之貴胤也 ('The king [of Gandhāra, called Ruluosa 如羅灑] is a descendent of the ancient king Kanīṣka') (T 2089, p.980a18). A monograph on the history of the legend of Aśoka and its functioning in the relationship between Saṅgha and state or ruler in Buddhist countries in Asia is still a desideratum; the contents of one of the first chapters would certainly have been an investigation of the dependence of the Kanīṣka legend on the Aśoka legend.

<sup>46</sup> For an early reference to Kanīṣka as a world-ruler (*dizhu* 地主 = *kṣitīśvara*) see *Sūtrālamkāra*, T 201, p.272a19 ff.; trans. Huber, *op. cit.*, p.80 ff. The setting in the beginning of this story recalls the legend of the Kanīṣka-stūpa: Kanīṣka being on his way to Kanīṣkapura (*Jinīzha-cheng* 閼尼吒城, originally Puruṣapura?) meets 500 [Buddhist stereotype number] begging boys (*qier* 乞兒) asking for a donation. For a discussion of cakravartin ideas in Kuṣāna art see Giovanni Verardi, 'The Kuṣāna Emperors as Cakravartins – Dynastic Art and Cult in India and Central Asia...' in *East and West* 33 (1983), pp.225-94 (with an appendix by Alessandro Grossato).

<sup>47</sup> It is of some significance that in the Khotanese version of the legend the stūpa is called dharmarājikā, which is the well-known term used by the Aśoka legend (Skt, Divy) for the 84,000 stūpas the Mauryan emperor had built.

<sup>48</sup> In Tāranātha's history the activities of Kanīṣka (*Kanika*) are extended to the building of four temples (originally stūpas?), one in each direction; cf. Lama Chimpa & Alaka Chattopadhyaya, *Tāranātha's History of Buddhism in India*, Delhi 1990, p.131.

Shāh-Jī-Kī Dherī stūpa was really intended to be a symbolic replication of Aśoka's stūpa-building is quite probable, based on the facts that it was important for Kanīṣka to enshrine a relic of the Buddha and that the building is called a dharmarājikā, a name for the stūpas built by Aśoka. The stūpa was, as Song Yun<sup>50</sup> and his co-travellers Huisheng<sup>51</sup> and Faxian inform us, considered the most important and greatest one in the realms of the West.

If it is now clear why it was so important for Kanīṣka to erect a stūpa, one may try to ask the subsequent question concerning the role of the legend. It is evident that the story is an aetiological one: it is intended to explain how Kanīṣka came to build the stūpa. And, to go a step further, it is also possible to show how the story came into existence by arranging patterns again taken from the legend of Aśoka. Both legends belong to the same type of

<sup>49</sup> This is also what the king Kṛkin is said to have done in the age of the Buddha. Kāśyapa: *Stūpa-lakṣaṇa* (ed. G. Roth, 'Edition of the *Stūpa-lakṣaṇa-kārikā-vivecanam* Including the *Prakīṇaka-caitya-lakṣaṇam*' in Bhikkhu Tampalawela Dhammaratana & Bhikkhu Pāsādika (ed.), *Dharmadūta. Mélanges offerts au Vénérable Thich Huyền-Vi*, Paris 1997, p.214, §§ 6, 7): *Vīṃśati-sahasrāyusī-prajāyām Bhagavataḥ Kāśyapasya Kṛkinā rājñā stūpaḥ kṛtaḥ... Cakravarttibhūtena mayā... stūpaḥ kṛtam iti*. Roth (n.51) also refers to a similar passage in the *Mahāvastu* (ed. E. Senart, *Le Mahāvastu*, Paris 1882, I, p.60 ff.) where the cakravartin Dhṛtadhanu is said to have built a stūpa for the Tathāgata Aparajitadhvaja; both passages show that building a stūpa for the Buddha of this period was considered as a characteristic feature of a world-ruler. This is perfectly in line with the instructions of the Buddha in the *Mahāparinirvāṇasūtra* that lay people should be concerned with the worship of the relics in the stūpas, the king being the layman of highest rank; cf. Gustav Roth, 'Symbolism of the Buddhist Stūpa according to the Tibetan version of the *Caitya-vibhāga-vinaya-dhāva-sūtra*, the Sanskrit treatise *Stūpa-lakṣaṇa-kārikā-vivecana*, and a corresponding passage in Kuladatta's *Kṛtyasamgraha*', in Dallapiccola et al., *The stūpa...* *op. cit.*, p.183; it should be mentioned that Roth sees in this text 'the oldest stūpa-reference in the Buddhist Canon, where a kind of symbolism drawn from universal kingship can be clearly recognised.' Which would make the responsibility of a cakravartin for the construction of the stūpa(s) the more understandable.

<sup>50</sup> = Huisheng (see note 51).

<sup>51</sup> T 2087b6 f.: 'This stūpa is considered to be the first in the western regions.'

Buddhist prediction-stories which Strong characterises with the attribute *ex post facto*<sup>52</sup>. The prototype of the prophecy performed by the Buddha about a person who would become a Buddhist king (*dharmarāja*) is certainly found in the so-called *Pāmsupradāna-vadāna*, the 'Avadāna of the Donation of Dirt'<sup>53</sup>, of the *Aśokāvadāna* (Sanskrit) which will be given in the translation by John Strong<sup>54</sup>:

'Soon the Blessed One came to the main road where two little boys were playing at building houses in the dirt'. One of them was the son of a very prominent family and was named Jaya, while the other was the son of a somewhat less prominent family and was named Vijaya. Both of them saw the Buddha whose appearance is very pleasing, his body adorned with the thirty-two marks of the Great Man. And young Jaya, thinking to himself "I will give him some ground meal," threw a handful of

<sup>52</sup> John Strong, *The Legend and Cult of Upagupta. Sanskrit Buddhism in North India and Southeast Asia*, Princeton 1992, repr. Delhi 1994, p.24; these stories differ from the prophecy episodes which stereotypically project the fruit of merit – becoming a Buddha, arhat, etc. – to a far future ahead.

<sup>53</sup> The considerable popularity of the avadāna is shown by the fact that a fragmentary version – unfortunately ending before the episode discussed here begins – is preserved in the Gilgit Buddhist manuscripts (Lokesh Chandra, Raghu Vira, *Gilgit Buddhist Manuscripts* (Facsimile Edition), Part 7, New Delhi 1974, pp.1508-17; cf. the synoptical table on p.5), but also by the various versions found in Buddhist narrative literature and by the depiction in Buddhist art, for which see Leo Both, *Das Kapiśāvadāna und seine Parallelversionen im Piṇḍapātrāvadāna*, Berlin 1995, p.54 ff. There were at least two Chinese texts (translations?) on these events which are now lost but registered in the oldest sūtra-catalogue, *Chu-san-ang-jiji* 出三藏集記, compiled by Sengyou 僧祐 (T 2145, p.25b2 f.): *Ayu-wang-hu-guobao-jing* 阿育王護國經 (Sūtra on King Aśoka preserving his karma) and *Ayu-wang-yu-to-suo-sheng-dajing-xi-jing* 阿育王於佛所生大敬信經 ('Sūtra on the great reverence and belief of King Aśoka in the lifetime of the Buddha').

<sup>54</sup> John Strong, *The Legend of King Aśoka. A Study and Translation of the Aśokavadāna*, Princeton 1983, pp.200 f., and 202 ff. Parts in which the author differs from Strong are given in the notes.

<sup>55</sup> This should rather be rendered as: 'playing with houses made of dirt' which would include the natural translation of the compound *pāmsvāgāraih*.

dirt into the Buddha's begging bowl. Vijaya approved of this by making an añjali. As it is said: He saw the greatly compassionate Self-Existent Lord whose body radiated a halo a fathom wide; his faith affirmed, and with a resolute face, he offered some dirt to the One who brings an end to birth and old age. After presenting this offering to the Blessed One, Jaya then proceeded to make the following wish (*praṇidhāna*): "By this root of good merit, I would become king and, after placing the earth under a single umbrella of sovereignty, I would pay homage to the Blessed Buddha." The compassionate Sage immediately perceived the boy's character, and recognizing the sincerity of his resolve, he saw that the desired fruit would be attained because of his field of merit. He therefore accepted the proffered dirt, and the seed of merit that was to ripen into Aśoka's kingship was planted. The Blessed One then displayed his smile<sup>56</sup> ... The Venerable Ānanda, making an añjali, then said to the Buddha: "Blessed One, it is not without cause nor without reason [that the Tathāgatas display the smile: why therefore has the Blessed One done so?]" And he added this stanza: ... O foremost of men, whose speech is like thunder, whose appearance is like that of the best of bulls, reveal what will be the fruit of the gift of dirt! The Blessed One said: "You are right, Ānanda, completely enlightened Tathāgata Arhats do not display their smile gratuitously; rather they do so for both a cause and a reason. Ānanda, do you see that boy who threw a handful of dirt into the Tathāgata's bowl?" "Yes, Bhadanta." "Because of that meritorious deed, Ānanda, one hundred years after the Tathāgata has attained parinirvāṇa, that boy will become a king named Aśoka in the city of Pāṭaliputra. He will be a righteous dharmarāja, a cakravartin who rules over one of the four continents, and he will distribute my bodily relics far and wide and build eight-four thousand dharmarājikās. This he will undertake for the well being of many people." And he added: After I die there will be an emperor; his name will be Aśoka and his fame widespread. He will adorn Jambudvīpa with

<sup>56</sup> There follows a long description of the Buddha's smile and an explanation of its meaning, which is omitted here because it does not contribute directly to the comparison of the two legends discussed here (on the Buddha's smile, cf. Strong, *The Legend... op. cit.*, p.62 f.).



my reliquaries and cause them to be honored by gods and men. His meritorious gift was just this: he threw a handful of dirt into the Tathāgata's bowl. Then the Blessed One gave all the dirt to the Venerable Ānanda and said: "Mix this with some cowdung and spread it on the walkway (*caṅkrama*) where the Tathāgata walks." And the Venerable Ānanda did as he was told.<sup>57</sup>

The Chinese versions, the *Ayu-wang-zhuan*<sup>58</sup> and the *Ayu-wang-jing*<sup>59</sup>, differ only slightly from the Skt version in that the extensive passage about the smile of the Buddha is omitted<sup>60</sup>.

<sup>57</sup> Divy (ed. E.B. Cowell and R.A. Neill, *The Divyāvadāna. A Collection of Early Buddhist Legends*, Cambridge 1886) p.336; cf. also the edition by Sujitkumar Mukhopadhyaya, *The Aśokāvadāna, Sanskrit Text Compared with Chinese Versions*, Delhi 1963, pp.31 f. and 33 f.

<sup>58</sup> Translated by An Faqin 安法欽 of the Western Jin dynasty (end 3rd cent.); T 2042, p.99b9 ff., *Ben-shitu-yuan* 本施土緣 'Avadāna of the gift of dirt'. Here the two boys are building a whole city (*cheng* 城) with houses (*shezhai* 舍宅) and granaries (*cang* 倉) filled with gruel (*qiu* 糗), all made of dirt. The extension in the Chinese versions (see also below) explaining that the dirt was intended to be rice or grain by the boy seems to be based on practical considerations, explaining why somebody would give dirt as a donation.

<sup>59</sup> Translated by Saṅghabhara (?) / *Sengjiapoluo* 僧伽婆羅 of the Liang dynasty (beginning of 6th cent.); T 2043, p.131c9 ff. Here it is only after having seen the Buddha that little Jaya gives him sand (*sha* 沙) intended to be gruel (*qiu* 糗).

<sup>60</sup> Cf. also the version in the Chinese 'Sūtra of the Wise and the Fool', *Xianyu-jing* 賢愚經 (story no.17: *Ashujia-shitu-pin* 阿輸迦施土品 / \**Aśoka-pāmsupratidāna-parivarta*), T 292, p.368c5 ff., translated by Huijiao 慧覺 (mid-5th cent.): a group of boys is playing in the street forming – as in the *Ayu-wang-zhuan* – granaries and grains of dirt. Seeing the Buddha walking along, the desire arises in one of the boys to donate a handful of dirt-grain. He climbs on the shoulders of one of his comrades and the Buddha receives the donation in his alms-bowl. The Buddha then instructs Ānanda that he should smear the dirt on the wall of his cell in the Jetavana, explaining to him that the boy would become a world-ruler. The story then goes one step further when the Buddha explains the merit of the boy in a former life by serving another Buddha, relativising the function of the donation of dirt. This story was definitely the model for the late Chinese text referred to by Strong, *The Legend... op. cit.*, p.65.

Also, the two Chinese pilgrims Faxian<sup>61</sup> and Xuanzang<sup>62</sup> allude to the story.

Comparing this plot with that of the legend of the Kaṇiṣka-stūpa, at a first glance there seems no connection. This opinion, however, is not quite correct if one analyses both stories in the light of their historical contexts – the *Aśokāvadāna*<sup>63</sup> being certainly en vogue if not composed in the era of Kaṇiṣka – and especially in the light of the 'symbolic semantics' of the stūpa. It should first be kept in mind that the stūpa in India was conceived as an overturned alms-bowl<sup>64</sup>, allowing it to be identified

<sup>61</sup> T 2085, p.863b23 ff.: 'King Aśoka once was a little boy playing in the street. He met the Buddha Śākya(muni) begging for alms. The little boy was delighted and donated to the Buddha a handful of earth. The Buddha accepted it (threw it) back into the dust (and) walked over the ground. As a result of that deed (the boy) became an Iron-Wheel-King and ruled over Jambudvīpa.'

<sup>62</sup> XJ 8, ed. Ji, p.631: 'The Arhat (Upagupta) said: "The great king, by his power of merit, (will) occupy a hundred spirits (*yakṣa*?), by his generous vow, to protect the three treasures (*triratna*) – that is what he has vowed and now is the time (to fulfil) it." Therefore (he told) him extensively that his gift of earth (to the Buddha) was the reason for the Tathāgata's prophecy that he would rebuild (the stūpas).'

<sup>63</sup> This is not necessarily the same version as that found in Divy.; the Chinese versions do already point to the fact that there were differences in details, episodes and wording.

<sup>64</sup> Cf. the remarks by G. Roth in 1. and 2. of his Introduction to his edition of the *Stūpa-lakṣaṇa-kārikā-vivecanam*, pp.205-7. The description of the stūpa conceived as an alms-bowl upside down found in the text edited by Roth are: § 16 (p.217: *pātrākṛtī*) and § 23 (p.219: *tat-pātrākāraṃ śāntikam iti*, 'Its [the stūpa's] form of an alms-bowl (means) calmness'). For the Chinese Vinayas, see Bareau, 'La construction...', *op. cit.*, p.234. There are other vessels (*kumbha*, *ghaṭa*, *kalāśa*, Tib. *bum-pa*) or instruments (*ghaṇṭā* or *gaṇḍī*) with which the dome of the stūpa is compared or denoted. The connection of the donations of dirt and the stūpa was already stressed by Paul Mus, *Barabudur, esquisse d'une histoire du Bouddhisme fondée sur la critique archéologique des textes*, Hanoi 1935, repr. New York 1978, II, p.288 f.; it is finally, in a slightly different context, found as a formula in the supplementary Sanskrit text of the *Mahāpari-nirvāṇasūtra*, with parallels in the *Divyāvadāna* and the *Mūlasarvāstivādin Vinaya*, where it is said that huge amounts of gold do not have the same value

symbolically as the Buddha's presence<sup>65</sup> even when there was no relic enshrined. Exactly this aspect of Buddha-worship by means of a stūpa, seen as an alms-bowl turned upside down, is found in Xuanzang's account in connection with the two merchants Bhallika and Trapuṣa<sup>66</sup>:

'Once, (when) the Tathāgata had (just) attained Buddhahood, he rose (from under) the Bodhi-tree and went to the Deer Park [*mṛgadāva* in Benares]. At that time two merchant-leaders (*śreṣṭhin*) were stricken by the brilliant light, followed it to its origin and finally gave boiled rice (sweetened with) honey to the Buddha. The Honoured One explained the to them the merit (which) men and gods (can achieve) and they were the first ones to ask for the five rules [*śīla* of the layman] and the ten good conducts. After they received the teaching of the Dharma they asked (him to give them something) which they could venerate, and the Tathāgata subsequently gave them his hair and nails. The two merchant-leaders wanted to return to their countries and asked (the Buddha to explain with which) ceremonies (they should) honour (the relics). The Tathāgata spread his *saṅghātī* rectangularly on the ground, then his *uttarasaṅgha*, (then) his *saṃkaksikā*. Further, he turned his alms-bowl upside down, put his staff upright on it, and consequently built a stūpa (of those items). The two accepted these orders (for building a stūpa), returned to their (home-) cities and erected (a monument) of veneration according to the instructions of the Holy One. This was the first stūpa in the period of the Dharma of Śākyā (muni).'<sup>67</sup>

The whole episode of Jaya throwing a handful of dirt into the

of merit as a *pradakṣiṇā* around a stūpa with the relics of the Buddha, as donating a clod of earth (or mud, *mṛttikapiṇḍa*) to the stūpa (Waldschmidt, 'Der Buddha preist...', *op. cit.*, p.424).

<sup>65</sup> For the stūpa as a symbol of the Buddha's presence, see e.g. Roth, 'Symbolism of the Stūpa', *op. cit.*, p.186 f.

<sup>66</sup> On the story of Trapuṣa and Bhallika, see now John Strong, 'Les reliques des cheveux du Bouddha au Shwe Dagon de Rangoon', in *Aséanie, Sciences humaines en Asie du Sud-Est*, Bangkok 1988, 2, p.79 f.

<sup>67</sup> Reported as an insertion in connection with Bactria / *Fuhe-guo* 縛喝國, XI 1, ed. Ji, p.122. The story is not known from other texts.

Buddha's alms-bowl seems to represent the stūpas which he is to build in his future existence as King Aśoka and as a Buddhist cakravartin, the dirt being the material prescribed unanimously by the Chinese Vinaya translations<sup>68</sup> and the bowl indicating the form of the stūpa<sup>69</sup> (see above). The symbolism was adequately put into words by Paul Mus, even if one does not follow his almost transcendently cosmological approach: 'La scène du don de la Terre préfigurait ainsi par tous ses détails la construction du stūpa royal: elle symbolisait le don du monde, mais sous la forme symbolique du don architectural; elle annonçait le stūpa; c'était le symbole d'un symbole.'<sup>70</sup>

In this context the throwing of dirt into the Buddha's bowl – which is explicitly the cause for the Buddha's prediction of Aśoka's building of dharmarājikā-stūpas in the future and his future status as a cakravartin<sup>71</sup> – can be seen as running parallel with the

<sup>68</sup> See Bareau, 'La construction...' *op. cit.*, p.232. The Mahiśāsaka and Dharmaguptaka Vinayas have the Buddha and his followers form the first stūpa by means of balls of dirt which, the Buddha declares, is more precious than gold or jewelry: *ibid.*, p.259 f.

<sup>69</sup> In this context it should be remembered that Jaya intended to donate the dirt as food and it should also be mentioned that the Theravādin and Mūlasarvāstivādin Vinayas prohibited the shaping of food as a stūpa, a rule which presupposes that this could be and actually had been done with the help of a bowl.

<sup>70</sup> Mus, *Barabadur*, *op. cit.*, p.289. By citing Mus – note bene – I do not dismiss Strong's objection against the French scholar's analysis and his own interpretation (*op. cit.*, p.67) of the gift of dirt as bearing 'negative and impure connotations' and the 'ambiguity of the episode'. But in the context of the Kaniska-story the gift of dirt certainly was taken as a symbol of donation given with 'purity of intent' (Strong, *op. cit.*, p.64) and of the great karmic effect of the donor becoming a cakravartin – so strong was this idea that Kaniska trying to construct his stūpa had problems in competing with the stūpa of dirt, as can be seen in the stories of the Chinese pilgrims.

<sup>71</sup> See the interesting statement of the *Stūpa-lakṣaṇa* (ed. Roth, p.210, §3.1): *Dānaṃ prthivī* (trans. Roth: 'The ground [represents] the gift (of a munificent donor)'). Here the ground (*prthivī*) for a stūpa is the first step on the Buddhist way to perfection, beginning with generosity in donations (*dāna*) and ending with the Nirvāṇa. In the context of this equation the first step for Jaya on his way to becoming a future cakravartin, the ruler of the earth (*prthivī*), would



building of a stūpa of mud or dung by the boy, causing Kaniṣka to build his stūpa<sup>72</sup>. The difference is that Kaniṣka has no story of former birth and that is the reason that the handling of dirt had to be transferred to the present time of Kaniṣka – a feature which the MSV takes back by re-transposing the building of the stūpa(s) to the present of the Buddha.

There is, however, one difference which makes it difficult to accept the Aśoka story in the form preserved as a direct model for the Kaniṣka legend. It is the *pranidhāna* of Jaya, the Aśoka-to-be, to become a world-ruler (*cakravartin*). Analysing the *Aśokāvadāna*, hints can be found that there was an older version with a simpler plot, which would eliminate all the illogical parts of the plot. It begins with the fact that there are two boys; only Jaya, the 'victor'<sup>73</sup>, plays a role in the plot, his counterpart, Vijaya, is of inferior origin and shows his secondary position even by his name, being a derivation with the same meaning as the former<sup>74</sup>.

consequently be the donation of earth (*prthivī*); this is exactly the way in which the motive has been taken up in Buddhist narrative literature (see Roth, 'Symbolism of the Stūpa', *op. cit.*, p.54 ff.). This interpretation is in line with the *pranidhi* performed by Jaya according to which the future cakravartin will be 'king of the earth under one parasol' (*ekachatrāyām prthivyām rājā syām*). Even if the construction of stūpas is not mentioned here – the boy could not know what was necessary to become a cakravartin – the terminology (*prthivī*, *chatra*) seems to indicate what the Buddha expresses in his prophecy: to become a dharmarāja / cakravartin, stūpas must be built.

<sup>72</sup> That the versions could be seen as belonging together may be found expressed by the *Saddharmapuṇḍarikasūtra*, Ch.2 (ed. Kern, Nanjio, p.501.11 f.) where the donation or dedication of stūpas made of sand to the Buddha is ascribed to several boys: *sikatāmayān vā puna kūṭu kṛtvā ye kecid uddiṣya jīnāna stūpān; kumārakāḥ krīḍiṣu tatra tatra te sarvā bodhāya abhuṣi lābhinaḥ*

<sup>73</sup> It is quite possible that the conception of Aśoka as a cakravartin influenced the choice of this name standing in close semantic and formal connection with the Buddha's epithet *Jina* also found in the text edited by Roth (see above).

<sup>74</sup> Vijaya may well have been introduced into the story as a kind of reflection of the future Aśoka's two sides, the dichotomy represented in the figure of his brother Viśāśoka, who has to be converted from his belief in heretic teachings to the Buddhist Dharma by Aśoka, or in the early phase of Aśoka's life when he himself was called *Caṇḍāśoka*, 'Aśoka the Fierce'. This dichotomy would have

As John Strong has rightly pointed out, it is a peculiarity of the *Aśokāvadāna* that a vow (*pranidhāna*) is taken not to enter a religious career (monk, arhat, bodhisattva, Buddha) but to become a 'universal monarch' (*cakravartin*)<sup>75</sup>. As one of the inten-

been expressed by *Jaya*, the 'victor' and *Vi-jaya*, the 'loser', the interpretation of the last name not being usual but theoretically possible (see the use of *vi-* in Jakob Wackernagel, Albert Debrunner, *Altindische Grammatik*, Bd II.1, *Einleitung zur Wortlehre-Nominalkomposition*, Göttingen 1957, p.261) and in the context shown by the translation of the names of the boys in the *Ayu-wang-zhuan* (T 2042, p.99b9 f.): 'the first was called "virtue-victory" (*Desheng* 德勝), ... the second was called "non-victory" (*Wusheng* 無勝) ...', and by the glosses in the *Ayu-wang-jung* (T 2043, p. 131c11 f.): '*Sheye* / *Jaya* is translated as "victory" ... *Pisheye* / *Vijaya* is translated as "non-victory" ...'. By the revelations of Piṇḍola Bhāradvāja later in the *Aśokāvadāna* it becomes clear that Vijaya was supposed to be Aśoka's future minister Rādhagupta (see Strong, *The Legend... op. cit.*, p.263), giving him a karmic prospect in the whole plot. That his role was not fixed can be seen in the version of the *Xianyu-jing* (see above), where it is the little boy on whose shoulder Aśoka-to-be is mounting to donate the dirt who will become Aśoka's minister. In texts such as the *Sūtrālamkāra* which only allude to the story, there is never mention of a second person besides Aśoka: '... therefore by (a small donation), in the future uncountable merit is achieved as (was done) by King Aśoka as he gave earth with a pure heart' (T 210, p.280a18 ff.; cf. the Huber trans., p.122).

<sup>75</sup> Strong, *The Legend... op. cit.*, p.61. In the Theravāda tradition it is only the *pranidhāna* that has 'survived', the Buddha being reduced to some Pratyekabuddha (P. *paccekasambuddha*) of the past, Aśoka (P: Asoka) to a honey-trader; cf. Wilhelm Geiger (ed.) *The Mahāvastu*, London 1958 (PTS), p.34, 5.49, trans. *id.*, *The Mahāvamsa or the Great Chronicle of Ceylon*, London 1964 (PTS), I, p.30: 'Now once, in time past, there were three brothers, traders in honey; one was used to sell the honey, two to get the honey. A certain paccekabuddha was sick; and another paccekabuddha, who, for his sake wished for honey, came even then to the city on his usual way for seeking alms... The trader, with believing heart, gave to the buddha who came there a bowlful of honey, so that it ran over the edge. As he saw the honey filling (the bowl) and flowing over the edge, and streaming down to the ground, he, full of faith, wished: "May I, for this gift, come by the undivided sovereignty of Jambudīpa, and may my command reach forth a yojana (upward) into the air and (downward) under the earth... Asoka was he who gave the honey..." Cf. the dis-

tions of the *Aśokāvadāna* seems to be to create a worldly counterpart to the Buddha – in other words: to create from Aśoka what the Buddha did not become because he had chosen the religious path: a morally true king (*dharmarāja*)<sup>76</sup> – it was necessary to give to that individual the same meritorious acts (*puṇyakarman*) and vows (*praṇidhāna*) as to the Buddha. What may be concluded from these observations is that the original pattern of the legend was perhaps void of the *praṇidhāna* and gave only the prediction (*vyākaraṇa*) of the Buddha, as is known from other examples so frequent in Buddhist literature and which can be found, a little distorted, in the prophecy of Kaniṣka in the MSV. That this was really the case can be proved because there is no other (earlier) version of the *Aśokāvadāna* available, but it can be made plausible by that fact the Piṇḍola Bhāradvāja, when he relates the episode to Aśoka, does not mention the *praṇidhāna* but only the prophecy by the Buddha<sup>77</sup>. Finally, the insertion of the *praṇidhāna* scene can be demonstrated by the strange narrative of the story: if the motif of the *praṇidhāna* is eliminated from the plot<sup>78</sup> it not only

cussion of the story by Strong, *op. cit.*, p.66 ff. It is clear from the structure of this legend that it was remodelled, according fabulous patterns: three brothers, the younger (Aśoka) being the virtuous one – the other two scold the younger brother for having given the honey to the Pratyekabuddha –, and substituting the concrete Śākyamuni by Pratyekabuddhas of an undetermined past. And even the Pratyekabuddhas are not behaving like ‘classical’ solitary Pratyekabuddhas: one of them is taking care of the others, a feature which runs contrary to a normal Pratyekabuddha’s behaviour.

<sup>76</sup> Notice that the *Stūpa-lakṣaṇa* text ranks the cakravartin before the arhat (Roth, p.210, [26]): *Arhanta Cakravarttis tu Pratyekaś ca Jino Jinah*.

<sup>77</sup> Divy, p.402.13 ff. (trans, Strong, p.263 f.: ‘Finally, great king, I was right then when, long ago, as a child, you threw a handful of dirt into the bowl of the Blessed One who had come to Rājagṛha for alms, thinking that you would give him some ground meal. Rādhagupta approved of your act, and the Blessed One predicted that one hundred years after his parinirvāṇa, you would become a king named Aśoka in the city of Pāṭaliputra, that you would be a righteous dharmarāja, a cakravartin ruling over one of the four continents, and that you would distribute his reliquaries far and wide and build the eighty-four thousand dharmarājikās.’).

<sup>78</sup> This is supported by the other version in Buddhist literature where no *praṇidhāna* is found.

omits difficulties in the logic of the story, such as the Buddha’s having to realise the future of the boy although Jaya had just announced his *praṇidhāna* with exactly the same content and Ānanda’s having to ask the Buddha to explain the meaning of the donation and the Buddha asking – superfluously – Ānanda if he had seen the boy donating the handful of dirt before performing his prophecy. Moreover, the story becomes smoother and narratively more consistent with the following sequence: boy<sup>79</sup> plays with houses<sup>80</sup> made of dirt – boy offers a donation of dirt to the Buddha – the Buddha smiles and makes his prophecy which is at the same time a kind of karmic reward for the future. The little boy in the Kaniṣka legend could then be interpreted as having been moulded according to the boy Jaya who, supplied with some of the main features of the *Pāṃśupradānāvadāna*, acts as a kind of reminder and messenger of the prophecy (*vyākaraṇa*) by the Buddha, admonishing Kaniṣka to fulfil his duty as a cakravartin: to build a stūpa.

Furthermore, the *Aśokāvadāna* also seems to supply an origin for the fact that the model for the Kaniṣka-stūpa is constructed of dirt in most cases but of manure in the legend reported by Song Yun. The direct connection is the scene in which the Buddha asks Ānanda to mix the earth of Jaya’s donation with cow dung and to scatter it on the path he is walking on. It is not clear what this

<sup>79</sup> It seems that the original version knew only one boy and that this was extended to four, probably under the influence of the conception of the four lokapālas as being connected with every stūpa: cf. *Stūpa-lakṣaṇa* § 3.15 (ed. Roth): *Śrīti-dharma-pravicaya-vīrya-samādhi-sambodhy-aṅgāni catbāro lokapālāḥ* (trans. Roth: ‘The four guardians of the world [represent] the (four) constituents of enlightenment: mindfulness, investigation into Dharma, energy, and concentration’).

<sup>80</sup> Was there a version in which the boy constructed a stūpa instead of houses (*āgarā*)? Cf. the note by Roth, ‘Symbolism of the Stūpa’, *op. cit.*, p. 198, and a Nepalese Skt text where the symbolism of the stūpa or caitya is also used for *kūṭāgāra*, ‘a sacred building with a peaked roof’. At least the construction of little stūpas on the main road (*rājamārga*) would be in partial accordance with the Buddha’s instruction in the MPS to build model stūpas at the crossing of four main roads (*cātummahā-pathe*, see Roth, *loc. cit.*).



theme is meant to express<sup>81</sup>, but if the story was really the model for the Kaniska legend it appears at least plausible that there is an uncertainty as to whether the stūpa was built of dirt or of dung. Finally, there is the possibility that the Skt word for dirt or dust, *pāṃśu*, in the *Aśokāvadāna* was interpreted as manure<sup>82</sup> in the process of making the Kaniska story – the more because cow dung was really part of the story, being mixed with dirt by Ānanda.

The *pāṃśupradāna*, the ‘donation of dirt’, performed by Aśoka into the *pātra* of the Buddha was obviously used in a transformed shape in the Buddhist symbolic scenario connected with Kaniska: the donation of dirt became the building of a stūpa of dirt because in the prophecy by the Buddha this donation was given as the karmic reason for Aśoka’s constructing of the dharmarājikā-stūpas and thereby becoming a cakravartin in the Buddhist sense<sup>83</sup>; seen

<sup>81</sup> This feature recalls the famous story of the Buddha Śākyamuni who in a former life spread his hair for his predecessor Dīpaṃkara, made a vow to become a Buddha in the future and received – as a kind of affirmation – the prediction from Dīpaṃkara which seems to be supported by the fact that the version of the *pāṃśupradāna* in the Nepalese *Pinḍapātravadāna* is actually placed in the lifetime of this Buddha; see Both, *Das Kapiśāvadāna... op. cit.*, p.58, who considers the discrepancy between the donation of dirt and a normal alms-giving as consistent for all versions. Strong – following Mukhopadhyaya – assumes that the manure with which Ānanda mixes the dirt is a symbol for purity. In the framework of the *Aśokāvadāna* the donation of dirt is interpreted by Upagupta as the reason for Aśoka’s ugliness: Divy, p.388 f., trans. Strong, p.234 f.

<sup>82</sup> Cf. Ralph Turner, *A Comparative Dictionary of the Indo-Aryan Languages*, London 1966, p.452b, no.8019, s.v., with the meaning ‘dung, manure’ for both Skt and New Indo-Aryan languages (e.g. Kāśmīrī, Oṛiyā, Hindī) and the reference to *pāṣi* (*op. cit.*, p.459b, no.8139), ‘dry cowdung, manure’. Modern languages and the special meaning ‘fertilizer’ (in O. Böhtlingk, R. Roth, *Sanskrit-Wörterbuch*, St Petersburg 1855-75, IV, p.620, s.v. *pāṃśu* 2) seem to indicate a ‘non-classical’, maybe originally euphemistic meaning ‘dung, manure’ of the word. This may also be supported by the analysis given for *pāṃśu* by Yaska, *Nirukta* 12.19: ... *pannāḥ śerata iti vā...* (‘... or, “fallen down (*pāṃśu*) lies” ...’) which does not really fit the meaning ‘dust, dirt’ but rather on a realistic background to the meaning ‘dung’. Both, *Das Kapiśāvadāna... op. cit.*, p.54, speaks of a ‘*Gemisch aus Lehm, Sand, Kot u.a.*’.

<sup>83</sup> This conceptualisation of Aśoka’s gift of the earth is clearly expressed by the

in the light of the Aśoka legend the constructing of a stūpa of dirt was a clear hint for Kaniska to act like his pre-decessor. It is quite reasonable then to connect the bringing of the Buddha’s alms-bowl to Puruṣapura by the Kuśāna ruler with the same episode of the *Aśokāvadāna* in which the bowl played such an important role.

To go back to the very first question concerning which of the two versions is the original one: in the light of the considerations above it seems clear that the MSV presents us with a secondary type of story in reducing the plot to the lifetime of the Buddha but transferring the theme of the boy’s (or boys’) building of stūpas of mud or manure to a level of narrative time where it makes absolutely no sense, the boy(s) and the motif of mud or manure having nothing to do with Kaniska at all. This transposition and the restriction of the narrative time (lifetime of the Buddha) may well have been influenced by the *Aśokāvadāna* (see above).

One point which still needs to be discussed is the somewhat strange name of the stūpa found first in Song Yun’s account: *Queli-ta* 雀離塔<sup>84</sup>. It would be a marginal point if the name were restricted to that one text, but it occurs in Chinese translations of Buddhist literature before Song Yun’s travel account. The fact

*Sūtrāṣṭkāra*, T 201, p.280a22: ‘(Aśoka) having donated dirt attained the great earth...’

<sup>84</sup> In Kumārajīva’s biography in the *Gaoseng-zhuan* 2 高僧傳 (T 2059, p.19 f.), there is a big monastery in Kuča / Guici 龜茲 called *Queli-dasi* 雀梨大寺 which is called *Queli-daqingsi* 雀離大青寺 in a citation from the lost *Shizhi-xiyu* 釋志西域記 (end 4th cent.) in the *Shuijing-zhu* 2. This monastery is usually brought up in connection with the two monasteries called *Zhaohuli* 昭怛釐 reported by Xuanzang (XJ 1); both words and the name *Queli-ta* for the Kaniska-stūpa were explained by Paul Pelliot to be transcriptions of a Tokharian word such as \**cākri* or *cöguri* (see Tokh. *cakka*, *cuki*, *sakek*) meaning ‘monastery’ (*vihāra*); cf. Mizutani, *Saiiki-ki... op. cit.*, p.15b, n.1. While this theory seems to fit for the Kuča monastery, it does not really explain why a stūpa as famous as the Kaniska-stūpa would be denoted only by a word for monastery. It is, however, possible that the writing *Queli* 雀離 in the *Shuijing-zhu* was a hypercorrected form (by the compiler of the *Shizhi-xiyu*-ji, Daoan 道安, or by Li Daoyuan?) of a name like *Queli* 雀隸 in the *Gaoseng-zhuan* influenced by the knowledge that the Kaniska-stūpa bore the same name. Pelliot’s hypothesis at least makes the point that the name *Queli* was a transcription.

that the *Queli-si*, being certainly the 'monastery of the Queli(-stūpa)', is found in avadāna literature beside such famous places as Grdhrakūṭa, Śrāvastī, translated around the time of Faxian's sojourn in India (between 401 and 405)<sup>85</sup> shows that the name had a certain popularity<sup>86</sup> even some time before and was well-known in the Buddhist world. But what did it mean? The first decision in analysing a Sino-Buddhist name or term has to be that of discerning if it was a transcription or a translation. In most cases this can be determined relatively easily – without enabling us necessarily to solve the subsequent question of meaning – but the example of Queli is and was<sup>87</sup> a puzzling one<sup>88</sup>. It can, however, be solved with the legendary background of the foundation of the

<sup>85</sup> In the *Za-biyu-jing* 雜譬喻經 (T 207, p.522c5) translated or compiled by Daolüe 道略, avadāna no.1, and in the *Zhongjing-zhuan-za-piyu* 眾經撰雜譬喻 (T 208, p.535c4), said to be a compilation by Daolüe after a translation by the famous Kumārajīva, avadāna no.18. For the authorship of the two works, cf. Édouard Chavannes, *Cinq cents contes et apologues extraits du Tripitaka chinois*, Paris 1962, 2, p.1, n.1; Prabodh Chandra Bagchi, *Le canon bouddhique en Chine. Les traducteurs et les traductions*, I, Paris 1927, p.193.

<sup>86</sup> The two collections do not give many concrete place names; the more significant it seems that the *Queli-si* is mentioned, in the case of T 207 even in the first place. This may have something to do with the life of the compiler Daolüe, details of which are not known. The Chinese had, at least, some solid information on Gandhāra, considering the fact that in a passage from the unfortunately lost work *Xiyu-zhi* 西域志, attributed to Shi Daoan and in this case to be placed in the second half of the 4th century, cited in the *Fayuan-zhulin*, a Chinese monastery with a stūpa founded by a Chinese envoy is mentioned in the capital (Puruṣapura) of the region (*Jibin* 罽賓 = Gandhāra): 'In the capital of (Jibin) there is a monastery called "Chinese monastery" (*Han-si*). In the past (when) the Chinese envoy (?) went there, he finally built a stūpa...' (T 212, p.589a2 f.).

<sup>87</sup> Even for the Chinese the name was not clear; see the remark on the name in Xuanzang's biography in XGSZ (cited above).

<sup>88</sup> Cf. the remarks by Thomas Watters, *On Yuan Chwang's Travels in India (A.D. 629-645)*, London 1904-05, repr. Delhi 1976, I, pp.62 f. and 207. See also Wang, *A Record...* op. cit., p.239, n.176: 'The meaning of this renowned stūpa and its exact spelling remain controversial'; Iriya Yoshitaka, *Rakuyō-garan-ki*, Tokyo 1974, 入義高, 洛陽伽藍記, 東京 p.111b, n.71: '... the original phonetic form of the designation Queli is unknown.'

stūpa and with the help of philological spadework.

First, Queli is not a translation<sup>89</sup>: the binomial does not occur as an independent word in Chinese and a tentative translation such as 'the stūpa of the oriole' does not only neglect the second character *li* 離 (lit. 'to leave, to be separate from')<sup>90</sup> but also has no motivating support from outside the name and in connection with the aetiology of the building.

This stands firm despite the fact that Xuanzang and Yijing – the latter definitely depending on the former – report a Queli-stūpa in the precincts of the great monastery of Nālandā and give an aetiological story of the sermon of the Buddha delivered to a heretic brahmin holding a sparrow in his hand – a totally blind motif inserted into the standard theme of the Buddha converting a heretic. From the fact that this story is not known from any other Buddhist source<sup>91</sup> and that the whole context of Xuanzang's and Yijing's report shows features of creating a sacred site<sup>92</sup> of Nālandā, with visits by the Buddha and wonders, it seems possible that the story was reported by Xuanzang. It is remarkable that he does not say anything about the name of the stūpa<sup>93</sup>. Yijing then, probably by the motif of the sparrow, identified it with the *Queli-ta* which he certainly knew from the Chinese sources<sup>94</sup>. Such a mis-

<sup>89</sup> Even Chavannes, *Cinq cents contes...* op. cit., p.122, n.6 (cont. from p.120), although he rendered the name of the stūpa by 'le stūpa du loriot' ('stūpa of the oriole'), says: 'Il ne serait même pas possible que ce nom cachât quelque transcription d'un mot étranger et n'eût point ici le sens de « loriot ».'

<sup>90</sup> See, however, Watters, *On Yuan Chwang's Travels...* op. cit., I, p.62, who takes *li* 離 in the sense of 'small bird, finch', a meaning which I did not find in any dictionary.

<sup>91</sup> Cf. Ji, *Xiyu-jì...*, p.760, n.1; Mizutani, *Saiki-ki*, p.301a, n.5; Watters, *On Yuan Chwang's Travels...* I, p.62, whose 'Indian word... Churi which denotes a small bird like the sparrow' I was not able to verify.

<sup>92</sup> Xuanzang and Yijing speak of several 100 sacred spots around the monastery: 'Around the whole monastery there are several hundred sacred spots of which only two or three can be briefly mentioned.' (XJ 9, ed. Ji, p.758).

<sup>93</sup> *Ibid*, p.760: 'In the east, outside the wall and beside the tank there is the stūpa of the heretic who is holding a sparrow in his hands and asking the Buddha about the matter of life and death.'

<sup>94</sup> 'From there to the south-west there is a little caitya, about 10 *zhang* high;



reported by Xuanzang. It is remarkable that he does not say anything about the name of the stūpa<sup>93</sup>. Yijing then, probably by the motif of the sparrow, identified it with the *Queli-ta* which he certainly knew from the Chinese sources<sup>94</sup>. Such a misinterpretation is not surprising as Yijing had not travelled the northwestern regions and knew this area only by hearsay<sup>95</sup>.

One of the most prominent features of the legend is certainly the stūpa built of mud or dung. The differences between the sources, some mentioning mud, others dung or manure<sup>96</sup>, may be explained by the influence of the Aśoka story, but it seems clear

<sup>93</sup> *Ibid.*, p.760: 'In the east, outside the wall and beside the tank there is the stūpa of the heretic who is holding a sparrow in his hands and asking the Buddha about the matter of life and death.'

<sup>94</sup> 'From there to the south-west there is a little caitya, about 10 *zhang* high; this is the place where a brahmin held a sparrow in his hand and asked (the Buddha); (what) is called Queli-stūpa in the language of the Tang, is exactly this one.' (*Datang-xiyu-qiufa-gaoseng-zhuan* 大唐西域求法高僧傳 (XQGS), cited after the edition by Wang Bangwei, *Datang-xiyu-qiufa-gaoseng-zhuan-xiaozhu*, 'A commented edition of the XQGS', Beijing 1988 王邦維, 大唐西域求法高僧傳校注, 北京, p.115). It should be noticed that Yijing calls the little monument a caitya / *zhidi* 制底, not a stūpa, which was probably the accurate Indian term for it, which may then have caused him to insist that it was exactly this monument of which the Chinese texts speak as *Queli-stūpa*.

<sup>95</sup> Yijing got, for instance, the information about the monk Long(fa) 隆(法) who died in Gandhāra / *Jiantuolu* 健陀羅 through monks coming from the north: 'The dharma-master Long(fa)... reached Gandhāra, was stricken by a severe illness and finally died. That is what was heard from monks coming from the northern regions.' (XQGS, ed. Wang, p.66).

<sup>96</sup> On dung (P. *gomaya*) and mud (P. *pāmsu*) as substances representing good luck, purity, etc., cf. Georg von Simson, 'Etymologie des Mittel ideologischer Auseinandersetzung: Bemerkungen zum Aggaññasutta des Dīghanikāya', in Peter Kosta (ed.), *Studia Indogermanica et Slavica* (Festgabe f. W. Thomas), Munich 1988, p.90 ff. The Khotanese version of the story has a final episode in which Kaniska's religious teacher, the famous Aśvaghōṣa (*Aśagaṣa*), shows his power to his royal pupil by having a Buddha image emanate from a 'ball of clay' (*āyasmīnai painḍai*) (Bailey, 'Kaṇaṣka', *op. cit.*, p.21) – unfortunately the ms. does not contain the end of the episode. An original *pāmsu* could well have been the basis for a change to the word for 'dung, manure' (see above).

that dung was the stronger motif in an aetiological story. That the material of which the stūpa was made was very important in the framework of the legend can be seen from the fact that Song Yun even gives a sub-legend of a brahmin doubting the authenticity of the dung-stūpa<sup>97</sup> insisting somehow on this very feature which would not make any sense if the material were only dirt or dust. The dung-stūpa (in Song Yun's version) then is the cause of the construction of the Kaniska-stūpa and its model. It should therefore not be surprising if a name for this monument would refer to this motif. The reconstructed Middle-Chinese form – following Pulleybank – of *queli* would be \**tsiak-lie*/*li*<sup>98</sup>. A corresponding Sanskrit word with the meaning of 'dirt, mud' or 'dung, manure' would be the heteroclytikon *śakṛt*, which is actually found in the *Mahāvastu*, a text written in a strongly Prākṛtic language, with a beginning palatal: *chaka*<sup>99</sup>. Such a hypothetical form is also reconstructed from the bulk of Indo-Aryan languages<sup>100</sup>. In a north-west Prākṛt-form (Gāndhārī), fitting the geographical setting of the Kaniska-stūpa, the name of the stūpa could well have been \**chakri(ka)*<sup>101</sup>, 'the (little stūpa) made of dung', the

<sup>97</sup> T 2092, p.1021b11 ff.: '(Once there was) a brahmin who did not believe that it was (a stūpa) made of dung and tried to check it with his hand. Therefore he made a hole. And although (the stūpa) was (already) some years old, the dung was not. He (tried) to fill it with incense clay, (but) it did not become full. Today (the stūpa) is protected by a heavenly shrine.'

<sup>98</sup> Pulleybank, *Lexicon... op. cit.*, pp.263 + 188. Other reconstructed systems do not differ enough to falsify the subsequent result: Tōdō Akiyasu, *Kanwa-daijiten* ('Big Chinese-Japanese Dictionary'), Tokyo 1986, 藤堂明保, 漢和大字典, 東京: \**tsiak-li*, pp.1436 + 141; Zhou Fagao et al. (ed.) *A Pronouncing Dictionary of Chinese Characters in Archaic & Ancient Chinese, Mandarin & Cantonese*, Hongkong 1974, \**tsiak-li*, pp.381 (no.10696) + 23 (no.596).

<sup>99</sup> Franklin Edgerton, *Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit Dictionary*, New Haven 1953, repr. Delhi 1970 ff., p.234a, s.v.

<sup>100</sup> Cf. Turner, *A Comparative Dictionary... op. cit.*, no.12241 *śakara*-, and no.12248 *śakṛt*- with reference to the entries no.4951 \**chaka*-, no.4952 \**chakana*-, no.4955 \**chakara*-, all with the meaning 'dung', no.5007 \**chākana*-, no.5008 \**chākara*-, both meaning 'made of dung'. For the change of *ś* and *ch* in Middle Indo-Aryan, see Oskar von Hinüber, *Das ältere Mittelindisch im Überblick*, Vienna 1986, p.93, (§ 167).

<sup>101</sup> The initial *ch*- for *ś*- (see above) seems to be the normal correspondence for

name of the little stūpa – no longer clearly visible – having been transferred to the big one, too<sup>102</sup>. This word-form would correspond perfectly with the reconstructed form of Middle-Chinese<sup>103</sup>, being an alternative name for the famous stūpa of Kaniška-

the 'correct' Skt *ś(akṛt)*, in Gāndhārī we have the example *chada* for Skt *śabda*; see John Brough, *The Gāndhārī Dharmapada*, Oxford 1962, p.101 (par. 50), who explains *ś*: *ch* as 'sandhi-alternate'. For the phonetic representation of *-r-* as *-ri-*, see v. Hinüber, *Das älteste Mittelindisch... op. cit.*, p.80 (§ 126); for examples from the Karakorum inscriptions, cf. Gérard Fussman, 'Les inscriptions Kharoṣṭhi de la plaine de Chilas', in Karl Jettmar (ed.), *Antiquities of Northern Pakistan, Reports and Studies, Vol.I: Rock Inscriptions in the Indus Valley*, Mainz 1989, p.3 f. (Fussmann reconstructed the name *Rāma(kri)ṣā* for *Rāma-kṛṣṇa*) and catalogue entries by v. Hinüber in Martin Benson, Dittē König, *Die felsbildstation Oshibat*, Mainz 1994, pp.43a and 121b (no.10:2 and 56:1 for *ṛṣi*); *ri* for *r* is regularly found in the Central Asian Prākṛt documents, e.g. *kṛita* which would correspond perfectly with the reconstruction of *(śa)kṛt*: *\*(cha)-kṛit*; see Thomas Burrow, *The Language of the Kharoṣṭhi Documents from Chinese Turkestan*, Cambridge 1937, p.2 (§ 5). In proper Gāndhārī *-kṛt* should be *-kid* (cf. Brough, *Gāndhārī Dharmapada... op.cit.*, Index, p.298b). *\*chakrit* could also have been a sanskritised form, where original *r* was rendered *ri*; cf. Jakob Wackernagel, Albert Debrunner, *Altindische Grammatik, Bd. I. Introduction générale par Louis Renou, Lautlehre, Nachträge*, Göttingen 1957, p.31 (par.28), and *Nachträge*, p.19, ad 31, 14. The form reconstructed – with the loss of the final *-t* or the Skt stem (?) – should have been rendered correctly by something like *\*quelijia* 雀離迦 in Chinese but the reduction of trisyllabic Indian nouns to Chinese binomials is quite a common transcription procedure.

<sup>102</sup> Another possibility is that the underlying Indian form was a *vṛddhi* form such as *\*chākri(ka)* in the meaning '(the stūpa) belonging to, originating from the (little) dung(-stūpa)'.

<sup>103</sup> It should be mentioned that transcriptional forms which utilise a final consonant and an initial consonant of a Chinese syllable to represent a consonantal cluster *cluster + liquid* (here: *k + r*) pronounced and written by one Indian syllable / character (*akṣara*) are not very frequent. Examples of the type *\*śaṣṭi* are: *ksatriya*: *chali* / *\*tṣait-lī* 刹利, or *Śāriputra*: *Shelifuluo* / *\*ṣiā-lī-pu* 舍利弗羅 (Pulleybank reconstructions; cf. also W. South Coblin, *A Handbook of Eastern Han Sound Glosses*, Hongkong 1983, p.252, nos 240 and 254); the underlying Prākṛtic forms of the early transcriptional corpus very often give the assimilated cluster or original double consonants (*-kk-*, *-tt-*) in that same structure, e.g. *saṃpatti*: *sanbazi* 三拔致 *\*sam-pat-ti* (Coblin, *ibid.*, p.243, no.48).

*ka*<sup>104</sup> and referring to the aetiological story connected to it. It fits well with the given context that it is only the version by Song Yun that reports this name of the stūpa and its model being constructed of dung. The name happened gradually to fall into oblivion<sup>105</sup> – especially with the legend giving only dirt but no manure (Xuanzang, MSV, p.2787) – but at least the biography of Xuanzang and the *Weishu* 魏書<sup>106</sup> show that the identity of the Kaniška-stūpa and the *Queli-ta* was still known in China for quite a long time<sup>107</sup>.

The story of the stūpa of Kaniška is interesting in showing the various aspects: it shows how, after the construction of a stūpa by a famous Buddhist ruler, the legend about its coming into existence was modelled according to the legend of the most famous stūpa-builder in Buddhist history, Aśoka. In later times, then, the importance of the Kaniška-stūpa was even 'upgraded', connecting its existence with the duration of the Buddhist Dharma<sup>108</sup>.

al.). Unfortunately, the equally structured *sakṛdāgamin* has no representation of the sequence *-kr-* in the corresponding *situohan* 斯陀含 or *xutuohan* 須陀含.

<sup>104</sup> It should be remembered that Faxian did not give the name – a fact which is quite understandable because he does not mention the material, dirt, mud or dung, either. To him the stūpa was explained as Kaniška-stūpa. The same probably happened to Xuanzang. The references to the stūpa after Xuanzang only know of the famous royal founder but not about the legend of the foundation.

<sup>105</sup> In the encyclopaedia *Fozu-tongji* 佛祖統記 by the monk Zhipan 志磐 (mid-13th cent.) the stūpa is only mentioned as the 'Great Stūpa' (*data* 大塔 in Gāndhāra (*Jiantuoluo* 健駄羅: T 2035, p.315a4 f., citing fragments of Xuanzang's biography in the XGSZ).

<sup>106</sup> *Weishu* 102, resp. *Beishi* 北史: see Kuwayama, *The Main Stūpa*, *op.cit.*, p.67.

<sup>107</sup> In the case of Xuanzang's biography it is, of course, not possible to say whether this was information preserved in the circles around Xuanzang, or added by the author of the XGSZ.

<sup>108</sup> XJ 2, ed. Ji, p.243: 'The Tathāgata made a prophecy on this stūpa: if it has burnt down and been reconstructed seven times, the Buddhist Dharma will have vanished everywhere. In wise reports of the past it is said that [the stūpa,] has already burnt down three times. When [Xuanzang] came to that country there had been a big fire just before and [the stūpa] could be seen reconstructed but was not yet finished.' Note that this motif is not found before Xuanzang. An overview on the Buddhist ideas of the decline of the Dharma may be found



(to be concluded)

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## AN OUTLINE OF THE YOGĀCĀRA-VIJÑĀNAVĀDA SCHOOL OF INDIAN BUDDHISM\*

### PART ONE

ERIC CHEETHAM

#### Introduction

This article is concerned with describing the essential teachings of the Yogācāra school in a structured way. The whole substance of this work is drawn from the writings of the founder of the school, Asaṅga, and of his brother, Vasubandhu. In addition, an extensive commentary on one of the earlier works has been used, that of the celebrated scholar-pilgrim, Hsüan-tsang.

Also, in the course of the article, reference will be made to some of the first Mahāyāna sūtras. These are not Yogācāra texts in the strict sense, but as the Yogācāra doctrine is often an expansion of sūtra themes, e.g. the Two Truths, the Great Way to Buddhahood and the *dharmakāya*, the Mahāyāna sūtras need to figure at times.

Two main themes occur throughout this article. One is the incidence of terminology, formulas and basic topics which Yogācāra retained from the earlier Indian Buddhist schools which preceded it and also from some of Śākyamuni's earliest recorded pronouncements.

The other theme will purport to show how Yogācāra further developed the deep (*gambhīra*) Dharma of the first Mahāyāna sūtras further to uncover the real nature of the Mahāyāna message. From that to construct a coherent and accessible system of doctrine and practice to achieve an expressed purpose of those Mahāyāna sūtras – Buddhahood for the Buddha's followers, and

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\* The author acknowledges with appreciation the critical suggestions received from Dr John Powers of the Australian National University, Canberra, during the preparation of this article.

to reveal the true nature of the world (*saṃsāra*).

### ASAṄGA

There seems to be a general consensus among most Buddhist scholars today that Asaṅga was the founder of the Yogācāra-Vijñānavāda (abbrev. Yogācāra) school. He is believed to have lived in parts of North-West India during the fifth century CE. At a later stage in his life he had the co-operation of his younger brother Vasubandhu in the development of the new school.

According to Paramārtha's 'Life of Vasubandhu'<sup>1</sup>, Asaṅga's teachings from Maitreya persuaded him of the authenticity of the Mahāyāna branch of Buddhism and of the special sūtras. Although Asaṅga had long been a monk in the Sarvāstivādin order, his encounter with Maitreya changed his doctrinal outlook and thereafter he became an ardent expositor and protagonist of the early Mahāyāna sūtras.

The tradition recorded by Paramārtha tells us that Asaṅga gained access to the Tuṣṭita heaven because of his mastery of special powers through meditation practice. There he found Maitreya, who answered Asaṅga's longtime puzzlement over the real meaning of *śūnyatā*. The supernatural exposition resolved all Asaṅga's difficulties and provided an advanced degree of enlightenment. The *śūnyatā* explanation he received was the Mahāyāna version of *dharmanairātmya*, as well as *pudgalanairātmya*. Of course, this new radical theme had already been systematised when Nāgārjuna founded the earlier Madhyamaka school.

Also, with the aid of Maitreya's tuition, Asaṅga began to perceive and to develop the characteristic doctrines of the new school of Yogācāra. Among others, one particular early Mahāyāna sūtra received his attention, the *Samdhinirmocanasūtra*<sup>2</sup>, which set out

<sup>1</sup> One of Walpola Rahula's sources in his entry on 'Asaṅga' in *Encyclopaedia of Buddhism* II, 1 (1966), pp.133-46.

<sup>2</sup> E. Lamotte, tr. *L'Explication des Mystères (Samdhinirmocanasūtra)* (= EM), Louvain 1935. [There is an English transl. from the original Tibetan by John Powers, *Wisdom of the Buddha, The Samdhinirmocana Mahāyāna Sūtra*,

several major doctrines associated with Yogācāra. In the course of a long career Asaṅga wrote commentaries on several Mahāyāna sūtras as well as a number of original works, several of which have been used here as source material.

### THE THREE CHARACTERISTICS (*lakṣaṇa*)

Each of our main source books<sup>3</sup> contains a description of the three *lakṣaṇas* (characteristics). Direct quotations will, however, be avoided as much as possible though the footnotes will provide the necessary references. But, of course, the explanations provided will be drawn from, and based upon, the texts indicated.

*Parikalpita* – Generally speaking, this word means: false imaginings, something which is only a figment of the imagination<sup>4</sup>. The word has other connected meanings. As the lowest of the three *lakṣaṇas* it is the most defiled. Consequently, unwarranted imputations are projected on to both 'external' and 'internal' dharmas. Basic to this common realm of existence is the major falsity (in terms of reality) of the bifurcation of subject and object, or of 'self' and 'other'. Another factor is the acceptance of general information about the nature of something and the need of language to communicate about it<sup>5</sup>.

Berkeley 1994, and from the Chinese by John P. Keenan, *The Scripture of the Explication of Underlying Meaning*, Berkeley 2000.]

<sup>3</sup> These are: E. Lamotte, tr., *La Somme du Grand Véhicule d'Asaṅga (Mahāyānasamgraha)* (= SGV), 2 vols, 2nd ed., Louvain 1973 [in the course of transl. into English by S. Boin-Webb; there is an Engl. transl. from the original Chinese by John P. Keenan, *The Summary of the Great Vehicle*, Berkeley 1992]; Wei Tat, *The Doctrine of Mere Consciousness (Ch'eng Wei Shi Lun) [Sanskrit Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi] of Hsüan tsang* (= DMC), Hong Kong 1973; E. Lamotte, EM (cf. n.2.). [There is a further transl. from the Chinese by Francis H. Cook, including the *Triṃśikā*, in *Three Texts on Consciousness Only*, Berkeley 1999, as well as from the Sanskrit in Stefan Anacker, *Seven Works of Vasubandhu*, Delhi 1984]

<sup>4</sup> F. Edgerton, *Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit Dictionary* (=BHSD), 1<sup>st</sup> Indian ed., Delhi 1970, pp.320-1.

<sup>5</sup> EM, Ch. VI, section 3.

Vasubandhu indicates that various mental objects arise due to karmic propensity. Imaginary notions are attached to these. In fact, these false attributions have no real nature<sup>6</sup>. *Parikalpita-lakṣaṇa* can thus be generally characterised as sensory or mental objects imagined as real and conceived in terms of self and others. All of it is therefore deceptive and illusory. In Yogācāra terms this applies to the whole everyday world of people, places, ideas and events.

*Paratantra*. – The second of the characteristics is *paratantra-lakṣaṇa*. The Yogācāra texts describe this in similar ways. Production due to causes<sup>7</sup>, or, in more detail, whatever is dependent on others, discriminations produced by causes and conditions<sup>8</sup>. This can be interpreted as referring to the formula of dependent arising (*pratītyasamutpāda*), in other words, the operation of the conditioned dharmas (*saṃskṛtadharma*).

Ordinarily the operation of the dharmas is obscured by the dominant worldly features of *parikalpita*. A proportion of the practice schemes of early Indian Buddhist schools was aimed specifically at bringing dharma perception within. This was in order to accentuate the effects of employing the four right efforts (*samyakpradhāna*) in weakening the activity of defiled (*akuśala*) dharmas and strengthening the presence of undefiled/good (*kuśala*) dharmas. And this, if successful, led the way to acquiring insight-knowledge (*prajñā*) in mainstream Hīnayāna. In Mahāyāna and in Yogācāra it was arrived at through *prajñāpāramitā*, which is a much more enhanced and somewhat differently orientated version.

*Pariniṣpanna*. – This is the third *lakṣaṇa*, sometimes called ‘own nature’ (*svabhāva*). Simply stated, it is ultimate reality. The BHSD gives it several meanings: completely perfected, arrived at the supreme goal, nature based on knowledge of absolute truth<sup>9</sup>.

<sup>6</sup> Vasubandhu’s *Triṃśikā*, vv.19-20. quoted in DMC, p.cxxxiii.

<sup>7</sup> EM, Ch. VI, section 3.

<sup>8</sup> *Triṃśikā*, v.25 quoted in DMC, p.cxxxiii, and BHSD, p.318.

<sup>9</sup> BHSD, pp.325-6.

Vasubandhu’s *Triṃśikā* and Hsüan-tsang’s *Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi* have more detailed descriptions. It is perfected knowledge, or *prajñā*, which sees into the suchness (*tathatā*) of things, perceiving them as they really are<sup>10</sup>. More explicitly, *pariniṣpanna* is the ‘complete and perfect nature of all dharmas which is revealed by the two emptinesses (*śūnyatā*)’<sup>11</sup>. The name *pariniṣpanna* is also given to the purified form of *paratantra*, but it is eternally free from *parikalpita*-nature or false imagination and illusion<sup>12</sup>. It can thus be inferred that this ultimate reality has to do with the true nature (*dharmatā*) of dharmas and with the perfected *prajñā* of their emptiness (*śūnyatā*), sometimes referred to as ‘purity’ (*anāsrava*)<sup>13</sup>.

Finally, we are told in the *Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi*<sup>14</sup> that all three natures or characteristics (*svabhāvalakṣaṇa*) are inseparable from mind/mentals (*citta*) and their associates (*caitta*). These mentals (*citta*) conditioned and perfumed by false nature of self and others are really deceptive and they obscure the totally dependent and impermanent nature (*paratantra*) of the dharmas, the basic constituents. But this too is not completely perfected. Only *pariniṣpanna* reveals the real emptiness of all dharmas and dissipates the wrong view of subject and object. The text concludes: ‘These three natures are all inseparable from mind etc. (*citta, caitta*)’<sup>15</sup>.

#### THE EIGHT CONSCIOUSNESSES IN YOGĀCĀRA

One of Yogācāra’s important innovations was to add two more consciousnesses to the already existing six. The original six go back

<sup>10</sup> DMC, pp.623-4.

<sup>11</sup> *Ibid.*, p.633.

<sup>12</sup> *Ibid.*, p.635.

<sup>13</sup> L. de La Vallée Poussin, tr. *L’Abhidharmakośa de Vasubandhu* (= *Kośa*), 6 vols, repr. Brussels 1980 [English transl. by Leo M. Pruden, *Abhidharmakośa-bhāṣyam*, 4 vols, Berkeley 1988-90], Ch.2, p.309, gives the basic view of ‘pure’ and ‘impure’ related to dharmas.

<sup>14</sup> DMC, p.637.

<sup>15</sup> *Ibid.*



to the Buddha's recorded words in the old Pāli texts on the eighteen *dhātus*. Śākyamuni explained that the All is just six triads of eye, visibles and visual consciousness dependently arising. And so on for hearing, smell, taste, touch and the mentals. The particular consciousnesses connected with each of these sensory and mental faculties are the six consciousnesses as part of the eighteen *dhātu* scheme<sup>16</sup>. Because each of the *dhātus* is a dharma or a collection of dharmas this formula represents the world and its beings.

*Manas*, the seventh consciousness – *Manas* is the first addition made by Yogācāra to the original formula of six consciousnesses as part of the *dhātu* scheme. It is placed in the sixth of the triads, alongside *manodhātu*, the mental organ element, and in certain aspects substitutes for it. According to the textual definitions *manas* is a dharma but it has multiple functions and associates. Primarily it has two functions. It can cogitate and reflect upon its objects<sup>17</sup>. This object is constantly supposed to be the *ātman*. When it is transformed (*parāvṛtti*), however, it can cognise absence of self (*nairātmya*)<sup>18</sup>.

In its normal condition *manas* has four particular features: self delusion (*ātma-moha*) – self belief (*ātma-dṛṣṭi*) – self conceit (*ātma-māna*) – self regard (*ātma-sneha*)<sup>19</sup>.

These four, in their turn, produce various defiled associates (all *upakliṣṭadharmaś*) and because of this constantly enhanced combination become an obstacle to the practice of the Way. Such a centre, controlling forms of thought and cognition, is doubtless the reason why *manas* is the location of the idea of 'self' and 'me'.

As already indicated, however, *manas* is capable of transformation and refinement. This can result from fundamental Buddhist practices plus special Mahāyāna practices (more of this anon). But it seems to occur in the upper reaches of the bodhi-

sattva stages and leads on to one of the end goals, full and perfect knowledge (*sarvajñāna*). This implies a considerable degree of preparation for full implementation. In Yogācāra terms, however, the disturbed and restricted state of *manas* in its defiled state is the general condition of everyone.

From this textual information *manas* can be generally described as a mental focus and an intellectual faculty producing responses, decisions and judgements based on data supplied by the first six consciousnesses and mental objects. All this takes place within a particular dharma stream (*pudgala, dharmasamāna*), but the same process occurs in every 'person'.

*Ālayavijñāna* (store consciousness). – The most important addition that Yogācāra made in the set of consciousnesses was the eighth, the store consciousness.

It should be noted that this eighth consciousness does not appear in the element of the eighteen *dhātu* scheme of all the dharmas<sup>20</sup>. Thus it is something special needing much explanation. Our textual sources provided this in abundant measure<sup>21</sup>.

Vasubandhu's verse is concise when he says that this *ālayavijñāna* is also called retribution consciousness (*vipākavijñāna*) and seed-carrier consciousness (*sarvabījakavijñāna*)<sup>22</sup>. Furthermore, according to its main title, *ālayavijñāna*, it is the receptacle consciousness because it receives and retains all the traces (*vāsanā*) of every dharma activity. These deposits are seeds (*bīja*) which remain in the *ālayavijñāna* as potential causes until their eventual fruition<sup>23</sup>.

*Ālayavijñāna* is the generative cause of all dharmas arising because its seeds (*bīja*) produce dharmas as and when conditions are favourable. Thus it is the medium of karmic actuation and so is

<sup>16</sup> *Saṃyutta-nikāya* IV, 14 and 32.

<sup>17</sup> *Triṃśikā*, quoted in DMC, p.287.

<sup>18</sup> DMC, p.287.

<sup>19</sup> *Ibid.*, p.289.

<sup>20</sup> A diagram of the eighteen *dhātus* will follow in Part Two.

<sup>21</sup> EM, DMC and SGV.

<sup>22</sup> *Triṃśikā*, v.2b, quoted in DMC, p.103.

<sup>23</sup> DMC, p.105.

also called *vipākajñāna*<sup>24</sup>.

The *ālayavijñāna* itself is said to be regarded by *manas* as the 'inner self'. As such, the *ālayavijñāna* is grasped by *manas* in the same way that *manas* grasps everything else<sup>25</sup>.

Asaṅga makes a point emphatically in a new direction. He writes that dharmas arise due to the *pratītyasamutpāda*, the twelve-linked chain of dependent arising. The twelve links distribute pleasure and pain. They also determine the existences in good or bad destinies (*sugatidurgati*)<sup>26</sup>. Asaṅga then concludes: the *ālayavijñāna* is a retribution consciousness provided with all the seeds (*sarvabījakavipākavijñāna*) which produce the *pratītyasamutpāda* and so all the existences in the triple world and all destinies arise from this consciousness<sup>27</sup>.

All these processes, actions producing seeds, seeds producing actions, show the *ālayavijñāna* to be a universal and unending conscious 'atmosphere' in which everything lives and dies according to karmic seed production and fruition. The *Mahāyānasamgraha* expresses this in difficult language. Asaṅga says that all defiled (*samkleśika*) dharmas lodge (*asmin ālijante*) in the *ālayavijñāna* as fruit (*phalabhāvana*) and the *ālayavijñāna* is present in these dharmas in the form of causes (*hetubhāvena*)<sup>28</sup>. Furthermore, it is described as being like a violent torrent proceeding with all the seeds. This has not been revealed before, the Buddha is said to explain, because the *ālayavijñāna* is profound and subtle beyond the understanding of the uninstructed and foolish<sup>29</sup>.

On this textual evidence it can be said that the store consciousness is a stream of continuous consciousness of universal dimensions. The seed elements (*bīja*) stored in it are forever being activated into dharmas which by their actions and associations

<sup>24</sup> SGV, p.32.

<sup>25</sup> DMC, p.105.

<sup>26</sup> SGV, p.37.

<sup>27</sup> *Ibid.*, pp.37-9.

<sup>28</sup> *Ibid.*, pp.12-13.

<sup>29</sup> *Ibid.*, p.14, quoting the *Samdhinirmocana* V, 7.

produce patterns and constructions of both 'internal' and 'external' composites. All this produces the beings, worldly perceptions and the responses to perceptions, of Saṃsāra.

This profound penetration to the *ālayavijñāna* gives rise, in Yogācāra, to a further significant doctrine, the teaching of *vijñaptimātratā*, with a literal meaning of 'mere notional projections', sometimes referred to as 'representation only'. This has two main meanings. First, that all perceptions of 'externals' are the result of seeds and dharmas arising from the store consciousness (*ālayavijñāna*), so that all sensory perception is mind-produced and has no independent existence. The *Mahāyānasamgraha* quotes the *Daśabhūmikasūtra*, saying '... in the Three Worlds there is nothing but mind (*citta*)...' <sup>30</sup>. Hsüan-tsang himself says: 'The word "mere" (*mātra*) does not deny dharmas so long as they are inseparable from consciousness...' <sup>31</sup>.

The second main meaning has to do with the ultimately false bifurcation of subject and object, sometimes given as *ātman* and dharmas. From this false apprehension arise all the defilements connected with grasping and selfhood. Vasubandhu's verses are terse as usual. He says that when no idea of object is considered this is the state of *vijñaptimātratā*, in which the apprehension of each object and the act of apprehension are absent<sup>32</sup>.

The actual apprehension of *vijñaptimātratā* is not a matter of reasoning or acceptance of scripture. Asaṅga tells us in detail how this 'higher knowledge' is gained. It becomes accessible in one of the more advanced stages of the bodhisattva process and results from training in the special insights concerning the nature of mental processes.

In fact, *vijñaptimātratā* or mere notional projections, as a penetration into a part of suchness (*tathatā*), occurs in the bodhisattva stage of *darsanamārga*, where deep insight examination of

<sup>30</sup> DMC, p.507.

<sup>31</sup> *Ibid.*, p.505.

<sup>32</sup> *Triṃśikā*, v.28, quoted in *Ibid.*, p.xxxvii.

mental and external objects reveals the true nature (*dharmatā*)<sup>33</sup>. Asaṅga tells us that at this stage the bodhisattva uses four examinations to realise that objects are simply mental words and the names of these objects are conceptual only<sup>34</sup>. This is the actual full knowledge of *vijñaptimātratā* and, when gained, all ideas of self and others are dissipated because inner and outer no longer obtain, all is mind-made.

The indication here is that within the defiled realm of *parikalpita*, i.e., most of the time, whatever is attributed to conscious experience has little to do with what is actually there. For *vijñaptimātratā*, externals and internals are simply names and concepts, part of *śūnyatā*.

#### *Bījas* (seeds, potentialities)

It has been seen above that the *ālayavijñāna* carries all the seeds (*sarvabījaka*). These seeds (*bīja*), or potentialities, are deposited by past actions of the stream and each of them will engender a particular dharma when the conditions are appropriate<sup>35</sup>. The seeds are like dharmas, part of a cluster and series which resides in the *ālayavijñāna*. Unlike dharmas, they are not momentary. They can persist for aeons or moments, depending upon the presence of suitable conditions, i.e., existing dharmas, for them to fructify as a retributive cause<sup>36</sup>.

In fact, the *bījas* are the Yogācāra medium for the transmission of karmic retribution, because the qualities deposited at their inception are retained and when the *bījas* engender a new dharma the results of these qualities are injected into that particular dharma. The moment that is done the *bīja* disappears.

The combined result of the process is an unending cycle. The *Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi* summarises that *bījas* engender consciousness. This engendered consciousness creates and deposits/

<sup>33</sup> SGV, p.155, plus Hsüan-tsang's commentary.

<sup>34</sup> *Ibid.*, p.161, plus Hsüan-tsang's commentary.

<sup>35</sup> DMC, pp.127 and 169; also Triṃśikā, vv.18,19, quoted in *ibid.*, p.xxxiii.

<sup>36</sup> *Ibid.*, p.81.

influences new *bījas*. *Bījas* thus created and increased by this imprinting (*vāsanā*) influence the engendered consciousness. The process evolves in a reciprocal cycle in the manner of cause and effect<sup>37</sup>.

For the inhabitants of the *parikalpita* realm all, or most, of these arising seeds will be of the defiled (*klista*) variety. But because they all derive from past actions some of these may have been deposited by Dharma practice in past existences. Consequently, some seeds could be outflows of insight-knowledge (*prajñā*). They too will surface when conditions are suitable. So any present Dharma practice could well be augmented by exercise in the distant past. Or, as one might say, one may have inherent capabilities only realised under certain circumstances.

Seeds (*bīja*) are not special to Yogācāra, although their *modus operandi* certainly is. The question is asked by the Sarvāstivādins in the *Abhidharmakośa*, 'What is meant by "seed" (*bīja*)?' The answer given by Vasubandhu is that it is the five *skandhas* capable of producing a fruit by means of *pariṇāma*<sup>38</sup>. The latter is defined as the evolution of the series (*samtāna*) to the point when the necessary fruit comes into existence.

In this context of Buddhist schools prior to Yogācāra the *bīja* seems to serve the same purpose. It is the medium of transmitting karmic effects, i.e. retribution (*vipāka*). Here it operates in a linear dimension by evolution of the elements of the stream of consciousness (*dharmasamtāna*). For Yogācāra, however, the seed (*bīja*) is deposited in the *ālayavijñāna*, which retains it outside the evolving stream until that particular stream produces conditions suitable for the seed to engender the dharma fruit.

#### *Vāsanā* (deposit, influence)

Closely connected with the *ālayavijñāna* and the *bījas* is another important Yogācāra doctrine. This is *vāsanā*, which has several meanings as noted above. It also has two main functions; the first

<sup>37</sup> *Ibid.*, p.135.

<sup>38</sup> *Kośa*, Ch.2, p.185.



has already been mentioned in connection with the seeds (*bīja*). *Vāsanā* concerns the traces or impressions deposited in the *ālayavijñāna* by every active dharma, i.e., every thought, word and deed of conscious beings. By this deposit or trace a seed (*bīja*) is delivered into the custody of the *ālayavijñāna*. This seed carries the potentiality of a later result imbued with the karmic quality of the original act, or dharma. This is the first of the functions of *vāsanā*. Such a seed, in company with many others, remains in the *ālayavijñāna* indefinitely until appropriate conditions obtain in the active world which would allow the seed to deliver its full potentiality by engendering a particular dharma as a retribution (*vipāka*) for the past actions<sup>39</sup>.

The second function of *vāsanā* is its capacity to influence (increase or diminish) previously deposited seeds in the *ālayavijñāna*. Such influence (*vāsanā*) is thus capable of augmenting or weakening seeds or clusters of seeds already held in the *ālayavijñāna* for future emergence as dharmas.

This influence, sometimes rendered as perfuming, can of course be of either a good or bad variety. Activity of a bad or depraved kind can be sustained or dispersed by the impact of appropriate actions and their outflow of influence<sup>40</sup>. The constant resurgence of the passions is actually brought about by relevant seeds and the ongoing sustenance by similar *vāsanā*<sup>41</sup>. In this way the seeds (*bīja*), following further influence (*vāsanā*), combine within the *ālayavijñāna* to project the karmic results into a future existence. This occurs when suitable conditions, already existing, stimulate and encourage the seed clusters, reinforced by *vāsanā*, to emerge and engender new dharmas.

Such a karmic procedure of action and reaction, of short or long duration, has consequences for all the practice systems of Buddhist teaching, both mainstream and Mahāyāna. Asaṅga elaborates on this in his explanations of the special Mahāyāna and

Yogācāra forms of practice to be described here later. Asaṅga sets out the recommended methods as being based upon and drawn from the sūtra texts themselves<sup>42</sup>. The special topics of the Mahāyāna deep-teaching sūtras have to be assimilated, pondered upon and absorbed by hearing (*śrutā*), or by reading them in such a way that seeds and future impregnation is channelled into and stored within the *ālayavijñāna*. This is called *śrutavāsanābīja* and Asaṅga states that deposits of this kind are also the seed of the *dharmakāya*, the real body of the Buddha<sup>43</sup>.

From what the text explains later it seems to be the case that if some seeds are 'cultivated' by right practice they will grow into the *dharmakāya* itself, i.e. into full enlightenment. Asaṅga describes one of the main procedures which can produce this result. The texts and topics (the contents of the Mahāyāna sūtras) contain deep Dharma and insight-knowledge. These need to be accessed by close attention to them and allowing the impregnation of hearing (*śrutavāsanā*) to saturate the mental series. Correct reflection (*yonīśomanaskāra*) on the words and their import gives access to unfettered knowledge (*nirvikalpakajñāna*)<sup>44</sup>. This is part of the special practices of the bodhisattva process leading to Buddha-hood. In this manner *vāsanā*, *bīja* and the *ālayavijñāna* all have a practice dimension when allied to the *gambhīra* Dharma of the early Mahāyāna sūtras.

As with the seeds (*bīja*) the idea and function of *vāsanā* are not a Yogācāra innovation. Vasubandhu, writing about the teaching of the Sarvāstivādins and others, says that *bhāvanā* perfumes and impregnates thought. Thus *bhāvanā*, or recalling and cultivating, is the equivalent of *vāsanā*<sup>45</sup>. As well as this similarity of usage, the Sarvāstivādins had another special term which prefigures the Yogācāra use of *vāsanā*. This term is *upacita*, or accumulated act, i.e., an action reinforced by deliberate further approval<sup>46</sup>. With

<sup>42</sup> SGV, p.3.

<sup>43</sup> *Ibid.*, p.68.

<sup>44</sup> *Ibid.*, pp.68, 161.

<sup>45</sup> *Kośa*, Ch.2, p.157; Ch 4, pp.248-9.

<sup>46</sup> *Ibid.*, Ch.4, p.242.

<sup>39</sup> *Triṃśikā*, vv.18,19, quoted in DMC, p.cxxxiii, also p.109.

<sup>40</sup> *Ibid.*, p.135.

<sup>41</sup> *Ibid.*, pp.581-5.

more technical precision this is a dharma-element followed by other dharmas of approval and, lacking any regret, thereby increases the retribution (*vipāka*) of the first dharma.

This procedure is almost identical to the effects of *vāsanā* on the *bījas*. The difference in Yogācāra is that this takes place in the *ālayavijñāna*, and not in the *dharmasamānā*. Here is one indication of the origin of this particular process.

### The triple gnosis (*śruta, cinto, bhāvanā*)<sup>47</sup>

The Yogācāra elaboration and combination of the *ālayavijñāna*, *bīja* and *vāsanā* set down markers for the right practice necessary to fulfil the basic goal of all Mahāyāna: Buddhahood, or full enlightenment. This goal is often expressed in the early Mahāyāna sūtras, especially the Lotus (*Saddharmapuṇḍarikasūtra*), the *Vimalakīrtinirdeśa* and the *Sūramgamasamādhisūtra*. Such right practice is generally known as the stages of the bodhisattva path. Yogācāra was mainly responsible for providing the detailed sequence of these practices contained in the whole extent of the bodhisattva path or process.

One of these is *bahuśruta*, literally meaning ‘much hearing’, but in this context meaning well-versed and well-acquainted with the content of the sūtras. *Bahuśruta* is also an umbrella term covering several other special teaching formulas. One of these is the title of this section. But *bahuśruta* needs to be presented first so that the intended purpose of the others can be perceived.

The basic notion of *bahuśruta* was well-known in pre-Buddhist times. It was then understood as referring to one who was learned and well-versed in the Vedas<sup>48</sup>. In the earliest Buddhist records Ānanda is portrayed as the highest example of Buddhist erudition in that he can recall all the teachings he had heard<sup>49</sup>. For early Mahāyāna, Ānanda was completely surpassed by the great bodhisattva Mañjuśrī, who could recall and expound all the teachings of

every Buddha, not just Śākyamuni<sup>50</sup>. Asaṅga is explicit on the Yogācāra application of this word. He says that the bodhisattva perfumes his mental states (*cittasamānā*) by much hearing (*bahuśruta*) of the Mahāyāna teaching. He reiterates the point by saying that these mental states (*cittacittasamānā*) are perfumed by much hearing (*bahuśruta*) of the texts and topics of the Mahāyāna<sup>51</sup>.

The primary formula associated with *bahuśruta* is the so-called triple gnosis of hearing or reading Mahāyāna topics (*śruta*), considering and pondering them (*cinto*) and meditative contemplation of all this (*bhāvanā*). As with several other key terms already mentioned, this formula was well known to the early Buddhist schools, particularly the Sarvāstivāda. Vasubandhu describes all three elements in his *Abhidharmakośa*. He describes *śruta* thus, ‘... a certainty which proceeds by means of knowledge called the speech of a qualified person’<sup>52</sup>. *Cinto* is given as, ‘... the certainty born from internal examination’<sup>53</sup>. The third factor, *bhāvanā*, is rendered as, ‘... a certainty born from meditation ... so that the specific marks of all three are established’<sup>54</sup>.

Even before the time of the *Abhidharmakośa* some early Pāli suttas proclaim the same theme as the Buddha’s word. Thus we have the Buddha’s admonition to his monks that they should listen to the suttas attentively so as to understand, recite and master them<sup>55</sup>. The *Aṅguttara* is more specific and comes close to the tripe gnosis above. It recommended listening to, reflecting upon and understanding the inner meaning<sup>56</sup>.

<sup>50</sup> E. Lamotte, tr. *Sūramgamasamādhisūtra, The Concentration of Heroic Progress*, Engl. transl. by S. Boin-Webb, Richmond/London 1998, p.208 ff and n.278.

<sup>51</sup> SGV, pp.154-5, 159.

<sup>52</sup> *Kośa*, Ch.6, p.143.

<sup>53</sup> *Ibid.*, pp.143-4.

<sup>54</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>55</sup> *Samyutta-nikāya* II, 267.

<sup>56</sup> *Aṅguttara-nikāya* V, 26.

<sup>47</sup> G. Tucci, *Minor Buddhist Texts*, Part II, Rome 1958, p.160.

<sup>48</sup> M. Monier-Williams, *A Sanskrit-English Dictionary*, repr. Delhi 1981, p.726.

<sup>49</sup> *Aṅguttara-nikāya* II, pp.28-9.

Yogācāra inherited all this as common practice. Asaṅga puts the whole procedure in its wider context. He tells us that the sūtras teach Dharma meaning while the Vinaya puts it all into action. The aim is to liberate from Saṃsāra and that is done by *vāsanā*. This influence or impregnation is achieved by *śruta*, *cinta* and, in place of the usual *bhāvanā*, Asaṅga gives us '... by cultivating tranquillity (*śamatha*) there is calming, and through insight (*vipaśyanā*) there is penetration'<sup>57</sup>.

Further on in the same text Asaṅga expands on this by saying that the *vāsanā* necessary for enlightenment arises from the Dharma heard from the sūtras and received and understood correctly. These deposits (seeds) are carried forward by the retribution-consciousness (*vipākavijñāna*)<sup>58</sup>. The reason for the replacement of *bhāvanā* in the old triple formula is not stated. One possible reason may be the prominence given to *śamatha* and *vipaśyanā* in the *Samdhinirmocanasūtra*.

This sūtra was highly regarded by early Yogācāra and the text devotes a whole chapter to a detailed exposition of the various processes involved in these practices<sup>59</sup>. It also defines the triple gnosis but substitutes *śamatha* and *vipaśyanā* for *bhāvanā* as the third factor<sup>60</sup>. Because of the extensive instructions given in the *Samdhinirmocanasūtra* and because of the usual contextual pattern of close and progressive attention to the contents of the Mahāyāna scriptures (and earlier Canons), Asaṅga may well have followed its example.

Whatever the reasons for the change they must have been strong to warrant altering such a well-established formula. At least part of the reason can be found in *śamatha* and *vipaśyanā* themselves. Not only does the *Samdhinirmocanasūtra* deal in considerable detail with *śamatha* and *vipaśyanā* (the third part of the triple formula), it also sets out clearly what it is all for. The

<sup>57</sup> SGV, p.3.

<sup>58</sup> *Ibid.*, pp.67-8.

<sup>59</sup> EM, Ch.8, sections 1-35.

<sup>60</sup> *Ibid.*, section 24.

opening of Chapter 8 has the Buddha listing the twelve subdivisions of the Canon from sūtras through birth stories and exploits (*avadāna*) to instructions and explanations (*upadeśa*). The text continues that all this is listened to attentively. Recollecting extracts all this is reflected upon and persistently recalled. The result is said to be a bodily and mental attitude called *śamatha*, or calm tranquillity<sup>61</sup>. Moving to *vipaśyanā*, the text tells us that once having gained the calm of *śamatha* a penetrating examination of the Dharma extracts follows. This consists of perceived images in interior concentration which arise from what has been heard and recollected. These are subjected to investigation, examination, a survey and a judgement which is called *vipaśyanā* or penetrating insight<sup>62</sup>.

The purpose is reiterated further on in the text. Here it says that *śamatha* and *vipaśyanā* should be based on the Dharma in conformity with the teachings already received and adopted<sup>63</sup>. The *Samdhinirmocanasūtra* continues to analyse the various types and groups of these practices and their topics. Later, it tells us of the expected progression of this formulation of the triple gnosis<sup>64</sup>.

This sūtra again presents the third factor of the triple gnosis (*śruta*, *cinta*, *bhāvanā*) as the pair of *śamatha* and *vipaśyanā*. It also reminds us that only this pair is capable of penetrating the meaning and intention of the text in question. *Śruta* and *cinta* contribute to 'deliverance' but cannot, on their own, reach it<sup>65</sup>.

All of this indicates the basic purpose of these special practices. In effect, the necessity of 'much hearing' (of the textual topics of Mahāyāna) called *bahuśruta* is brought about by the triple gnosis of *śruta* and *cinta* and completed by *śamatha* and *vipaśyanā*. Here we have one of the principle Yogācāra practice methods. A method which is a constant requirement throughout the process of

<sup>61</sup> *Ibid.*, Ch.8, Nos 2 and 3.

<sup>62</sup> *Ibid.*, No.4.

<sup>63</sup> *Ibid.*, No.2.

<sup>64</sup> *Ibid.*, No.24.

<sup>65</sup> *Ibid.*



the bodhisattva stages (*bhūmi*). The combination of *bahuśruta* and the triple gnosis is based upon and employs the co-ordination of the *ālayavijñāna*, the *bījas* and *vāsanā* in a practice manner adaptable to all capabilities. And it is aimed at the realisation of the deep (*gambhīra*) teaching of the Mahāyāna sūtras and the subsequent explanation of them. Eventually, by means of the bodhisattva process (which uses this technique) the ultimate goal, also presented in the Mahāyāna texts, is brought within reach, i.e., full and perfect enlightenment.

At a much less elevated level the meaning of the word *bahuśruta* and its associated methods of the triple gnosis was expanded from earlier times by early Mahāyāna and Yogācāra. It was intended to convey a being or beings, well acquainted with Mahāyāna sūtra contents and motivated to pursue deep Dharma. This word also implies a stream of consciousness (*dharmasamāntāna*), impregnated (*vāṣita*) with, and saturated by, Dharma assimilation from past existences. These propensities were accompanied by good roots produced by long-term engagement in right conduct and general outlook conducive to appreciating the content of the Mahāyāna sūtras.

#### THE THREE TURNINGS OF THE DHARMA WHEEL

Now that some of the main topics of Yogācāra have been presented, one of the matters with which this article is concerned can be addressed. This, as mentioned in the introduction, is the theme that Yogācāra preserved and made use of a number of technical terms and topics which were part of the corpus of early Indian Buddhist doctrine well before the Mahāyāna appeared on the scene as a distinct teaching. The importance of this feature, if it can be shown, is that it would help to illustrate that Yogācāra, with Madhyamaka before it, is firmly linked to the doctrines and practices of the first Indian Buddhist schools and in some cases to the original itself. The situation can be likened to a kind of evolution. Although the later forms are dissimilar in certain respects, they contain features or elements which point clearly to their parentage and to their part in a long development.

This picture is set out in a particular way by one of the early,

Mahāyāna sūtras, the *Samdhinirmocanasūtra*<sup>66</sup>. In this text the special teaching of the three turnings of the Wheel of the Dharma is explained. The first turning was at Vāranaṣī, where the Buddha pronounced the Four Noble Truths (*caturāryasatya*) and other original formulas. This so-called Śrāvaka teaching is said to have been insufficiently explained and gave rise to some controversy. As a result of this the Mahāyāna was enunciated, in particular the doctrine of *dharmanairātmya*, i.e., all dharmas are without own-nature (*sarvadharmaniḥsvabhāva*). This was the second turning of the Wheel.

This too was considered as open to criticism and insufficiently explicit. So the Wheel was turned for the third time. Now the teaching of *śūnyatā* was explicit for both the Śrāvaka and the Mahāyāna. In this third exposition the text says it is unsurpassed, has an explicit meaning and causes no controversy<sup>67</sup>.

What this does, amongst other things, is to show that the Dharma, as an expressed teaching, is capable of development and a deeper, more precise meaning. This is just what Yogācāra perceived and revealed, and in this way Yogācāra can be regarded as the third turning of the Wheel. It is certainly true that Yogācāra followed on as a further teaching, requiring some knowledge of the earlier corpus for its own right comprehension.

Some of the evidence for this can be seen in the special terminology used here to set out the main doctrine of Yogācāra. For example, the *ālayavijñāna*, perhaps the fundamental Yogācāra teaching: at first sight the descriptions of the *ālayavijñāna* may be disconcerting to anyone familiar with the earlier mainstream teaching, even for some early Mahāyānists. But it has to be noted that a very similar theme formed part of the doctrine held by the mainstream Mahāsāṃghika school. They called it the root consciousness (*mūlavijñāna*) and it was spoken of as a 'hidden' teaching in much the same way as it is presented in the *Samdhinirmocanasūtra*, where the Buddha stated that the *ālayavijñāna*

<sup>66</sup> *Ibid.*, Ch. 29, 31.

<sup>67</sup> *Ibid.*, section 30.

'... is not revealed to the uninstructed'. The wording used by Professor A. Bareau deserves to be partly quoted to appreciate the similarity:

'There is a root-consciousness (*mūlavijñāna*) which serves as support for the eye-consciousness and the other sense consciousnesses, just as the root of the tree is the basis for the leaves ...'<sup>68</sup>

Whatever the date of origin of the Mahāsāṃghika school it was certainly well before Yogācāra appeared, and this Mahāsāṃghika school undoubtedly formed part of the mainstream branches of Indian Buddhism.

The next terminological linkage is the seeds (*bīja*). It has already been shown in previous pages that this term was used by the Sarvāstivādin school, as recorded in the *Abhidharmakośa*. Also, its actual usage by the Sarvāstivādins is very similar to its purpose in the Yogācāra scheme, i.e., as the carrier of karmic results into the future. Here we have another case of Yogācāra reaching back into an early mainstream Hīnayāna school's teaching to gain the basis for its own version.

Both *vāsanā* and *bahuśruta*, already presented earlier, are further examples of terminological linking between Yogācāra and the mainstream body of terminology. *Vāsanā* was part of the Sarvāstivādin technical terminology and it is defined in the *Abhidharmakośa* as the equivalent of *bhāvanā*<sup>69</sup>. The meaning is also very similar, as something that influences and impregnates the mental series. But Yogācāra applied this, not to the mental series, but to the *ālayavijñāna*.

For *bahuśruta* there is a similar correspondence. This term was known and used from the earliest days of the Indian Saṃgha as referring to a monk who was well-versed in the canonical texts and who could recall them. In early Mahāyāna the word retained this meaning, except that the great bodhisattvas could both recall

<sup>68</sup> A. Bareau, *Les Sectes bouddhiques du Petit Véhicule*, Paris/Saigon 1955, p.72 (my translation).

<sup>69</sup> *Kośa*, Ch.4, p.248.

much more and express more deeply<sup>70</sup>. Even more expansion in application took place in Yogācāra. Here the word *bahuśruta* was closely connected with Yogācāra usage of *bīja* and *vāsanā* to mean someone who has applied themselves both deeply and positively to the contents of the Mahāyāna sūtras and śāstras with the effect that a permanent and transforming impression is made on their mental series. This, in its turn, advances that person (*pudgala*) towards and along the bodhisattva process.

There are more linking features needing a place at this point, although they have not yet been presented in detail. They are the eighteen *dhātus* and the dharma elements. Both will be set out in Yogācāra terms below. Now, these need to be discussed briefly and set alongside the other terminology linking Yogācāra with the earlier Indian Buddhist schools and in some cases with the recorded words of the Buddha himself.

First, the eighteen *dhātus* (realms and domains) have been specified by the Buddha as the all or everything<sup>71</sup>. These eighteen domains are the five senses, their respective realms, plus their respective consciousnesses, as well as the mental organ and consciousness and its mental objects (see eighteen *dhātus* diagram in Part Two).

This major formula is basic to all the early mainstream schools and had to be known and understood. It is also fundamental to Yogācāra, which accepted it and employed it as central to the Yogācāra system. Asaṅga, in fact, used the formula as the overall framework for his version of the dharma scheme<sup>72</sup>, of which more anon. Thus Yogācāra employed this fundamental formula (with certain additions and interpretations) going back to the recorded words of the Buddha and the Canons of most, if not all, of the mainstream schools.

<sup>70</sup> *Śūtraṃgamasaṃādhisūtra* trans., *op.cit.*, p.208.

<sup>71</sup> *Samyutta-nikāya* IV, 14 and 32.

<sup>72</sup> *The Compendium of the Higher Teaching (Philosophy) by Asaṅga (Abhidharmasaṃuccaya)*, Engl. transl. by S Boin-Webb from the French of Walpola Rahula, Fremont 2001, pp.23 ff.

It is a similar, if rather more complicated, story with the dharmas. The details of the particular Yogācāra dharma system will be set out in later pages. At this point it needs to be shown how Yogācāra inherited the original dharma scheme, which had been elaborated in the Abhidharma texts. Perhaps the most significant item in the records of the Buddha's words on dharmas is to be found in *Dhammapada* I, which has the Pāli text of the first verse: '*Manopubbāṅgama dhammā*' etc., given as 'Mind precedes all mental states'<sup>73</sup>.

Another example is found in the *Aṅguttara*: 'Whether or not the Holy Ones appear in the world, the essential nature of things pertaining to things (*dharmāṇāṃ dharmatā*) remains stable'<sup>74</sup>.

More examples of this major topic will be given here later. Suffice to say that a good proportion of the theses of the Sarvāstivādins concerns dharmas and *citta* and the Sarvāstivādins are one of the first separately identified schools of Indian Buddhism. Other mainstream schools disagree on the quality and substance of dharmas, e.g., the Bahuśrutas, Lokottaravādins, Andhakas and Prajñaptivādins<sup>75</sup>.

Furthermore, that great compendium of mainstream Hīnayāna doctrine, the *Abhidharmakośa* by Vasubandhu, devotes significant parts of Chapters 2 and 4 to defining dharmas.

Yogācāra also had a dharma scheme of its own, as we shall see, which was derived from the earlier systems of the mainstream Hīnayāna schools, particularly the Sarvāstivāda. This is confirmed when the two detailed lists are compared<sup>76</sup>. Of the 100 dharmas

<sup>73</sup> Translated by Ven. Buddhārakkhita, Kandy 1996, p.23.

<sup>74</sup> From E. Lamotte's *History of Indian Buddhism*, tr. S. Boin-Webb, Louvain-la-Neuve 1988, p.25 and n.25, quoting *Aṅguttara-nikāya* I, p.126, and *Visuddhimagga*, p.518

<sup>75</sup> Cf. Bareau, *Les Sectes bouddhiques ...*, *op. cit.*, for analysis and appendages.

<sup>76</sup> J. Takakusu, *The Essentials of Buddhist Philosophy*, Honolulu 1947. Dharma sheets at pp.72 and 94. N.B. some items of the Hossō sheet have been amended here (in the following pages) in the light of Asaṅga's own listing in the

listed for Hossō, i.e., the Japanese form of Yogācāra, over sixty are common to both Sarvāstivāda and Yogācāra. The rest are specific Yogācāra additions to the old scheme. Not only that, but many of the definitions of the dharmas in common use are virtually unchanged by Yogācāra. That is not to say that the Yogācārins just adopted the old dharma system. Far from it. Their additions to it and their basic reinterpretation of the whole system shows that the Yogācāra scheme was substantially developed from the previous dharma teachings.

All of these examples of change and evolution of the earlier scheme of dharmas serve as an illustration of the topic of the three turnings of the Dharma Wheel.

The teaching of the three turnings of the Dharma Wheel has been described at the beginning of this section. In effect, it sets out a three-stage progression of main teaching topics. These develop the earliest formulas, i.e., the Four Noble Truths, into the Mahāyāna form of *śūnyatā*. Furthermore, there is a development between the second and third turns of the Wheel which involves a more explicit exposition of *śūnyatā* for all the Buddha's followers, both Hīnayāna and Mahāyāna<sup>77</sup>. Such a progression is evident in each of the six examples given above (*ālayavijñāna*, *bīja*, *vāsanā*, *bahuśruta*, eighteen *dhātus* and the dharmas). Each of these originated in the earliest Buddhist teachings and each of them was revised and reformulated in the Yogācāra system – they represent a direct linkage with the early Buddhist schools and to some of Sākyamuni's own recorded words. They are some of the first phase doctrinal topics and special terms taken up by Yogācāra. More of the same are spread throughout Asaṅga's own works, especially the *Mahāyānasamgraha* and the *Abhidharmasamuccaya*.

In the *Mahāyānasamgraha*, as an example, in the Introduction (*prastāvāna*), the Abhidharma is discussed. In Chapter III Saṃsāra and Nirvāṇa feature, as well as the five *mārgas*. Chapter V

*Abhidharmasamuccaya*. See also lists in the appendices to this article (Part Two).

<sup>77</sup> EM, XXX and XXXI.



focuses on *śīla*, *citta* and *prajñā*. And in Chapter X the five *skandhas* appear and there is an exposition of the Buddha's attributes<sup>78</sup>. All these topics figure prominently in the earlier Dharma teachings. Here, however, they are all reorientated and expanded to conform to the Yogācāra system.

In the light of this, it is possible to see Yogācāra as a further teaching, going deeper and more explicitly into the original doctrines. Just as suggested in the *Samādhinirmocanasūtra*, in fact, a pattern of a very ancient practice may also be seen here. The *Vimalakīrtinirdeśasūtra* has an early section in which Vimalakīrti questions the arhat Mahākātyāyana on his practice of explaining in detail some of the Buddha's brief sayings<sup>79</sup>. In a sense, early Mahāyāna and Yogācāra follow this same practice in a rather more expanded manner, and developed in depth. Thus it can be said that Yogācāra, by retaining and developing the ancient teachings and terminologies, demonstrates its ancestry. In so doing it shows how it is firmly linked to and is part of the evolution of Indian Buddhism as a whole.

(To be concluded)

<sup>78</sup> SGV.

<sup>79</sup> E. Lamotte, tr., *The Teaching of Vimalakīrti (Vimalakīrtinirdeśa)*, Engl. transl. by S. Boin, London 1976, p.63 and n.50, with Pāli references.

Translated from the Chinese Version by  
Thích Huyền-Vi and Bhikkhu Pāsādika  
in collaboration with Sara Boin-Webb

Twelfth Fascicle

Part 21

(The Triple Gem)

9. 1' Thus have I heard. At one time the Buddha was staying in Śrāvastī, at Jetṭ's Grove, in Anāthapiṇḍada's Park. Then, in time, many bhikṣus put on their [outer] robes and took up their alms-bowls [in order to] enter the city to beg for alms-food. Now the following occurred to that group of bhikṣus: At this time it is still [too] early for us to enter the city and beg for alms-food. Now all of us could go to the whereabouts of the adherents of other teachings (*an-yatīrthya*) and brahmin [ascetics]. – So all of them went to the place where [the followers] of other teachings and brahmin [ascetics] were. Having arrived, they exchanged friendly greetings<sup>2</sup> [with them] and sat down at one side. Then the brahmin [ascetics] asked the [Buddhist] śramaṇas: The hermit<sup>3</sup> Gautama always deals with sense-pleasures, forms, feelings and perception.<sup>4</sup> How does he differ from [us when] he deals with these [topics]? What we deal with likewise is what the ascetic [Gautama] treats, and what he treats likewise is what we deal with. The teaching he sets forth and the teaching we set forth are identical; his instructions and our instructions are the same. – When that group of bhikṣus had heard this statement, they rose from their seats and left together without any good or bad words, [but] thinking: We should go to the Exalted One and ask him about the meaning of this [statement].

After their [almsround and] meal, that group of bhikṣus went to the place where the Exalted One was. On their arrival they bowed down their heads at his feet and sat down at one side. They told the Exalted One what they had been asked by the brahmin [ascetics]

1 See T2, 604c7 ff.; Hayashi, p. 198 ff.

2 Lit.: 'they enquired after each other'.

3 See Soothill, p. 416a (道士, *mārgapuruṣa*).

4 The Pāli parallel (for references see below, n. 14 ) has *kāmānaṃ... rū-pānaṃ... vedanānaṃ pariñāṇaṃ paññāpeti*.

whose statement] occasioned [their – the bhikṣus' – uncertainty] to persist. – When you are asked this question by [adherents of] other [teachings and] brahmin [ascetics], the Exalted One said to the bhikṣus, you should reply to them in this way (*prakāra*), viz. with a [counter-]question: As for sense- pleasures, what is enjoying (*āsvāda*) them like and what is their wretchedness (*ādīnava*) [because of which] they should be given up (*√tyaj*)? As for forms,... as for feelings<sup>5</sup>, what is enjoying them like and what is their wretchedness [because of which desire for them] should be given up? – When you reply to the brahmin [ascetics] with a [counter-] question thus formulated, they will fall silent and make no reply [on their part]. However, should there be anyone who has something to say, he will be unable to explain this [matter] in a profound way. [The followers of other teachings] will be all the more confused (*sam-√muh*) and at their [wits'] end; for this is not their field (*viśaya*). To be sure, O bhikṣus, I tell [you that] there is nobody [in the world with its] Māra, Māra gods, Śakra and Brahmā, the four World-Guardians, [with its] śramaṇas and brahmins, human and non-human beings who could explain this [matter] in a profound way except (T2, 605a) the Tathāgata, the Fully Enlightened One, [anyone among] the many noble [disciples] of the Tathāgata [or] anybody who has received my teaching.

As for sense-pleasures, what is enjoying them like? There are the so-called five sense- pleasures. Which are the five? When the eye sees forms eye-consciousness is caused to arise [, followed by] excessive fondness (*bhakti*) [for forms], ever-present in mankind [and giving it] complete satisfaction (*paritoṣa*). When the ear hears sounds, the nose smells scents, the tongue recognises flavours and when tangibles<sup>6</sup> are felt with the body [the respective kinds of consciousness are] caused to arise [, followed by] excessive fondness [for the respective sense-objects], ever-present in mankind [and giving it] complete satisfaction. Now when on account of these five

5 Whilst above in the EĀ text four topics are mentioned, viz. three tallying with those of the Pāli parallel and additionally 'perception', in this place *saṃjñā* is omitted.

6 Cf. BSR 20, 2 (2003), p. 206, n. 7.

sense-pleasures [one's] mind experiences pleasure and pain<sup>7</sup>, this is called enjoyment of sense-pleasures.

As for sense-pleasures, what is their wretchedness? Now there is a son of good family who – for his livelihood – trains to become proficient in many a field: either in farming or writing or [public] service or calculating or pretension to empowerment<sup>8</sup> or engraving or courier service or royal service. He does not avoid [exposing] his body to heat and cold, [and in his] training he works hard and zealously, [taking great] pains and without sparing himself<sup>9</sup>. Becoming rich and making a fortune by taking so much trouble – that is great wretchedness for the sake of sense- pleasures. In this world all suffering is due to the attachment (*sneha*)<sup>10</sup> to and desire (*abhidhyā*) for them.

[If], however, that son of good family works so hard but does not gain any wealth, he worries too much and his suffering is indescribable. [In this situation] he thinks to himself: I have achieved something that deserves praise; I have applied all methods and carried out all plans, and yet I earn no money. If one compares [the performance] with its [outcome], one should think of giving up. – This points to the desirability of giving up sense-pleasures.

Furthermore, while carrying out his plans, that son of good family may earn money; and with that earned money he may, in an intelligent manner, undertake a big [project]. Continually he is on his guard for fear that the king might order [his property] to be confiscated, that thieves might secretly steal it, water might sweep it away [or] that fire might consume it. It, moreover, occurs to him: [If I] try circumspectly to hide [my money] in a [secret] storeroom, [I will] be apprehensive about its future loss. [If I] want to invest [my money in the hope of making] a profit, [I will] be apprehensive about the risks; or a wicked son will grow up in my family and [eventually] squander my property. – On account of [all] this sense-pleasures [taken to require possessions as a prerequisite] create sheer distress<sup>11</sup>. All this

7 Lit.: *duḥkhasukhacitta* against the Pāli *sukhaṃ somanassaṃ*.

8 I.e. 權詐. Could this be a sarcastic allusion to the profession of a lawyer?

9 Lit.: 'not at his own pleasure'.

10 Cf. BSR 19, 1 (2002), p. 54, n. 17.

11 I.e. 大患. Cf. Karashima, p. 185: 患惱, 'distress, suffering'.

[suffering] is due to (*pratītya*) and has its roots (*mūla*) in sense-pleasures which cause this havoc (*apakṣāla, vikāra*).

Now although that son of good family always concerns himself with safeguarding his money, after some time it is confiscated by the king, thieves rob him of it, it is swept away by water, it is consumed by fire, it is hidden in a storeroom and thereafter its [whereabouts] are uncertain, it is made good use of [by way of] investment [for the sake of high] returns, but without getting any, [or] a wicked son growing up in his house [eventually] squanders his money [so that] of a considerable fortune not even a fraction is left.<sup>12</sup> Consequently he worries too much and suffers, beating his breast and wailing: The money I had earned before has gone now, it is lost. – Accordingly, he is thrown into confusion and becomes mentally deranged. This is the meaning of [what has just been said, viz.] sense-pleasures create sheer distress. [All] this [suffering] is due to and has its roots in sense-pleasures so that one does not attain the Unconditioned (*asaṃskṛta*).

Furthermore, due to sense-pleasures and being rooted in them, [adversaries] put on armour and attack each other. In doing so, they face units of [war] elephants, of the cavalry, infantry or war chariots. On seeing the cavalry, the [war] elephants, the war chariots or infantry they charge at them. They put each other to the sword or shoot each other dead; with lances and battleaxes they cause blood and gore. As sense-pleasures are related to this [blood and gore], they create sheer distress which is due to and has its roots in them, causing this havoc. Moreover, due to sense-pleasures and being rooted in them, [adversaries] launch fierce attacks either on city gates or on its ramparts, putting each other to the sword, shooting each other dead, piercing each other with their lances, knocking down [and cutting off] each other's heads with iron discs or killing each other with molten iron. [As a result of all this,] they suffer too much and die in huge numbers. Accordingly, those who enjoy sense-pleasures are subject to impermanence. Everybody [one day] meets his end (*ni-vṛt*), [being subject to] transformation (*pariṇāma*) without there being any [real] standstill. Being in the grip of sense-pleas-

12 Lit.: 'of a very large figure [he] does not get one'.

ures and [therefore] being subject to impermanence and transformation, this is what is called sense-pleasures creating sheer distress.

How should one give up sense-pleasures? When someone succeeds in practising the overcoming of sensuous greed (*kāma-rāga*), this is called their renunciation. The so-called śramaṇas and brahmin [ascetics] who do not know of sense-pleasures as entailing sheer distress, also do not know where to begin [in order to] give them up. [Those] śramaṇas and brahmin [ascetics] do not really know of the deportment (*īryāpatha*) pertaining to them; they are not [real] śramaṇas and brahmin [ascetics] and are unable to give rise to their realising [the ultimate goal] and perfect mastery over themselves<sup>13</sup>. The śramaṇas and brahmin [ascetics] who perfectly know of sense-pleasures as entailing sheer distress, are capable of really and unpretentiously giving them up. They know of the deportment pertaining to śramaṇas and brahmin [ascetics]. They have given [rise] to their realising [the ultimate goal] and perfect mastery over themselves. This is what is meant by giving up sense-pleasures...<sup>14</sup>

### Addendum to EĀ XVI

At BSR 11, 1 (1994), pp. 54-62, a translation of the EĀ version of the story of King Māṇḍhātṛ is given. Mention should be made of D. Schlingloff, *King Mandhatar's Rise and Fall*, Interpretation of the Bagh Painting Based on the Line drawings in J. Marshall, *The Bagh Caves*, 1927, and the Identification of M. Zin in *East and West* 51 (2001), Munich 2003. This brochure also contains a comprehensive bibliography (literary versions of the Mandhatar story, Pāli and Sanskrit texts, Chinese and Tibetan translations). Many thanks are due to Prof. Schlingloff for offprints of his publications.

13 I.e. 自遊戲; cf. Soothill, p. 414b: 遊戲 - *vikṛīḍita*; see also BHSD, p. 482: '*vikṛīḍita* something like *easy mastery... perfect mastery*'.

14 Cf. M I, p. 83 ff. (*Mahādukkhakkhandhasutta*); I.B. Horner, *The Middle Length Sayings* I (PTS), London 1954, p. 110 ff. ('Greater Discourse on the Stems of Anguish'); Bh. Nāṇamoli, Bh. Bodhi, *The Middle Length Discourses of the Buddha*, Boston 1995, p. 179 ff. ('The Greater Discourse on the Mass of Suffering'). The present EĀ discourse has two more parallels, viz. at T1, 584c ff. (No. 26, MĀ, sūtra No. 99) and T1, 846 ff. (No. 53, separate sūtra). Thanks are due to Dr Anālayo for kindly having made available his study of the *Mahādukkhakkhandha Sutta*, being part of his comprehensive comparative study of the Pāli Nikāyas vis-à-vis the Chinese Āgamas in preparation.



## OBITUARY

RIA KLOPPENBORG (8 March 1945 – 4 October 2003)

It is with deep regret that we record the passing of the distinguished occupant of the Chair of Asian Religions at the University of Utrecht. Born with the imposing nomenclature Maria Anna Gertruida Theresia Kloppenborg, Ria (as she was affectionately known) read Sanskrit, Pāli, Tibetan and the cultural and political history of South and South-East Asia at Utrecht under Jan Gonda and at Leiden under David Seyfort Ruegg. She obtained her doctorate for a pioneer study of Buddhist asceticism which was published as *The Paccekabuddha* (Leiden 1974; abridged ed., BPS, Kandy 1983) which included a translation of the Khaggavisāṇa Sutta accompanied by relevant passages from the canonical commentary to the Sutta-Nipāta. Appointed Associate Professor in 1970, she also taught Indian Religions at Tilburg Technical University (1977-79) and in 1979 was invited to occupy the additional post of Associate Professor in the Department of South Asian Languages and Culture at Groningen, teaching Sanskrit, Pāli, Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit and Cultural History. In 1988, at Utrecht, she was promoted to full Professor of Asian Religions and the Science of Religion, responsible for not just the classical languages involved but for the wider fields of Buddhism, Hinduism and Comparative Religion.

Ernst Waldschmidt's edited Sanskrit text of the Catuspariṣat-sūtra was translated by Ria as *The Sūtra on the Foundation of the Buddhist Order* (Leiden 1973) as was the Sanskrit text of the Bodhicaryāvatāra under the title *De Weg tot het Inzicht* (Amsterdam 1980). Selections from two canonical Pāli texts in translation later appeared as *De verzen van de theri. Uitspraken van bevrijde vrouwen uit het vroege Boeddhisme* (Nieuwkerk aan de IJssel 1998) – expanded as *Theratherigatha. Verzen van monniken en nonnen. Uitspraken van bevrijde mannen en vrouwen in het vroege boeddhisme* (*ibid.* 2000). Her many miscellaneous writings included 'Theravāda Buddhism in Nepal' (*Kailash* V, 1977; repr.

in *The Young Buddhist*, 1983), 'Some Reflexions on the Study of Sinhalese Buddhism' (*Official and Popular Religion*, ed. P.H. Vrijhof and J.Waardenburg, The Hague 1979), 'Ascetic Movements in the History of Theravada Buddhism' (*The Young Buddhist*, 1981), 'The Place of Maitreya in Early and Theravāda Buddhism and the Conditions for Rebirth in his Time' (*Proceedings of the 30th International Congress of Human Sciences in Asia and North Africa*, ed. G. de la Lama, Mexico 1982), 'The Earliest Buddhist Ritual of Ordination' (*Selected Studies on Ritual in the Indian Religions. Essays to D.J.Hoens*, ed. Ria Kloppenborg, Leiden 1983), 'Visualizations in Buddhist Meditation' (*Effigies Dei. Essays on the History of Religions*, ed. D.van der Plas, Leiden 1987), *De Leraar van der wereld, trainer van mensen* (Utrecht 1988), 'The Buddha's Redefinition of Tapas (Ascetic Practice)' (*Buddhist Studies Review* 7, 1990), 'Het Boeddhisme' (*Wereldgodsdiensten in Nederland*, ed. J. Slomp, Amersfoort 1991), 'Boeddhisme' (*Religieuze Bewegingen in Nederland* 23, 1992, and *De Godsdiensten van der wereld*, ed. J.Weerdenburg, Utrecht 1993), *Het pad van de Bodhisattva* (Amsterdam 1993), 'Female Stereotypes in Early Buddhism. The Women in the Therīgāthā' (*Female Stereotypes in Religious Traditions*, ed. Ria Kloppenborg and Wouter J.Hanegraaff, Leiden 1995), 'Het denken over de dood in het vroege en Theravada-boeddhisme' (*De vele gezichten van de dood. Voorstellingen en rituelen in verschillende culturen*, ed. D. Tiemersma, Rotterdam 1996).

RBW

In her life Ria proved to be an inspiring teacher and scholar. Students who followed her classes would not forget this experience easily and many of them wrote their MA or Ph.D theses under her diligent guidance. Ria would take you on a journey through time and space, her teaching would confront you with a unique way of associating facts and incidents from the remote past and from far off countries with modern actuality. She was able not only to accomplish this if it came to the wider cultural similarities or differences but even where the personal emotional sphere was

## Obituary

involved. For Ria her commitment to her studies and students was closer to a way of life than to a mere 'profession'. Humanity and the human condition prevailed in all aspects of her teaching and writing. For Ria her working approximated to an art form and amidst her manifold publications there are translations of ancient texts that can be considered as literary reworkings of the originals. She would never accept a translation that merely reflected the contents of the work instead of giving proper attention to the literary merits of the original. Her fascination for the arts moved beyond her academic undertakings: she was a painter of mainly Buddhist themes and was also a musician. She often travelled to Asia and many of her students accompanied her on trips to India, Nepal, Sri Lanka and Thailand. Occasionally, Ria's house would change into an open forum in which friends and relatives would display their proficiency in music, poetry and dance.

Ria understood that the essence of Asian studies was not only a matter of academic research because Asian traditions may confront the West with new impulses. For this reason she was working over the last six years of her life with a group consisting of psychotherapists and psychiatrists who were trying to find and construct connections between modern psychotherapy and Buddhist techniques of meditation. [The working group, Psychotherapie en Boeddhisme, was established in 1998. Attention is drawn to her relevant writings in this field: 'Autonomie en (non)identiteit. De boeddhistische weg tot bevrijding en de psychotherapie', *Humanisme en boeddhisme*, ed. Fons Elders, Nieuwerkerk aan de IJssel 2000, and 'Boeddhistische psychologie en westerse psychotherapie : niet-Zelf en zelf', *De moderniteit van religie*, ed. G.Hellemans, et al., Zoetermeer n.d.]

At the beginning of 2003 it became clear that Ria was ill, but the fact that her illness [cancer of the pleura] would have such a devastating effect was unexpected. She died in the company of dear friends.

I will remember, working under Ria as a post-graduate student, how she inspired her protégés, how she could stimulate and at the same time slow them down if their ideas were too far-fetched. Her combination of scholarly research with a feeling for the

aesthetic was fascinating. The parties would continue till the early morning with breakfast in the garden and the songs of the first birds...

*Paul van der Velde*

When I came to Holland in 1985 I was on the point of giving up Buddhist studies. I had been working with a supervisor who had never written a thesis, had only published a single article and who was, therefore, unequipped to provide the necessary encouragement and support. I then had the very good fortune to be introduced to Ria Kloppenborg who ensured that I persevered. She arranged a research position for me and I duly defended my doctoral dissertation, 'Debates and Case Histories in the Pāli Canon' (Utrecht 1991), Chapter V of which was published in *BSR* 9 (1992, pp.117-36).

Besides her own research, Ria's special gift was to provide people with ideas that went beyond the limits of 'normal science' with the opportunity to work out these ideas. The result was that many people benefited apart from myself. It was particularly dear to her heart that the teachings of the ancient texts should be made useful through being combined with contemporary knowledge in many fields, including 'personal growth' and psychotherapy. Thus, she encouraged me in my explorations of Buddhist psychology which, today, has taken the form of *vipassanā* combined with breathwork (– for further information see [www.i-breathe.com](http://www.i-breathe.com)). Ria, I share this *puñña* with you.

*Joy Manné*

~ REVIEW ARTICLE ~

ON TRANSLATING THE SUTTANIPĀTA

K. R. NORMAN

1. INTRODUCTION

One of the best aids available for anyone trying to understand and translate a Pāli canonical text is the commentarial tradition. The commentaries which are available to us represent the accumulated wisdom of the commentarial tradition at the time of their composition, as well as containing in the lemmata the forms of the canonical texts which were current at the time the commentaries were compiled.

Another aid is what might loosely be described as philology. In the case of a Pāli text this means an understanding of the development of the Pāli language, including grammar and syntax, vis-à-vis Sanskrit and the Prakrit dialects, a knowledge of metrical matters, and a comparison with the vocabulary of Brahmanical and Jain parallel compositions.

It is alleged that there is an opposition between tradition and philology when translating Pāli texts, but it is more accurate to think of a complementary relationship. The best translations will result when tradition and philology are wedded together and the results obtained by the usage of one method are compared with and controlled by those obtained by the other.

For anyone trying to translate the Suttanipāta (Sn) the commentarial tradition is especially rich. It consists of Nidd I & II, Pj I & II and Nidd-a I & II<sup>1</sup>. Nidd I and II (the commentaries on the *Atthaka-vagga*, the *Pārāyana-vagga* and the *Khaggavisāṇa-sutta*) are especially helpful because they were made early enough to be included in the Pāli Canon. Professor von Hinüber (=OvH) has

<sup>1</sup> The abbreviations of the titles of Pāli texts are those adopted by *A Critical Pāli Dictionary*, ed. D. Andersen, H. Smith, H. Hendriksen, Copenhagen 1924 ff.



given information about a tantalisingly small fragment of another Sn commentary which has been discovered in Thailand<sup>2</sup>.

A recent translation of Sn<sup>3</sup> by N.A. Jayawickrama (=NAJ) claims to be based primarily upon the commentarial tradition. His notes at the end of each sutta frequently consist of quotations from the commentaries. He states (p.i): 'In preparing this translation ... [I] was most indebted to Pj II and Nidd I and Nidd II in conveying the meanings as intended by the Buddhist tradition which goes back to at least 2 millennia. The rejection of this tradition would have resulted in many pitfalls that in certain circumstances can result in *micchādīṭṭhi* – heresy – from the orthodox point of view.'

NAJ's translation is accompanied by an edition of the text. He states (p.i) that this is 'more or less a transcript' of the PTS edition<sup>4</sup>, with a few changes based on printed editions in Sinhalese script, and Bapat's Devanāgarī edition<sup>5</sup>.

With reference to the text he has translated he notes (p.i): 'The readings traditionally accepted as correct by the Commentators and their successors and the copyists of the manuscripts have been given preference rather than to arbitrarily emended readings on the grounds of metre or parallel versions seen in versions posterior to Pali.' He continues (p.ii): 'My main concern was to translate every word of the text following as far as possible the sequence of words in Pali and even bringing out the emphasis in the text keeping in mind the early history of Buddhist thought.'

A glance at the variant readings recorded in the critical apparatus of the PTS editions of Sn and the commentaries on it, and a comparison of the various editions of Sn might possibly

suggest that an element of caution is needed in following NAJ in this practice, e.g. the PTS edition has *-jjhāyin* 'learner' in 85 where, as NAJ notes (p.41), Sinhalese editions read *-kkhāyin* 'teacher'. Cf. *samānabhāvaṃ* in 702 where, as NAJ notes (p.279), Pj II reads *°bhāgaṃ*.

It is, in fact, worthy of note that variant readings and interpretations had already developed by the time of the commentaries, as can be seen from the pāthantaras they sometimes record and the alternative explanations they give. As Grace Burford has pointed out<sup>6</sup>, the commentaries on Sn represent a rather mixed bag of preservation and innovation. Sometimes the commentaries simply preserve the teachings recorded in the original text. In other cases their interpretations alter the significance of the verses as originally stated. It is clear that the commentarial tradition of interpretation developed and changed between the time of Nidd I and II and that of Pj I and II.

## 2. RECENT TRANSLATIONS

I should like to examine some aspects of NAJ's translation to see how far his claim is justified, and at the same time to compare it with two other translations which have appeared in England in the last twenty years ((a) K.R. Norman, *The Group of Discourses* (Sutta-nipāta) I, PTS London 1984 (= GD), and (b) H. Saddhatissa, *The Sutta-nipāta*, Curzon Press, London 1985).

(a) My own translation is, in part, two translations, since at the end of each sutta in the first edition (1984) and in the paperback edition (1985) alternative translations by I.B. Horner and Walpola Rahula (=IBH and WR, from here on, IBH implies IBH and WR) are given. In the introduction to my translation Richard Gombrich (=RFG) states, '[Miss Horner and Dr Rahula's] combined erudition here presents the meaning of the Sutta-nipāta substantially as it has been handed down in the Theravādin

<sup>6</sup> Grace G. Burford, *Desire, death and goodness: the conflict of ultimate values in Theravāda Buddhism*, New York 1991.

<sup>7</sup> Norman, GD, p.v.

<sup>2</sup> O. von Hinüber, 'The Paramatthajotikāḍipani, a fragment of the sub-commentary to the Paramatthajotikā II on the Suttanipāta', *Journal of the Pali Text Society* XXIII (1997), pp.27-41.

<sup>3</sup> N.A. Jayawickrama, *Suttanipāta* – Pali Text with Translation into English and notes, University of Kelaniya 2001, pp.vii, 435.

<sup>4</sup> D. Andersen & H. Smith, *Sutta-Nipāta* (new edition), PTS London 1913.

<sup>5</sup> P.V. Bapat, *Sutta-Nipāta*, Poona 1924.

tradition. [Mr Norman] has used the methods of historical linguistics and drawn on his unrivalled knowledge of Middle Indo-Aryan philology in an attempt to arrive at the text's original meaning.' Somaratne similarly states<sup>8</sup>, 'KRN often finds himself rejecting the traditional interpretation in favour of historical and philological interpretations', but in his review of GD Cousins questions<sup>9</sup> the accuracy of RFG's statement.

The aim of my translation, as of those I have made of Thera-gāthā and Therīgāthā (*Elders' Verses* I & II, London 1969, 1971), was to produce a literal, almost word-for-word, translation which I hoped would, when considered alongside the original Pāli, adequately convey my understanding of the original speakers' words, i.e. to give the meaning of the text as it was intended by the original speakers, or as it was accepted by the first hearers. This is not necessarily, therefore, the meaning it had for the later commentaries, or even for Nidd I and II. In particular, in all my work in the field of Pāli I have been mindful of the fact that the Aśokan inscriptions and some Jain texts probably predate the Pāli commentaries and may well give guidance about the form and meaning of some early Pāli vocabulary.

(b) The stated purpose of Saddhatissa's translation was to present the spirit of the text in contemporary language<sup>10</sup>. He adds end-notes to some suttas, but rarely comments on the text. In Cousins' eyes<sup>11</sup> his translation goes some way in the direction of giving the general reader the feel for the contents of the Sn. In my review of Saddhatissa's work<sup>12</sup> I drew attention to some of the splendid phrases which it contains.

<sup>8</sup> G.A. Somaratne, review of NAJ's translation in *Sri Lanka Association for Buddhist Studies Newsletter* 1, 1 (2003), pp.3-4.

<sup>9</sup> L.S. Cousins, review of GD in *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society* (1985) 2, pp.219-20.

<sup>10</sup> Saddhatissa, *op. cit.* p.vii.

<sup>11</sup> L.S. Cousins, review of GD, vol.II (1991), in *JRAS* 4, 2 (1994), pp.291-2.

<sup>12</sup> In *JRAS* (1986), pp.285-7.

### 3. INVESTIGATION

My investigation is restricted to a small selection of words:

#### (1) 3 *visosayitvā*:

Brough very plausibly suggested<sup>13</sup> that the original reading should be *va sosayitvā*, not *visosayitvā*, thus giving a comparison to balance the comparisons with *va* or *iva* in 1-2 4-5. The error (if it is one) is older than the commentary, which gives no hint of *va*. I translated in accordance with Brough's suggestion:

NAJ supplies '(like)' in the translation, but makes no comment on the text.

KRN: 'Like one drying up'.

IBH: 'by drying up'.

Saddhatissa (= Saddh) states<sup>14</sup>: 'On the analogy of these [two] stanzas, therefore, I feel that the reading has been corrupt, even during the commentary period. I would suggest that it reads as *saritaṃ siṅhasaram va sosayitvā* and have translated it accordingly' – 'like drying up'. It is not clear from this if Saddhatissa was aware that Brough had already made this suggestion.

#### (2) 35 *visāṇa*:

Nidd II (Nāgarī [Nalanda] ed.) 248,6: *yathā khaggassa nāma visāṇaṃ ekaṃ hoti adutiyaṃ, evaṃ eva so paccekabuddho takkappo tassadiso tappatibhāgo*. Pj II 65,10-11, written some 600 years later, gives a similar explanation: *khaggavisāṇakappo ti, ettha khaggavisāṇaṃ nāma khaggamigasiṅgaṃ*.

NAJ earlier, although quoting both Nidd II and Pj II, nevertheless insisted<sup>15</sup> that the comparison was not with the horn, but with the animal. He has now changed his mind about *visāṇa*. He says (p.26): 'I have retained the translation of *visāṇa* as horn'. In his translation of the Gāndhārī version of the Rhinoceros Sūtra,

<sup>13</sup> J. Brough, *The Gāndhārī Dharmapada*, London 1962, p.200.

<sup>14</sup> *op. cit.*, p.2, n.2.

<sup>15</sup> N.A.Jayawickrama 'A Critical Analysis of the Sutta Nipāta', *University of Ceylon Review* VII (1949), p.120; repr. in *Pali Buddhist Review* 2, 1 (1977), p.22.

Salomon too has changed his mind, but in the opposite direction<sup>16</sup>.

NAJ: ‘alone like the horn of a rhinoceros’.

KRN: ‘solitary as a rhinoceros horn’.

Saddh: ‘alone like a unicorn’s horn’.

(3) 78 *saccam*.

Pj II 148,14-16: *niddānan ti chedanam uppāṭanam, karaṇa-vacanatthe c’ etam upayogavacanam vedītabbam, ayaṃ hi ettha attho: saccena karomī niddānan ti.*

Pj II 148,23-28: *athavā niddānan ti chedakam lavakam uppāṭakan ti attho, evaṃ sante. yathā tvaṃ dāsaṃ vā kammā-karaṃ vā niddānam kāreṣi “niddehi tiṇāni” ti tiṇānam chedakam lavakam uppāṭakam karosi, evaṃ ahaṃ saccam karomī ti upayogavacanen’ eva vattum yujjati.*

NAJ notes (p.38) that Pj II explains this as an accusative used in the sense of an instrumental, but he does not say that the commentary in fact gives two explanations. Nevertheless, he does not follow the commentary in taking it as an instrumental, but translates as an accusative:

NAJ: ‘I make truth my weeding’.

KRN: ‘I make truth my weeding-[hook]’.

Saddh: ‘I make truth the destroyer of weeds’.

(4) 84 *maggajina*:

Pj II 162, 7-8: *maggajino ti maggena sabbakilese vijitāvi ti attho.* As the commentary makes clear, the tradition took this as meaning ‘conquering (all defilements) by means of the path’.

There is, however, evidence for the use of *nāna* in comparable references, cf. *maggā-nāna* in Pj II 490,24 (ad 698), and *-ññū* in contexts with words meaning ‘know’: *maggāññū maggavidū maggakovidō*, Nidd I 446,25.

The ending *-ññū* is to be derived from *-jñā*<sup>17</sup>. Although *jina* may indeed be derived from Skt *jina*, the existence side by side of *mārga-jina* and *mārga-jñā* as epithets of the Buddha is remarkable, and I assume that *jina* is here derivable from *jñā*, with a svarabhakti vowel.

NAJ: ‘the winner of the path’, but he accepts (p.41) the possibility of *mārga-jñā* ‘knower of the path’.

KRN: ‘[the one who] knows the way’.

IBH: ‘conqueror (by means) of the way’.

Saddh: ‘has won the path’.

(5) 143 *abhisamecca*:

Pj I 236,11-14: *santaṃ padan ti upayogavacanam, tattha lakkhaṇato santaṃ pattabbato padam, nibbānass’ etam adhi-vacanam; abhisameccā ti abhisamāgantvā; sakkotī ti sakko, samattho paṭibalo ti vuttaṃ hoti.*

If *santaṃ padam* is indeed a synonym of Nibbāna, then it is inappropriate to say that the subject of the sutta has already obtained it. For this reason RFG claims<sup>18</sup> that *abhisamecca* is an absolutive being used as an infinitive (of purpose), and translated ‘in order to attain’. In making this claim he states that he is following a suggestion of mine. I can find no evidence that I have ever stated such a thing in writing, but it is not impossible that I have at some time referred orally to Sen who states<sup>19</sup> that infinitive forms can sometimes carry the sense of the absolutive, and absolutive forms can sometimes carry the sense of the infinitive. The examples of the latter usage which he gives from Aśoka (*dasayitpā janam, savaṃ paricajitpā*) are, however, in fact absolutives in both form and meaning.

The use of infinitives as absolutives certainly occurs in Pkt<sup>20</sup>,

<sup>17</sup> For the ending *-ññū* < *-a*, see GD, p.200 ad 167.

<sup>18</sup> R.F. Gombrich, *Kindness and Compassion as Means to Nirvana*, Amsterdam 1998, p.15.

<sup>19</sup> S. Sen, *Historical Syntax of Middle Indo-Aryan*, Calcutta 1953, § 158.

<sup>20</sup> *Ibid.*, loc. cit. and F. Edgerton, *Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit Grammar* (BHSG), New Haven 1953, § 35.54.

<sup>16</sup> Compare R. Salomon, *Ancient Buddhist Scrolls from Gandhāra*, London 1999, p.33, n.33, with *id.*, *A Gāndhārī Version of the Rhinoceros Sūtra*, Seattle 2000, p.11.



but as far as Pāli is concerned, I have no certain example of this usage. In my note on 424 I gave as an alternative explanation for *daṭṭhu* the possibility that it is a genuine absolute in *-tu*<sup>21</sup>, of which there are examples in the Aśokan inscriptions. I now favour that explanation, and no longer see it as an infinitive with *-m* lost *metri causa*. If there are no certain examples in Pāli of an infinitive being used as an absolute, then the chances of the usage being reversed, i.e. absolute for infinitive, are reduced.

Gombrich follows the commentary and states that *taṃ santam padam* 'the peaceful state' is rightly explained as Nibbāna<sup>22</sup>. NAJ too follows the commentary in this, but does not follow the commentary's explanation of *abhisamecca*. He states that it is in form an infinitive, not an absolute. He compares Skt *abhisametyai*, and says (p.59) that *abhisamecca* should be equated to *abhisametave* in meaning. He is therefore assuming that *abhisamecca* is to be derived from *\*abhisamecce*. This is a very interesting suggestion, but one which is impossible to prove or disprove. An original *\*abhisamecce* could well have been misunderstood and changed to *abhisamecca*. The suffix *-ecce* < *-etyai* would, however, be unique in Pāli, as far as I know, and since the formation *abhisametyai* is very rare in Skt, it would seem to me to be very unlikely that such a formation would continue to be used in Middle Indo-Aryan.

Saddhatissa also translates *abhisamecca* as though it were an infinitive, but gives no justification for doing so. It is interesting to see that Nānamoli's translation seems to be an attempt to mix together an absolute and an infinitive: 'The state of peace to have attained'<sup>23</sup>.

My explanation of the problem is to say that the commentary is wrong in saying that *santam padam* means *nibbānam*, but correct in saying that *abhisamecca* is an absolute. I take *santa* literally as 'peaceful'. It is used often enough as an epithet of a bhikkhu

(where it certainly does not imply 'gained Nibbāna') and I see no reason why *santipadam* (which is what I understand *santam padam* to mean) should not literally mean 'state of being peaceful, calm, at rest'. The presence of *taṃ* 'that [well-known] state' does not seem to me necessarily to imply Nibbāna. It could equally well refer to that well-known peaceful state which bhikkhus attain.

NAJ: 'for the purpose of attaining'.

KRN: 'having attained'.

Saddh: 'who wishes to attain'.

Nānamoli: 'to have attained'.

RFG: 'in order to attain'.

(6) 239 *satam añhamānā*:

Pj II 284,3-4: *satan ti santo ariyā. asamānā ti bhuñjamānā*.

As NAJ notes (p.99), the commentary explains *satam* as a nominative plural. NAJ rejects this, but also fails to follow the commentary's explanation of *asamānā*. He prefers to take this as passive, with *satam* as the genitive plural of the agent. He translates as though the participle were a finite verb: '... are consumed (by) the virtuous', but the connection between this and the finite verb *bhaṇanti* in pāda 4 is unclear in his translation. I take the commentary's *asamānā*<sup>24</sup> as active, agreeing with the subject of *bhaṇanti*, and assume that *satam* is to be taken with *dhammena* 'in accordance with the doctrine of the good'.

NAJ: 'are consumed by the virtuous'.

KRN: 'those eating [seeds]'.

IBH: 'those good men who eat'.

Saddh: 'the virtuous who eat these'.

(7) 303 308 552 *rathesabha*:

Pj II 332,22-23: *rathesabho ti mahārathesu khattiyesu akam-piyatṭṭhena usabhasadiso*.

NAJ: 'the conqueror in chariot (of war)'.

<sup>21</sup> GD, p.237.

<sup>22</sup> Gombrich, *op. cit.*, p.15.

<sup>23</sup> Bhikkhu Nānamoli, *The Minor Readings*, PTS London 1960, p.10, and *The Illustrator of Ultimate Meaning* (in the same volume), pp.271, 275.

<sup>24</sup> For this and other variants of *añhamānā*, see M. Cone, *A Dictionary of Pāli*, Part I, *a-kh* (NPED), PTS Oxford 2001, p.265, s.v. *asnāti*.

KRN: ‘the lord of warriors’, and (more literally) ‘a bull among heroes’.

Saddh: ‘the lord of chariots’.

NAJ states (p.124): ‘Pj explains -*sabho* as *usabhasaciso*, prob[ably] it is an aluk-samāsa *rathe* + *sabho* (cf. *antevāsika*) with *sabho* derived from root *sah*, to overpower.’ He adds (p.232): ‘an aluk samāsa with *rathe* and *sabho*, a variant of *saho*, from an earlier root \**sabh*.’ It is strange that he does not follow the commentary’s explanation of *ratha* = *khattiya* + *usabha* (in the form *isabha*).

The correct derivation and meaning is given in the *Pāli-English Dictionary* (PED): *ratha* + *ṣabha*, Skt *rathāṣabha* [ṣic] lord of charioteers. *Ratha* here in meaning of ‘charioteer’.<sup>25</sup> Monier Williams gives ‘warrior, hero, champion’ for *ratha*.<sup>26</sup> See also *Elders’ Verses* I, p.242 (ad Th 822).

(8) 372 378 1003 1147 *vivatta-cchadda*:

Pj II 365,28: *vivattacchaddo ti vivaṭarāgadosamohach. idano*.

Pj II 450,23-25: *vivattacchaddā ti ettha rāgadosam. hamāna-ditthi-avijjāduccaritachadanehi sattahi paṭicchanne kiṭṭhesandha-kāre loke taṃ chadanam vivattetvā*.

I earlier accepted the view that this word and Skt *vighuṣṭaśabda*, which occurs in Buddhist Hybrid Skt texts in contexts where Pāli has *vivattacchadda*, were related<sup>27</sup>, but I took the Skt form to be the original and translated it as ‘of wide-spread fame’.<sup>28</sup> In so doing I had overlooked the existence of Pkt *viyattachauma* in a list of epithets describing the Jina<sup>29</sup>. Although Pāli *chadda* can be

derived from Skt *śabda*, there seems to be no way in which Pkt *chauma* can be so derived. I was then forced to the conclusion that -*chadda* and -*chauma* were both to be derived from Skt *chadman*. It then follows that *vighuṣṭaśabda* must be an incorrect back-formation from something like \**vihuttachadda*. The commentary derivation is therefore correct, and the only point of doubt is the translation to be given for -*chadda*.

The explanation given by the Jain tradition differs from that given in Pāli. Referring to the genitive/dative form in -*ānam*, it states: *vyāvṛttachadmabhyah, ghāṭi-karmāṇi saṃsāro vā chadma tad vyāvṛttam kṣiṇam yebhṃyas te*<sup>30</sup>. The word is translated by Jacobi as ‘who have got rid of all unrighteousness’<sup>31</sup>, and by Williams as ‘who have thrown off all travesties’<sup>32</sup>. In Skt *chadman* has the meaning of ‘deceit, disguise’<sup>33</sup>, and in the second edition of GD I adopted this meaning for the compound, and translated it as ‘with deceit removed’.

NAJ: ‘who has rolled back the veil (of roots of evil)’, ‘... the veil (of ignorance)’.

KRN: ‘with deceit removed’.

IBH: ‘the veil drawn back’.

Saddh: ‘who has torn asunder the veil of evil’.

(9) *jjhagamā* 379:

Pj II, 369,16: *ajjhagamā ti adhi-agamā, gato ti vuttam hoti*.

NAJ’s statement (p.157 ‘There is no pf [i.e. perfect] *jagāma*’ may prove somewhat surprising to his readers. It is, however, a consequence of his stated (p.1) rejection of ‘arbitrarily emended readings on the grounds of metre’. It is, therefore, a reference to my decision to accept, for the purposes of my translation, OvH’s conjectured *jagāma*<sup>34</sup>.

<sup>25</sup> T.W. Rhys Davids and W Stede, *Pāli-English Dictionary* (PED), PTS Chipstead 1925, s.v. *ratha*<sup>1</sup>.

<sup>26</sup> M. Monier Williams, *Sanskrit-English Dictionary* (= MW), Oxford 1899, s.v. 1. *ratha*.

<sup>27</sup> K.R. Norman, ‘Two Pāli etymologies’, *BSOAS* 42, pp.321-8, here p.323 (repr. in *id.*, *Collected Papers* II, PTS Oxford 1991, pp.71-83).

<sup>28</sup> GD, p.62.

<sup>29</sup> H. Jacobi, *The Kalpasūtra of Bhadrabāhu*, Leipzig 1879, p.37, § 6; see also

H.D.T. Sheth, *Pāiasaddamahanṇavo*, Calcutta 1928, s.v. *viatta*.

<sup>30</sup> Jacobi, *op. cit.*, p.103.

<sup>31</sup> H. Jacobi, *Jaina Sūtras*, Part I, Oxford 1884, p.225.

<sup>32</sup> R. Williams, *Jaina Yoga*, London 1963, p.194.

<sup>33</sup> See MW, s.v. *chadman*.

<sup>34</sup> O. von Hinüber, ‘Zum Perfekt im Pāli’, *Zeitschrift für Vergleichende*

The Tristubh metre of the cadence of pāda c is incorrect, since we need a long penultimate syllable. OvH's suggestion that we read here an historically correct perfect form *jagāma*, which despite NAJ does occur in Pāli at Ja VI, 203,2\* (glossed as *gato*, 203, 5'), not only corrects the metre, but also gives a better sense, since we need the translation 'went away', which a form from *adhigam-* would not give, as can be seen from its occurrence in 5: *yo nājjhagamā bhavesu saram*, '... not found any essence in existences', where Saddh translates as 'does not see' and NAJ as 'has not experienced'. The commentary tries to solve the problem by assuming that *adhigam-* can have the correct meaning, and explains it as *gato*.

If we accept that the original reading was *jagāma*, we can surmise that, as the perfect tense began to go out of use in Pāli and the form was no longer understood, *jagāma* was replaced by *jjhagamā* – the initial *a-* being in crasis with the final *-ā* of *manta-yitvā* (but the Sinhalese Buddhajayanti edition reads *-tvā ajjha-*).

NAJ: 'went away'.  
KRN: 'went away'.  
Saddh: 'went away'.

(10) 523 *khetta-jina*:

Pāda a of 524 explains *khetta-jina* as meaning *khetāni viceyya kevalāni*, and Pj II 428,27-29 explains *viceyya* as both *viceyya* and *vijeyya*: *tāni vijeyya jetvā abhibhavitvā vicēyya vā aniccādibhāvena vicinitvā upaparikkhitvā*. The double explanation is repeated: *etesam khetānam vijitattā vicitattā vā khetta-jino* (429,6). This doubtless goes back to an earlier version of the sutta where, in a dialect where both *-c-* and *-j-* became *-y-*, the word appeared in the ambiguous form *\*vijeyya*.

The Buddhist Hybrid Skt of the Sabhiya-sutta, however, has *kṣetra-jño* at this point, and the explanation given there is:

*kṣetrāṇi saṃyama kevalāni*

*Sprachforschung* 96 (1982-83), pp.30-2. It is accepted by NPED, p.86, s.v. *adhigacchati*.

*divyam mānusaṃ yaṃ ca brāhmaṃ kṣetraṃ  
sa sarvaṃ lākṣetrabāndhanāt pramukto  
kṣetrājño tāyī pravuccati tathatvāt* (Mvu III 398,19\*-399,2\*).

In view of the equivalence, and of the existence in Pāli of the words *khetta-ñña* and *khetta-ññu* and of the words *kṣetra-vid* and *kṣetra-vidyā* in Skt<sup>35</sup>, I think that the Buddhist Hybrid Skt reading is the correct one. I therefore take *khetta-jina* as being derived from *kṣetra-jña*<sup>36</sup>, with a svarabhakti vowel (see the note on *magga-jina* above) and in pāda a (and 524d) I translate it as 'field-knower'.

NAJ: 'the winner of the field'.  
KRN: 'field-knower'.  
IBH: 'field-conqueror'.  
Saddh: 'world-winner'.

(11) 649 *no*:

Pj II 471,9-10: *ajānantā no pabrunti ... ajānantā yeva evaṃ vadanti*.

NAJ states (p.254) that Pj is silent on *no*, and he wonders if it is a variant of *nu*. As can be seen, however, the commentary is not silent, but explains it as = *yeva*. It is, therefore, the equivalent of the emphatic particle *eva*.

NAJ: 'the ignorant do proclaim'.  
KRN: 'only the ignorant say'.  
IBH: 'truly the ignorant say'.  
Saddh: 'these ignorant ones say'.

(12) 664 *bhūnahu*:

Pj II 479,3-4: *bhūnahu bhūtihanaka vuddhināsaka*.

In view of the fact that *bhūnahu* is to be derived from Skt *bhrūṇahan* 'embryo-killer'<sup>37</sup>, the commentary's explanation 'de-

<sup>35</sup> See MW, s.v. *kṣetra*.

<sup>36</sup> See NPED, p.775, s.v. *khetta-jina*.

<sup>37</sup> See GD, p.294 [ad 664], quoting B. Saksena, 'Pāli *bhūnaha*', *BSOS* 8 (1936), pp.713-14).



stroyer of growth' is not unreasonable. PED's 'a destroyer of beings' is not far off the mark, and it is not clear why Saddh and NAIJ translate the way they do. NAIJ comments (p.266): '-*nahu* prob[ably] from -*ghna*, (root *han*) with metathesis', but his 'treacherous' does not reflect the presence of either *bhū* or *han*.

NAJ: 'treacherous'.

KRN: 'abortionist'.

IBH: 'a destroyer of growth'.

Saddh: 'slandering'.

(13) 704 967 *tasathāvara*:

Nidd I 448,12-19: *tasā ti yesaṃ tasinā taṇhā appahinā, yesaṃ ca bhayabheravā appahinā. kiṃkāraṇā vuccanti tasā? te tasanti uttasanti paritasanti bhāyanti santāsaṃ āpajjanti. taṃkāraṇā vuccanti tasā. thāvarā ti yesaṃ tasinā taṇhā pahinā, yesaṃ ca bhayabheravā pahinā. kiṃkāraṇā vuccanti thāvarā? te na tasanti na uttasanti na paritasanti na bhāyanti, santāsaṃ na āpajjanti, taṃkāraṇā vuccanti thāvarā.*

To follow the commentary would give the translation 'those who tremble and those who do not tremble' but, as Somaratne states<sup>38</sup>, this gives the wrong idea. In my opinion<sup>39</sup> it is better to follow the meanings of Skt *trasa* and *sthāvara* and the Jain compound *tasathāvara*.

MW (s.v. *trasa*) gives: mfn. moving, n. the collective body of moving things (opposed to *sthāvara*), MBh xii f.; Jain.; and (s.v. *sthāvara*): standing still, not moving, fixed, stationary, stable, immovable.

NAJ: 'feeble and strong', 'the trembling and the stable'.

KRN: 'both moving and still'.

Saddh: 'weak or strong', 'feeble or strong'.

(14) 1040 1042 *sibbanī*:

Nidd II (PTS) 276,8: *sibbanī vuccati taṇhā.*

Th-a 278,28 (ad Th 663): *sibbanīṃ, taṇhaṃ.*

A III 400,1-2: *taṇhā sibbanī; taṇhā hi naṃ sibbati tassa tass' eva bhavassa abhinibbattiyā.*

As 363,20-23 (ad Dhs 189,23): *ghaṭan'-atthēna sibbanī. ayaṃ hi vattasmim satte cuti-paṭisandhi-vasena sibbati, ghateti, tunna-kāro viya pilotikāya pilotikaṃ, tasmā ghaṭan'-atthēna sibbanī ti vuttā.*

NAJ (p.390) states that *sibbanī* can be equated to 'the sewing', and declares that PED 'seamstress' (= *sibbantī*) is unlikely. Nevertheless, the form of the word suggests that it refers to an agent, not to an action<sup>40</sup>. If, then, *taṇhā* does the sewing, it is not too inappropriate to regard *taṇhā* as a sewer, i.e. seamstress.

NAJ: 'the fabric (of craving)'.

KRN: 'seamstress'.

IBH: 'desire'.

Saddh: 'patchwork world of greed'.

#### 4. CONCLUSIONS

It is clear that when NAIJ follows the commentaries blindly he is sometimes led to mistakes in interpretation, e.g.:

(i) 704 967 *tasathavara*:

It is also clear that, despite his claim, NAIJ does not always follow the commentaries, e.g.:

(ii) 78 *saccaṃ*

(iii) 143 *abhisamecca*

(iv) 239 *satam añhamānā*

(v) 303 308 552 *rathesabha*

(vi) 664 *bhūnahu*

(vii) 1040 *sibbanī*

<sup>38</sup> Somaratne, *op. cit.*, p.4.

<sup>39</sup> K.R. Norman, *A philological approach to Buddhism*, London 1997, p.163.

<sup>40</sup> Cf. MW, s.v. *sīvanī*: 'needle'.

He also admits that alternative interpretations to those given by the commentaries are possible, e.g.

(viii) In 3 he inserts '(like)'.

(ix) In 84 he accepts the possibility of a development from *mārga-jñā*.

NAJ's translation is clear and easy to read. It is, however, clear that despite his statement that to reject the commentary tradition would have resulted in many pitfalls, he has in a number of places rejected that tradition, and in at least one case (his interpretation of *abhisamecca*) has made enviable use of the philological method of which he speaks so disparagingly.

The volume contains a slip of paper listing a handful of corrections. In his review<sup>41</sup> Somaratne adds a few more, and use to date has revealed another dozen or so. None of them will cause confusion to readers.

K. R. Norman

<sup>41</sup> Somaratne, *op.cit.*, p.4.

## BOOK REVIEWS

*Kaṅkhāvitaraṇī* by Bhadantācariya Buddhaghosa Edited by K.R. Norman and William Pruitt. Pali Text Society, Oxford 2003. xix, 596 pp. £30.00. ISBN 0 86013 413 X.

The (anonymous) *Kaṅkhāvitaraṇī* (Kkh) – also called *Mātikatthakathā* – traditionally ascribed to Buddhaghosa, is a commentary on the *Pātimokkhasutta* (see von Hinüber, *A Handbook of Pāli Literature*, Berlin/New York 1996, pp.109-11 [§§221-5]). Other than the *Samantapāsādikā* which it often cites, it dispenses with intricate discussions of Vinaya problems in favour of straightforward commentary on the *Pātimokkha* rules. Its importance for Vinaya studies could not be matched by the standard of Dorothy Maskell's PTS edition, notorious for its inaccuracies. Thus it cannot seriously be doubted that a new edition has been a *desideratum* of Pāli studies. If Maskell was basically a mere transcript of the Simon Hewavitarne Bequest edition, this new edition is a consolidated one, being based on four printed editions of which, viz. B<sup>e</sup> quotes yet another edition in its footnotes, viz. K<sup>e</sup>. Its variant readings are listed, as are those of Kalawila Indaratana's Sinhalese edition (SK), quoted by Maskell. Those of a number of manuscripts are not given, being identical throughout to those of the prints (p.xvi). It is somewhat astonishing that neither the (anonymous) *Kaṅkhāvitaraṇī*-*Porānatikā* nor Buddhānāga's *Kaṅkhāvitaraṇī*-*Abhinavatikā* *alias* *Vinayatthamañjūsā*, both easily accessible in the editions of the *Chatthasaṅgāyana* and the *Bhūmibalo Bhikkhu* Foundation of 1984, which are valuable secondary sources, have been consulted. Also not used are the printed edition of the *Kaṅkhāvitaraṇī*-*piṭapota* by Kalukondayāvē Paññāsekhara (Mahābodhi Yantrālaya, Colombo 1936), and that of the *Kaṅkhāvitaraṇī*-*Atthayojanāmahātikā* (see Bollée, *IJJ* 11 [1968], p.315), presumably due to these not being available.

The extent to which this new edition constitutes an improvement on the old one is apparent on every single page as the critical apparatus at the bottom of each page also notes the deviant readings of E<sup>e</sup> (though it is certainly not exhaustive, e.g. Maskell's *kathikam* [132,17] is not given at 227,27). Also the *nigamana* and the *uddāna* of *aṅgas*, both of them missing from

Maskell's edition, have not been added (cf. von Hinüber, *JPTS* 21 [1995], pp.131-3). Not only is the wording of the text as such much better, it is also superior from an interpretative vantage point. Thus Maskell (157,2-3) did not recognise, unlike Norman/Pruitt (278, 5\*-6\*), that *bhikkhuṇiṇaṃ hitatthāya, Pātimokkhaṃ pakāsayi, yaṇ nātho tassa dāne so, sampatto vannaṇākkhama* is an ordinary śloka (the same holds for [Maskell] 14,34-5 = [Norman/Pruitt] 23,6\*-7\*). Moreover, that the text of the Pātimokkha on which the Kkh comments is placed at the beginning of each section is very user friendly. Immensely helpful too are the indexes, three of which give quotations and parallel passages from the Kkh. No.4, though curiously omitted from the table of contents (p.xiii), lists all words occurring in the text, a most valuable research tool.

This edition tenders a very reliable text of the Kkh. Naturally there are places where a better reading might have been desired. A few random remarks, jotted down while going through the text, may attest to this point:

- 22,14: Read *manasikarivā* as one word (cf. 22,10/16: *manasikaroma*). The same holds good for *manasikarotha*, 22,17, and *manasikaroma*, 22,21. Correct the index (p.541 s.v. *manasi*) accordingly.
- 33,15: Read (with e.g. B<sup>e</sup> C<sup>e</sup> [=Maskell]) *ummattakakhittacittavedanattānaṃ* as one word (and correct the index [s.v. *ummattaka*] accordingly).
- 35,10: Read with Maskell (=C<sup>e</sup>) *nānataṃ* as against *nānattaṃ*, which does not scan with the cadence of an even śloka pāda.
- 48,16/51,3: Read *iti-cittamano* (cf. 51,3: †*iti-cittamano ti iticitto itimano*).
- 61,26: Read *kāyappaṭibaddhañ* (instead of *kāyappaṭibaddhañ*).
- 151,8: Read *tividhā pi* (instead of *tividhāpi*).

Minor though it is, a point of criticism concerns the treatment of the final *-ṃ* ~ *-m*. There is some confusion here, and it would have been wiser to keep *-m* before vowels and *h-* (and possibly before all labials) and *-ṃ* before all other initials irrespective of the readings in the sources. By so doing, some of the footnotes would have become superfluous and quite a number of 'double' entries in the index could have been avoided (cf. e.g. *nānābhaṇḍapañcakam* / *nānābhaṇḍapañcakam* [p.499a]). Printing errors seem to be very rare and negligible (on 96,10 the number of the foot-

note after *chiddassa* should be 9 and not 7; and in footnote 9 *chidassa* should be corrected to *chiddhassa*).

Parallels between Vinayapitaka and Samantapāsādikā (Sp) have been recorded using small letters printed above the line (<sup>a-a,b-b,...</sup>). Sometimes it takes some searching to detect the beginning and the end of a parallel. More problematic is that in the case of the (*i*)ti-citations of the Kkh only the end of the citation is marked off by signs such as \*, †, §, or #. In each case the source has to be consulted to elicit the beginning of such a citation. It would have been more helpful to indicate, using the same sign (e.g. \*-\*, †-†, ...), where an *iti*-citation actually starts.

Though a lot of parallels have been given there are surely many more, e.g. 72,13-14 = Sp 595,11-12; 219,24-29 ≠ Sp 870,35-871,4; 228,4-13 ≠ Sp 1409,25-36 (a long list of additions will be found in the detailed review of the book by Dr Petra Kieffer-Pülz, which is to be published in *ZDMG*). According to the 'index of parallel passages' (pp.381-5) there are only two to a text other than the Sp, viz. to Ps IV 43,4-6 and 43, 6f. on p.273 (*ad* Kkh 273,25-274,1). Correct this to: Kkh 274,1-275,12 ≠ Ps IV 43,8-44,25 ≠ Sv 1041,7-1042,11.

This excellent edition paves the way for a translation of the text. Indeed no less is promised by the authors on p.xviii. Needless to say this is highly welcome news.

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*Index to the Jātaka*. Edited by M. Yamazaki and Y. Ousaka. Pali Text Society, Oxford 2003. v, 729 pp. £40.00. ISBN 0 86013 409 1.

V. Fausbøll's edition of the Jātakatthavaṇṇanā, with more than 3,100 pages in six volumes, is by far the longest single work published by the PTS. Anyone trying to trace the occurrence of a specific word in the text has in the past faced a gigantic task.

The current availability of the Burmese, PTS, Siamese and Sinhalese versions of the Pāli Canon on CD-ROM or the internet has made it possible for readers to use the search engines associated with those versions to find any word they require, but this solution suffers from the obvious drawback that it can only be used when one has a computer to hand. To solve this problem Professors Yamazaki and Ousaka, whose indexes to the Dhamma-



pada, Dīgha-nikāya and Vinaya-pitaka have already been published by the PTS, have now put all students of Pāli further into their debt by producing a computer-generated index to the Jātakatthavannanā.

Like the work on which it is based, this index is the largest of its kind which the PTS has published. With more than 730 A4-size pages it is almost exactly the same size as the PTS's Pali-English Dictionary, and compiling it was not an easy task. Realising as he progressed just how large the text was, Fausbøll began to abbreviate some of the most common words and phrases, prefixing lists of these to Volumes IV and V. Unfortunately for those wishing to generate indexes by computer, his abbreviations were not always consistent, so that (as Margaret Cone points out in the Preface) *B.* by itself stands for *Bodhisatto*, but in the combination *A.B.* it stands for *Bārāṇasiyaṃ*. Fausbøll also saved space in the commentarial passages in Volume VI by abbreviating words and phrases in the lemmata, often giving only the first element of a compound, and not separating words in the same way as they appear in the verses.

In most cases the compilers of this index have restored the full form of abbreviated words, so that *Bodhisatto*, for example, appears in place of *B.* The abbreviation *p.* is, however, listed instead of *pubbe*. Differences of word separation have been normalised, e.g. *yamme* at VI 579,8' is corrected to *yam me*, as in the verse (579,5\*), but truncated compounds in lemmata have been left in their truncated form.

Fausbøll usually put double hyphens after truncated lemmata, and this normally shows up in the index as a single hyphen. So, for example, the text reads *pāthīnavannā* at VI 449,10\*; the lemma at 450,7' is *pāthīna* - -, and this is listed in the index as *pāthīna*-. The presence of the hyphen therefore shows that it is a truncated form.

Some hyphens in Fausbøll's text seem, however, to have defeated the compilers' computer. The phrase *pakkhīva* at VI 449,3\* appears as *pakkh* - - in the lemma at 449,29', but no entry *pakkh* appears in the index. In the narrative *pokkharavassam* occurs at VI 586,31, and is listed, but *p-vassam* which occurs as an abbreviation of this at 586,32 does not appear, either in that form or as *pokkharavassam*. The sandhi consonant *d* is correctly extracted from *yadesa* at VI 198,12', but not from the more obvious *ya-d-esa* at VI 198,8\*.

Some obvious misprints in Fausbøll's edition have been corrected, e.g. *caṇḍāla*<sup>o</sup> at VI 213,19\* is listed as *caṇḍāla*<sup>o</sup>. Other misprints are not corrected, e.g. *mahāsattasa* which occurs as a mistake for *sattassa* at III 298,9. Nor are such obvious errors as *arūḷha* and *aropentu* corrected to *ārūḷha* and *āropentu* respectively. *Kevaṭṭa*<sup>o</sup> and *Kevatta*<sup>o</sup> are not corrected to *Kevaṭṭa*<sup>o</sup>, nor is *luddā* corrected to *luddā*.

The compilers of the index have not followed the Critical Pāli Dictionary's convention of adding an acute accent to line numbers to denote quotations from the commentarial passages with the result that, except for words which are followed by a hyphen, readers have no way of telling which forms occur in commentarial passages, and which in narrative passages.

Occurrences in verse are shown by adding an asterisk to the page number, instead of the line number as in the Critical Pāli Dictionary. Line numbers are shown by a superscript numeral, instead of a lower case numeral in a smaller font size.

Usage of the index will probably accustomise readers to such idiosyncrasies, and they will then be able to appreciate more fully the compilers' achievement in producing this invaluable work.

K.R. Norman

*Sacred Biography in the Buddhist Traditions of South and Southeast Asia*. Edited by Juliane Schober. University of Hawai'i Press, Honolulu 1997. xi, 366 pp. ISBN 0-8248-1699-4; Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi 2002. Rs 495. ISBN 81-208-1812-1.

This volume comprises selected papers given at two conferences in 1990 at Arizona State University and the University of Chicago on the themes of 'Interpretations of the Jātaka Tales in Southeast Asia' and 'Buddhist "Life Stories": Sacred Biography in Southeast Asia' respectively. The theme of sacred biography spans a variety of subject disciplines, including history of religions, history of art, and anthropology, and the individual contributions focus variously on Buddhist texts, art, myth and ritual.

The theme of sacred biography, which Juliane Schober claims to be a 'lacuna' in Buddhist studies, encompasses a remarkable variety of topics, and the book is divided into four main sections. The first of these deals with the Jātaka stories. Frank E. Reynolds

demonstrates how the Jātaka highlights three different lineages of Gautama: a lineage of successive Buddhas, a family lineage and a lineage of previous lives. Mark R. Woodward's contribution consists of detailed textual analysis, showing the links between the biographical and the philosophical. Robert L. Brown explores Buddhist monuments in which Jātaka scenes are depicted, focusing on the Ajanā cave paintings, Chula Pathom Chedi and Wat Si Chum in Thailand, the Ananda Temple in Pagan, Burma, and Borobudur in Java. He argues that the inaccessibility of the scenes and their lack of narrative content indicate that their prime purpose was not didactic but rather an attempt to 'historicize and manifest the presence of the Buddha' (p.74).

Part Two focuses on textual sources relating to sacred biographies of other enlightened beings. John S. Strong demonstrates how the post-canonical story of Gautama's 'Great Departure' signals a parallel between the homeless and the householder, and between monks and laity. Reginald Ray offers a study of longevity amongst Buddhist arhats, with special reference to Nāgārjuna, suggesting that its causes lie in the arhat's accomplishment through meditation and his being needed by other sentient beings to whom he vows aid. Jonathan S. Walters discusses three biographical texts from the post-Aśokan empire, *Cariyāpiṭaka*, *Buddhavaṃsa* and *Apadāna*.

The third section focuses on the theme of 'kingship'. Forrest McGill discusses some paintings that are now housed in the Phoenix Art Museum depicting scenes from the *Vessantara Jātaka* (the 'Great Life'), in which the Buddha-to-be is born as King Vessantara. He questions whether the motives of Buddhist laity in donating such pictures is really to 'meet Maitreya', arguing that such expressions of devotion belong to what Melford Spiro called 'the rhetorical mode of nibbānic Buddhism' (p.208), and suggesting that their motives are probably pragmatic in nature. Thomas John Hudak's contribution, which follows, is an analysis of the structure and stages of compilation of the *Panyatsa-jātaka* stories. The section ends with Paul Christopher Johnson's discussion of the Siamese Buddhist king Mongkut, who successfully predicted a total solar eclipse on 18 August 1868. Mongkut has served to reinforce the view that Buddhism is the 'religion of reason', but Johnson is rightly critical of such claims. Arguing that rationality is not absolute but is something that is negotiated

within a culture and historical period.

The book's final section consists of anthropological contributions. Julianne Schober discusses Mahāmuni, the Buddha's living twin, whose image is said to have been cast during the Buddha's lifetime. James L. Taylor focuses on Ajaan Man Phuruithatto (1870-1949), arguing that his hagio-legend resulted in local recluses being institutionalised into nationally acclaimed personalities. Gustaaf Houtmann writes on U Ba Khin (1899-1971), one of the precursors of the *vipassanā* revival, raising the question of the relationships between biography, 'sacred biography', hagiography and history.

Schober's collection of papers is unashamedly a set of proceedings from academic conferences. At times the material is difficult, even dense, and it is unlikely that it will attract interest beyond academic circles: it is certainly not an introductory book, or one for the general reader. Much of the book's merit lies in the conceptual mapping of concepts: the editor emphasises Stanley Tambiah's notion of 'indexal symbols', arguing that the study of sacred biography opens up themes that are germane to a variety of academic subject areas, but also throws up contrasts between a religion's past and its uptake by present-day supporters. The book is not only a valuable contribution to Buddhist studies but also a salutary counter, on the one hand, to traditional Buddhists who regard sacred biography as fact and, on the other hand, present-day Western Buddhists who regard their religion as the unsullied 'religion of reason'.

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*Pain and its Ending: The Four Noble Truths in the Theravāda Buddhist Canon.* Carol S. Anderson. Curzon Press, Richmond 1999. xv, 255 pp. £40. ISBN 0-7007-1065-5; Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi 2001. Rs 295. ISBN 81-208-1806-7.

Carol Anderson's book is intriguing. This intrigue lies not in a radical thesis, but rather in how it manages to be both fascinating and frustrating at the same time. Likewise, in scope the book is broad in places (as the title suggests) while at other points becoming narrow and specialist.

Nonetheless, to scholars interested in the presentation of Theravāda teachings in the Canon this will prove a valuable resource. In the book, Anderson surveys the range of occurrences of the Four Noble Truths throughout the Canon, and is brave enough to tackle the Abhidharma uses of the formula. Overall the writing is precise and the arguments follow relatively clear paths. There is more to this work than just a description of where the Four Noble Truths occur and how they are described in canonical material. The central plank of the analysis is a distinction between the Four Noble Truths as 'symbol' and as 'doctrine'. Anderson approaches the Truths both as a doctrine – as a 'right view' to be attained – and also as a symbol. The symbolic power of the Four Noble Truths is at its most evocative in the accounts of the life of the Buddha, and Anderson contrasts this with their use elsewhere, where they form part of a wide network of teachings.

After a generally clear introduction, the first chapter, 'Cultivating Religious Experiences: Doctrine and *Diṭṭhi*', begins with a concern for the 'various relationships between sacred texts and the actual behaviors of religious practitioners' (p.30). However, it mostly consists of a study of the notoriously awkward notion of *diṭṭhi*. While there is a good engagement here with the various types of *sammā-diṭṭhi* (right-view), it would have been interesting to see the *Sutta-nipāta* verses (in the *Aṭṭhakavagga*) which equate right-view with no-view brought into the discussion.

In the second chapter, 'Stories and a Symbol of the Buddha's Enlightenment', Anderson suggests that in the Nikāyas the Truths are often to be seen as a symbolic expression of the Buddha and his achievement, as she writes (p.79): 'they are an encapsulation of a particular body of claims about the Buddha and his teachings.' There is a useful line of thinking here, but there is a question over its accessibility to a wide audience. The material is often technical and becomes embroiled in concerns over whether the Four Noble Truths were present in the earliest forms of the suttas she examines. While clearly an important concern, the discussions of this often interrupt her broader line of thinking and might have been better located in an appendix.

The third chapter, 'Analyzing the Four Noble Truths', examines how the teachings of the Truths are integrated with other aspects of the Dhamma – particularly how they fit into the analytical scheme of the Buddha's teaching. The Truths are here

seen as part of a body of teaching – not the symbol of that teaching, or even perhaps its summation: 'Within the networks of the Buddha's teaching, the four noble truths are one doctrine among others and are not particularly central' (p.85). This chapter concerns the patterns of the Truths' occurrences in the text and allows Anderson also to assess the, rather limited in her view, extent to which the suttas present the Truths as emblematic of the Buddha's enlightenment.

In the fourth chapter, Anderson moves to look at Abhidhamma versions of the Truths. Her concern is to identify whether there is a pattern to their usage with the *mātikās* of the Abhidhamma. Her typically Buddhist response (yes and no) indicates that the Truths are analysed systematically as part of a web of doctrine in the Abhidhamma, as we might expect – forming a central element in the outworking of the suttas that the texts represent. Anderson closes her analysis, which traces a useful path through the Abhidhamma material, by reiterating one of her central concerns about the Truths as propositions when she writes: 'in the analytic networks of the *Tipitaka*, the four noble truths are no more or less important than any other relevant teaching of the Buddha' (p.127).

The fifth chapter, 'The Four Noble Truths and the Path', examines the relation of the Truths to the Path. The author begins by commenting on the way in which, although the *idea* of a Path is strong, there is, in the Pāli Canon, 'the absence of an overarching and comprehensive structure of the path to *nibbāna*' (p.131). Here Anderson is interested in how the Truths work as more than pure propositions, that is: how they operate as teachings. In the account given, she discusses the effect of hearing the Truths and the extent to which they compare, in terms of efficacy, with other elements of the teaching. There is some interesting discussion here, with a well-justified concern with the pedagogical deployment of the Truths. Not all scholars will agree with her conclusions, but by this stage of the book Anderson is addressing important issues and pulling together a broad range of canonical and commentarial material.

In the sixth chapter, Anderson engages with what seems rather a mammoth task: to examine 'Studies of the Four Noble Truths in Europe and the United States'. While this is interesting and has some engaging discussion, there are two problems with this



chapter. Firstly, it is unable, given its size, to address the breadth of this topic and one can read it as being somewhat selective. Secondly, the topic breaks up the overall argument of the book. While the author is able to make links to her broader lines of thought, this chapter might have been better employed as the starting point for a follow-up work rather than as a component of this one.

In conclusion, there are two key roles for this volume. Firstly, it is a fantastic resource for scholars – it gathers together much useful material, as well as prodding us into re-thinking the way we approach doctrinal teachings – demanding we consider the symbolic as well as propositional value of teachings.

Secondly, although its impact may be limited in this respect by its technical content, it may help to combat a problematic tendency in the representation of Buddhism. In all too many teaching contexts (be it secondary schools or universities), the Four Noble Truths are treated as both a 'Buddhist creed' and a handy summation of the teachings of the Buddha. Whatever we think of Carol Anderson's claim that the Truths were absent from the earliest strata of the Pāli Canon, we can all benefit from being reminded of how the Truths, particularly as teachings – as expression of doctrine – are integrated within a broader range of ideas. While I think her closing lines (p.231) do not make this as clear as she does elsewhere, Anderson offers an intriguing study into what it is that makes the Truths occupy their special place in Buddhism – and her use of the idea of them as symbol here is powerful and provocative.

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*Coming to Terms with Chinese Buddhism. A Reading of the Treasure Store Treatise.* Robert H. Sharf. University of Hawai'i Press, Honolulu 2002. xiii, 400 pp. \$47.00. ISBN 08248-2443-1.

This book consists of two parts: a thoroughly annotated translation of the *Treasure Store Treatise* (part two), and two chapters placing this work in its intellectual and historical context (part one). Although it follows the traditional model of translating and philologically dissecting Buddhist texts, the book's main intent is polemical. As indicated by the title, *Coming to Terms with*

*Chinese Buddhism*, the author clearly intended to use this text to make a point about how we tend to interpret Chinese Buddhism. Sharf explains in his introduction that Chinese Buddhism has traditionally been seen as the product of a confrontation between two civilisations, the Indian and the Chinese. In this 'master narrative,' the sinification of Buddhism is regarded as a gradual inculturation process of the 'foreign' religion into Chinese society, a dialectic process in which the paradigms of Indian Buddhism were gradually transformed in accordance with Chinese conditions. Sharf rejects this dominant interpretative model and proposes that we stop measuring Chinese Buddhism against a normative model of Indian Buddhism but instead regard it as the product of forces acting within Chinese society alone; the direct impact of Indian Buddhism, for example through its missionaries, was negligible, he argues.

The *Treasure Store Treatise* (*Pao-tsang lun*, T 1857, 45.143b-150a), then, is an ideal example to show the internal dynamics shaping the Chinese Buddhist tradition. A short work traditionally ascribed to Seng-chao (374-414), it shows some striking similarities with the *Tao-te ching*, whose famous opening sentence it appears to parody. While the *Tao-te ching* starts with 'The Way that can be talked about is not the Constant Way. The name that can be named is not the constant name,' the *Treasure Store Treatise* opens as follows: 'Emptiness that cannot be deemed empty is not true emptiness. Form that can be deemed form is not true form.' Although this at first sight cheap Buddhist pastiche of a Taoist classic may not seem like an 'important work that merits study,' Sharf convincingly shows that it is both important in understanding a certain phase in the historic development of Chinese Buddhism, and is symptomatic of the way Chinese Buddhist intellectual discourse operates.

In the first chapter, the author tries to find out when the *Treatise* was actually composed and how it came to be associated with Seng-chao. Both external and internal evidence suggest that the text cannot predate the late eighth century: citations of its title or quotations attributed to it do not appear before the ninth century, while the style and some circumstantial evidence further confirm that it came about in early Chan milieux (mainly the Ox Head school) ca. 800. It is well known that throughout the eighth century, Tang emperors held the *Tao-te ching* in high regard,

giving it an unassailable status which in turn elevated the status of Taoist clergy. At the same time, Taoism was consolidated as a legitimate part of mainstream literati culture. In this context, rather than directly engaging Taoism in a debate on which tradition was superior, the Buddhist milieu behind the *Treatise* appropriated Taoist rhetoric to further their own cause. However, while declaring all doctrines to be expressions of a single truth, it is unmistakable that this truth is Buddhist (p.76). Seng-chao, then, was an ideal author to hang the *Treatise* on, as his style was celebrated for 'recast[ing] Buddhist thought in an idiom familiar to and esteemed by literary Chinese' (p.37). Moreover, this style of exegesis had become current in seventh and eighth century Taoist circles, commonly known as the Twofold Mystery Taoism; besides the Ox Head school of Chan, the Twofold Mystery circles were another important intellectual component of the *Treasure Store Treatise*.

The second chapter delves into what Sharf calls the 'hermeneutics of sinification' (p.132): this refers to the main interpretative concepts used by texts such as the *Treatise*. While we mostly try to explain the conceptual framework of Chinese Buddhist texts according to categories outlined in specific sūtras, translated into Chinese but deemed to reflect Indian originals fairly accurately, the author calls attention to the persistence of indigenous Chinese hermeneutics. More specifically, he proposes that the 'Cosmology of Sympathetic Resonance' (*kan-ying*) is paramount in understanding the argumentation of Chinese Buddhist texts. Originally, this refers to an understanding of a set of basic correspondences between various phenomena; in one famous example from the Han dynasty, a palace bell suddenly started ringing of itself. According to the court astrologer, this was because a mountain had collapsed: 'Mountains are mothers in relation to bronze. When the mother collapses, the child cries.' It was later confirmed that a mountain had indeed collapsed (p.82). Rather than a specific theory, this correlative thinking is a mode of theorising (p.81), which the author also discerns in Buddhist philosophical discourse. The impact of Chinese cosmology can be seen in particular in the case of the translation of the Buddha-bodies theory from India to China. While neither the Indians nor the Chinese ever settled on one single version of the Buddha-body theory – though the *trikāya* theory, positing three bodies, appears

to be the most common, the numbers range from two to ten – Sharf notes the special importance of the resonant- or response-body (*ying-shen*) of a Buddha in China. Although this term was sometimes used as an equivalent of the *sambhogakāya* or the *nirmāṇakāya*, it gradually developed into a generic term for any corporeal body of a Buddha responding to the needs of suffering beings. While this is still broadly in line with the standard *trikāya* doctrine, the author shows how the power to produce such bodies was often interpreted in terms of the traditional Chinese theory of sympathetic resonance (p.111).

The translation of the *Treatise* takes up the bulk of this book. The original text consists of only three short chapters, but the author has divided the text into paragraphs, which are put in bold face and followed by extensive notes on the key terms, expressions and concepts. It is therefore easy to read the highlighted text first and the author's comments later. In general, the quality of the translation is very high, striking an ideal balance between a faithful rendering of the original and clear readable prose. Despite the revisionist attempt, this work stands out for its clear prose, eschewing the post-modern jargon and style that are often the staple of revisionist works.

In sum, I found this book a very welcome addition to the field of Chinese Buddhist studies. The assertion that traditional Chinese cosmology remained a core component of Chinese Buddhist thinking will force everyone in the field to reconsider the way we approach at least some of the texts of the Chinese Buddhist tradition. However, I cannot help but find the contention that traditional scholarship on the sinification of Buddhism has mistakenly assumed that this process was a 'dialogue' between distinct entities is somewhat overblown. Although the author is certainly right in calling attention to the internal dynamics of Chinese Buddhism, I do not think that previous scholars working on the sinification of Buddhism regard Indian Buddhism as a normative, constant ideal, even if they did not spell this out. Ironically, I think that Sharf's own work can be seen to confirm the validity of earlier periodisation models by showing the gradual dissociation in the eighth-ninth centuries of Chinese Buddhist terms from their Indian equivalents, thus hinting at a transition from 'independent growth' to 'appropriation'. Also, if previous scholarship is guilty of essentialising Indian and Chinese Buddhism, then

what is the use of a term like sinification, which assumes this essential distinction between the two? Even if the author manages to eschew an essentialising discourse on Indian Buddhism, is not 'the ubiquitous and persistent influence of Chinese cosmology' (p.132) a statement that essentialises Chinese ways of thinking? Finally, I think the book would have benefited from an overall conclusion that took up some of the arguments never fully developed in the text; these include the impact of Taoism on Chan, and the nature of Chinese Buddhist schools (now relegated to an appendix on esoteric Buddhism in China, which argues that there never was a distinct esoteric sect in China). But these concern the presentation of the author's arguments; with the arguments themselves I find myself in full agreement.

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*Charming Cadavers. Horrific Figurations of the Feminine in Indian Buddhist Hagiographic Literature.* Liz Wilson. The University of Chicago Press, Chicago 1996. xvi, 258 pp. Cloth: \$55.00; £43.95. ISBN 0-226-90053-3; paper: \$19.95, £15.95. ISBN 0-226-90054-1.

With her book, Liz Wilson highlights one of the key Buddhist practices, namely that of contemplating the impermanent body as a means to seek detachment from the material world. She argues that the post-Aśokan Buddhist texts discussing this contemplation are heavily gender influenced. She hereby focuses on the South-East Asian tradition. The author meticulously shows how the Buddhist narrative is marked as masculine to the extent that women are conscious of themselves only as perceived by men. This is the result of the fact that female bodies are presented as prime symbols of impermanence, to be observed not as persons but as 'walking corpses' (p.2 *et passim*).

In this context Wilson discusses several themes: celibacy and the social world, the Buddhist construction of the body, horrific figurations of the feminine, temptation, and the nuns' monastic life. She thereby emphasises the macabre figurations of women as object lessons, not only for men but also for women. The 'male gaze' (p.14 *et passim*) is thus prominently present, and even

women learn about impermanence by observing female bodies or even their own body (pp.106-7, 123, 148 ff.). Masculine horrific figurations are rare exceptions (p.105 ff.). Women thus incorporate evil and even actively promote it. They are Māra, or at least daughters of Māra (pp.36 ff., 93, 124, 179). They captivate men (p.68) and they deceive their victims through the power of illusion (p.71).

However, by highlighting the evil of women, the author somehow overemphasises their negative role. Buddhist texts, and certainly the earlier ones, not only see women as object lessons and blameworthy beings. The rules imposed on the first nun Mahāprajāpatī (p.145) also incorporated an institutional aspect (cf. A. Sponberg, 'Attitudes toward Women and the Feminine in Early Buddhism', in J. Cabezón, ed., *Buddhism, Sexuality and Gender*, Delhi 1992, pp.3-36). Just as is the case in lay society, women had to play a subordinate role. Still, like their male counterparts, they could reach arhatship and thus were not evil *in se*. The ascetic and negative view of women seems to me to be a later but even stronger evolution (cf. A. Hierman, 'Chinese Nuns and Their Ordination in Fifth Century China', *Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies* 24.2, 2001, pp.275-304). When women were first seen as institutionally dangerous to the Buddhist community, they then became regarded as constituting a danger to the ascetic life of that very community. But even then, they were not merely considered to endanger one man in particular but rather the community as a whole. A man committing sexual intercourse was therefore not 'defeated [by evil]', as the term *pārājika* is explained on p.24, but should be expelled from the community so that this weak element can be eliminated (the idea of expulsion is related to the etymology of the term *pārājika*. 'Defeat' is a later evolution. Cf. O von Hinüber, *A Handbook of Pāli Literature*, Berlin/New York/New Delhi 1996, p.10). The negative evolution of the perception of women did not stop there, however. From a danger to the community of monks as a result of physical attraction, women evolved into beings incorporating danger. They are evil. They are now the daughters of Māra. They represent impermanence and constitute object lessons for both men and women.

I thus can only agree with Wilson's conclusion (pp.7, 192-3) that there is no decline in androcentric thinking in the millennium



after the death of the Buddha. On the contrary, women evolved into personifications of impermanence and decay, as a result of which the semantic fields of womanhood and attachment to the evil world inevitably became even more related than ever before. The author's lively work exemplifies this in a very clear and straightforward way.

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*Psychology and Buddhism. From Individual to Global Community.* Edited by Kathleen H. Dockett, Rita Dudley-Grant and C. Peter Bankart. Kluwer Academic/Plenum Publishers, New York 2003. xv, 308 pp. £47.00. ISBN 0-306-47412-3.

The literature at the interface of Buddhism and Western psychology was first established in 1894 with the publication of Enryo Inoue's *Eastern Psychology* (Tokyo). Buddhism has since been approached from a number of Western psychological perspectives, such as psychoanalysis, behaviourism, cognitivism, to name but a few. However, this edited volume of thirteen essays is the first sustained contribution to this embryonic dialogue between Buddhism (in particular a socially engaged Buddhism) and community psychology. Buddhism and psychology are approached here both comparatively and integratively. The book is divided into four sections: section one, 'Foundations', section two, 'Healing' and Psychotherapy', section three, 'Empowerment, Responsibility and the Challenges of Change', and the concluding section, 'Future Debates: Global Impact'. These contain three, four, five and one essay respectively.

Regarding the content of each of these sections, I find only section one to be problematic. Chapter one is an essay by the editors entitled 'On the Path of the Buddha: A Psychologist's Guide to the History of Buddhism', and chapter two is co-editor C. Peter Bankart's essay, 'Five Manifestations of the Buddha in the West: A Brief History', which contextualises the twentieth century engagement of Buddhism with Western psychology into five phases (Freudian Psychodynamics, Jungian Analytical Psychology, NeoFreudian Eclecticism, Behavioural Pragmatism and New Age Consciousness). However, also included in the same section is Edward S. Ragsdale's comparative essay, 'Value and

Meaning in Gestalt Psychology and Mahayana Buddhism', which I suggest is an altogether incongruent inclusion under the theme of 'foundations'.

The book's thesis is that Buddhism and psychology normally focus their attentions only on the individual, and these essays argue for a move 'beyond the individual to the community and global level' (Dudley-Grant, Bankart and Dockett, p.3), and the consequent broader alleviation of suffering. Thus, much of this work deals with both in broader forms, those of *socially engaged* Buddhism and *community* psychology.

For those whose areas of interest and research are the promotion and continuation of a comparative and integrative dialogue between Buddhism and Western psychology and the relating of Buddhism to global concerns, I find that the major successes of this book are: firstly, the further development of a recently established dialogue between Buddhism and community psychology; secondly, that all of these essays achieve, to a greater or lesser extent, the book's promised move of refocusing concern and action from the individual to community, which is undertaken through a wealth of approaches. These essays contribute to the alleviation of what the authors propose as community/global problems, such as value conflict; alcohol and drug abuse; limited notions of responsibility; the language of biological determinism in the human services; ethno-political conflict, and the environment.

In chapter three, Ragsdale argues for a commonality of response from both Gestalt psychology and Mahāyāna Buddhism to the question of values as either absolute or relative. He posits that both find a 'relational' and middle way between these conflicting extremes (p.71). Thus, for him, constructing a less volatile way to negotiate *global* value conflicts would thereby constitute an alleviation of the suffering one encounters as co-terminus with such value conflicts.

Debating questions of value as foundationally absolute or relative could proceed *ad infinitum*. Thus I find Ragsdale's challenge potentially fruitful when he questions 'whether problems of ethics and value can be resolved within this duality' (p.71) and suggests this alternative response. However, his essay also raises questions on the comparative method which characterises a number of essays on this book, and these will be touched on shortly.

Firstly, these essays constitute a selection of the integrative approaches to Buddhism and community psychology. In chapter nine, Edward A. Jason and John Moritsugu's 'The Role of Spirituality in Community Building', Buddhism is employed to *energise* community psychology's vision (p.201); in chapter eight, Kathleen H. Dockett's 'Buddhist Empowerment: Individual, Organisational and Societal Transformation', integrates so-called 'Buddhist empowerment' as found in Nichiren Buddhism with community psychology as a resource for the transformation of individuals, organisations and society.

However, problems arise for this book when a number of authors uncritically employ the method of comparison for similarity rather than difference when approaching the Buddhist traditions at hand. The problem with a comparative method which is eager to establish similarities while unable to deal with differences is that it tends uncritically to impose contemporary understandings and concerns on a profoundly different historical and cultural milieu. Ragsdale wants to distance himself from this method and he suggests a 'mutual illumination' of Gestalt psychology and Mahāyāna Buddhism, which he claims will avoid the 'risks of comparing traditions so widely separated by time, culture, and institutional nature' (p.72). Call it semantic nit-picking, but to claim that Mahāyāna Buddhism (pre- the formulation of the discipline of psychology in the late nineteenth century) requires 'illumination' from mid-twentieth century Gestalt psychology can imply that Mahāyāna Buddhism is veiled in an interpretative darkness which requires the illuminating force of Gestalt psychology. My reservations regarding such claims by Ragsdale and others is that, although he attempts to respect issues of 'time', 'culture' and 'institution', these positions can in fact reflect an ideology of, if not cultural imperialism, then of epistemological imperialism.

Facing similar problems in chapter six is Belinda Siew Luan Khong, in her 'Role of Responsibility in Daisenanalysis and Buddhism', wherein she argues that an 'enlarged notion of responsibility' (p.157) will emerge through the engagement of early Buddhism and Daisenanalysis. Khong argues for a reciprocal understanding, whereby 'each perspective is made more meaningful by an understanding of the other' (*ibid.*), which is roughly akin to Ragsdale's 'mutual illumination'.

I find Dockett's essay is one of the more considered and promising contributions to social activism and change. Dockett gives a detailed discussion of her proposed Buddhist empowerment to be deployed on the following levels: for the individual – commitment, stress resistance and personal control (pp.177-85); for the organisation and community – belief systems, opportunity role structure, support system and leadership (p.185); and for the society – 'changing large social structures and institutions' (p.191), particularly through the work of socially engaged Buddhist action and movements as detailed by Dockett (pp.191-3).

Another important contribution is chapter five, that of Polly Young-Eisendrath's 'Suffering from Biobabble: Searching for a Science of Subjectivity'. Young-Eisendrath argues for a move from contemporary, harmful use of the language of biological determinism in the human services, which she describes as 'biobabble' (p.125), to an integration of Buddhism and psychology which will 'diminish the effects of biobabble' (p.128).

Young-Eisendrath gives a particularly pertinent example of the problem with the use of biobabble, whereby its use eliminates 'the role of meaning and intentions in the development of societies and people. In this story the "master molecule" of the gene, falsely endowed with an autonomous power, overrides the effects of personal desires, intentions, and actions' (p.127). To challenge such determinism, she incorporates the Buddhist concept of karma, which does not deny action, volition and intention. Indeed, for her, this integration would constitute a 'new science of subjectivity' (p.125) which recognises, firstly, the impermanence of suffering and thus the possibility for change and, secondly, the capacity for alleviating suffering.

I contrast Dockett and Young-Eisendrath with less promising contributions, such as that of Richard P. Hayes in chapter seven, 'Classical Buddhist Model of a Healthy Mind'. Hayes suggests that a 'classical program' (p.162) for achieving such a healthy mind is to follow the Buddhist path of ethics, meditation and compassion. On achieving this healthy mind, he suggests that out of that state should come a broader concern for others, and points to the *Cakkavattisihanāda Sutta* (which contains advice for families and government) as part of that 'classical program' to bring about an 'ideal society' (p.166).

In Hayes' favour, I find his account of the Buddhist path to be wholly consistent with traditional scholarship in this area, and his essay is the most grounded in primary source material, that of the Pāli Canon. However, whilst he demonstrates that early Buddhism did indeed have broad community and societal concerns, I find that his proposal of a 'classical program' fails to convince as a contribution to contemporary/global suffering, as it remains too simplistic and even idealistic. Hayes writes that, 'if one patiently works at expanding the circle of friendship to include all of humanity, and then all of life, before one knows it, fear gives way to trust, despair to hope, arrogance to confidence, competitiveness to cooperation, anxiety to serenity and folly to wisdom. And then, without giving the matter any further thought, one shines as a beacon by which others can also find their way' (p.179). Thus, 'before one knows it' and 'without giving the matter any further thought' one will 'shine as a beacon', just like that!

Although a number of essays here are based on primary source materials, the majority are based on secondary, and mainly twentieth century, source materials on Buddhism, which emerges as problematic, especially if the implication is that these understandings are the same as early Buddhism's. To obtain some sense of the authors' particular understandings of dependent origination (*paṭiccasamuppāda*) and Buddhism in general, I shall locate their versions of this concept which, according to the editors in chapter one, is the concern of almost every chapter in this volume, 'either directly or indirectly' (p.20).

Rita Dudley-Grant, in chapter four, 'Buddhism, Psychology and Addiction Theory in Psychotherapy', finds her source on dependent origination in R. Metzner's 1996 article, 'The Buddhist six-worlds model of consciousness and reality' (*Journal of Transpersonal Psychology* 28, pp.155-66). Belinda Siew Luan Khong, in chapter six, presents dependent origination as traditionally understood by early Buddhism, when she writes that it 'originally applied to the aggregates that constitute the human being' (p.147), but she then goes on to claim that it refers to the 'indissoluble unity of human beings with all other beings' (pp.150-1). Kathleen Dockett, in chapter eight, informed by Nichiren Buddhism, understands dependent origination as referring to the 'oneness of self and environment' (p.179) and as a 'deeply ecological Buddhist principle' (p.180), whilst also taking from Kenneth Kraft's 1996

essay, 'Engaged Buddhism' (in A. Kotler, ed., *Engaged Buddhist Reader*, Berkeley, pp.64-9), the meaning of this concept as an ecological principle of interdependence. Dockett and Doris North-Schulte, in chapter ten, find their source in the third president of Soka Gakkai, Daisaku Ikeda's article, 'In search of new principles of integration' (*Seiko Times*, March 1993, pp.33-9), for whom dependent origination is 'the web of all life that binds all people', whilst they themselves understand dependent origination as an integrating principle 'for uniting self and other' (p.234). Shuichi Yamamoto, in chapter eleven, 'Environmental Problems and Buddhist Ethics: From the Perspective of the Consciousness-Only Doctrine', is the sole author in this work to quote the abstract form of dependent origination, as found in the *Samyutta-nikāya*, which is as follows: 'That being, this comes to be; from the arising of that, this arises; that being absent, this is not; from the cessation of that, this ceases' (S II 28). But again, there is no referencing. The editors, in chapter thirteen, 'On the Path to Peace and Wholeness: Conclusion to Psychology and Buddhism', do not indicate where they sourced their dependent origination as 'mutual interdependence' (p.281).

I find deeply problematic the (mis)interpretations of dependent origination as 'unifying', as a doctrine of 'oneness' and as an 'ecological principle' that 'binds', for three reasons. Firstly, it could be argued that this theme of unity is alien to the doctrine of dependent origination, and owes more to contemporary interpretations and concerns from the influence of the ecologising of Buddhism. Understanding dependent origination as a unifying concept can be traced to the Taoist-influenced Hua-Yen (Flower Ornament) Buddhism. Hua-Yen Buddhism's favourite imagery is that of the Jewel Net of Indra, whereby the net is constructed so that at each node there is a jewel, which in turn reflects all other jewels in the net. As Francis H. Cook writes in his *Hua-Yen Buddhism: The Jewel Net of Indra* (University Park/London 1977, p.2), 'the Hua-Yen school has been fond of this image... because it symbolizes a cosmos in which there is an infinitely repeated interrelationship among all members of the cosmos. This relationship is said to be one of simultaneous *mutual identity and mutual interdependence*.' This imagery of mutual identity, interconnect-edness and unity has been appropriated to develop many contemporary ecological interpretations of Buddhism, but none of the

authors indicates such a source. I do not suggest that Buddhism cannot contribute to contemporary ecological concerns, just that one has an awareness of the problems of reading back of ecology into early Buddhism.

Secondly, and alternatively, this theme of unity and oneness might be more representative of Advaita Vedānta's doctrine of the *ātman/brahman* identity than of early Buddhism. Thus, I suggest that if the authors were in search of a unifying monism to apply to contemporary global issues, then perhaps a book on Psychology and Advaita Vedānta would have been more applicable.

Thirdly, and most importantly, this book's theme of oneness and unity of individual and global community rests mostly on false assumptions regarding the doctrine of dependent origination, that the individual is *necessarily* unified or at one with the global community. Dependent origination/arising, as found at *Saṃyutta-nikāya* II 28, means that all phenomena arise in accordance with conditions, which does not imply that all phenomena are unified or that the individual is *necessarily* unified with the global community. But this is not to suggest that dependent origination is not a foundational source of relating the individual to community, as one has only to consider the formation of the Saṅgha and the fact that the Buddha taught the Dhamma for forty years after his Enlightenment. However, these understandings of dependent origination are, as I have demonstrated, a mixture of contemporary interpretations and vague unreferenced versions of this concept. Moreover, they are also based on obscure and generalised versions of Buddhism, not to mention the distortive reading back of contemporary ecological/global concerns into early Buddhism.

This treatment of dependent origination is a real problem for this book and such a central theme, to my mind, should have been addressed in a more critical fashion, but also more specifically textually based, which would have lent the work greater credibility, particularly for the readership of interested Buddhist scholars.

Issues raised by the book are, as shown, the comparative method, and Young-Eisendrath's essay also raises questions which feed an already well stuffed belly of a debate, that of nature-nurture. But a central issue raised by, but not referred to in this book, is that of the validity of Buddhism and psychology as cross-cultural categories. Can one apply Buddhism and psychology to the issues dealt with in this book, irrespective of the cultural diversity?

However, these problems aside, this book is important as the first sustained foray into this newly established dialogue between Buddhism and community psychology. The editors conclude in their final essay that 'Buddhism and psychology can forge a bond that can be mutually enhancing for the benefit of our society' (p.285). However, what I concur with and find admirable in their conclusion is the importance of what the editors suggest was the 'overarching theme' of this book, that of 'peaceful solutions to the terror, fear, and ethnic warfare that has been one of the greatest challenges to freedom in the twenty-first century' (p.277).

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*Buddha and Christ: Images of Wholeness.* Robert Elinor. Lutterworth, Cambridge 2000. 233 pp. £40.00. ISBN 0 7188 3011 3.

*Jesus and Buddha: The Parallel Sayings.* Edited by Marcus Borg. Duncan Baird, London 2002. 160 pp. £16.99. ISBN 1 903296 79 X.

Comparisons between the Buddha and Jesus of Nazareth have intrigued scholars and seekers for over a century. In the introductory essay to *Buddha and Christ*, Robert Elinor traces the history of writings that have suggested significant parallels, starting with Ernst von Bunsen's *The Angel-Messiah of Buddhists, Essenes and Christians* (1880), followed by Albert J. Edmunds' two-volume *Buddhist and Christian Gospels* (1902) and Rudolf Seydel's *Die Buddha-Legende und das Leben Jesu nach den Evangelien* (1884), translated into English as *Buddhism in Christianity* (1909). More recent, and much better known, is Roy C. Amore's *Two Masters, One Message* (1978) and, within the last decade, Thich Nhat Hanh's *Living Buddha, Living Christ* (1995) and the Dalai Lama's *The Good Heart: A Buddhist Perspective on the Teachings of Jesus* (1996) have added momentum to the debate about whether there might be some historical influence between Buddhism and Christianity, or whether the two religions are particular expressions of some archetypal reality that transcends both.

Amore gained recognition for his contention that Jesus was influenced by Buddhism. Elinor and Borg, by contrast, both support an archtypalist position, Elinor describing the two religions as 'local inflections of a universal archetype' (pp.15-16),



and Borg – drawing on William James – contending that ‘the most satisfactory explanation for this similarity of underlying structure is not cultural borrowing, but commonality of religious experiences’ (p.10).

Elinor’s *Buddha and Christ* explores the parallels principally through art. The book is superbly illustrated, with over a hundred plates, mostly in colour, and carefully cross-referenced with the text, thus providing illustration rather than mere decoration. The author starts with artistic portrayals of the lives of the Buddha and Christ, and ‘images of incarnation’. He considers Christianity’s ambivalent attitude to images, particularly evident in the contests between iconoclasts and iconodoules, noting that Buddhism has been much less prone to such controversy. The first part concludes with a chapter on ‘resurgent symbols’, highlighting artistic portrayals of key concepts that are germane to each religion.

The second part of Elinor’s book takes a more diachronic approach: there is a chapter on early images of the two founder-leaders, followed by an account of how Buddhist and Christian art develops as each religion is propagated worldwide, beginning with Aśoka in the case of Buddhism, and Constantine in the case of Christianity. A final chapter deals with twentieth century art, and includes material on theatre and film.

In some parts of the book Elinor makes comparisons between the two religions; in other places he allows material from only one religion to develop in its own right, for example in his exposition of bread, wine, fish, lamb and shepherd as symbols of Christ. While this has the effect of giving the book a slightly untidy structure, the author avoids the temptation to create false parallels or to contend that the two religions are really ‘saying the same thing’. His conclusion is that religious art is a symbolic process, which expresses the ‘nameless’ and points to a shared and more ultimate religious experience.

*Buddha and Christ* is not a closely argued book and Elinor – although a scholar himself – does not break any fresh ground in Buddhist or Christian scholarship. The book’s merit lies in providing an informative and reliable commentary on some very fine illustrations. If, as a result, the book is more of the ‘coffee table’ than the academic variety, it still performs an important role.

*Jesus and Buddha: The Parallel Sayings* is also of the coffee table variety, but differently so. Its illustrations evoke rather than

inform and tend to be of landscapes, seascapes, flowers and fruit, rather than specifically religious imagery belonging to either tradition. The book is arranged around a number of themes, such as ‘compassion’, ‘wisdom’, ‘temptation’ and ‘miracles’, and each page presents a pair of parallel sayings of Jesus and the Buddha. The Buddhist verses tend to be drawn mainly from the Pāli Canon, although there are one or two Mahāyāna passages.

The book contains an introduction, written by Jack Kornfield, and a slightly longer Editor’s Preface by Borg. Borg is an accredited Christian scholar and an important contributor to the ‘Jesus debate’: he regards Jesus as a religious mystic rather than a political agitator or an apocalypticist, and hence his favoured view of Jesus of Nazareth fits in well with the concept of the Buddha as a religious teacher who gained enlightenment through meditation. Although one might argue that the extensiveness of Buddhist scriptures is bound to allow comparisons with Christian sayings, some of the parallels that Borg identifies are uncanny. For example, Jesus’ saying, ‘Do not store up for yourselves treasures on earth... but store up for yourselves treasures in heaven, where neither moth nor rust consumes and where thieves do not break in and steal’ (Matthew 6:19-20; p.50) is paralleled with the Buddhist text: ‘Let the wise man do righteousness: A treasure that others can not share, which no thief can steal; a treasure which does not pass away’ (*Khuddakapatha* 8:9). Borg identifies many more.

Whether such parallels can wholly be explained in terms of a shared archetypal reality demands much more discussion than Borg is able to provide in a brief introduction. One remark, however, is worth querying. Borg states, ‘Because the Buddha lived about five hundred years earlier than Jesus, the direction of borrowing would have been from the Buddha to Jesus’ (p.10). This is not necessarily so: traditions develop, and it is equally possible that Christian tradition percolated through into later forms of Buddhism: it cannot be safely assumed that, when Buddhism or Christianity attributes sayings to the Buddha and Jesus respectively, such sayings are authentic. Further research is needed to establish the pedigree and relationship of such sayings, and no doubt future scholarship will see further research on this important subject.

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*The Unexpected Way*. On Converting from Buddhism to Catholicism. Paul Williams. Continuum, London/New York 2002. Pb. xx, 240 pp. £12.99. ISBN 0 567 08830 8.

**NOT AT ALL UNEXPECTED** – This essay reviews a rather unusual subject, a book by Paul Williams, its ex-Buddhist author (Professor of Indian and Tibetan Philosophy at the University of Bristol) has thought it worthwhile to write upon his decision to convert to Roman Catholicism. From the tone of this work the author's writing is more one of self-justification than a balanced account of his spiritual journey. Though it purports to record this, the understanding of the Dharma displayed by Williams (W) is remarkably deficient. And if not so in his lectures, then the book displays an astonishing ignorance of the accepted meanings of the Dharma's teachings. Admittedly his understanding may have been twisted by his conversion but he has not honestly presented the clarity of the Dharma. The material offered below attempts to demonstrate this. It is divided into two sections, Buddhist and Christian, though in the book the teachings of these two intermingle.

**BUDDHIST** – The author nowhere quotes the Buddha's words, neither from the Sanskrit sūtras nor the Pāli suttas. This is surprising from a learned teacher of the Dharma as W was, both in his university classes and in his books. I find the author's avoidance of any texts attributed to the Buddha as evidence of his unwillingness to face the teachings of the canonical texts. Another notable omission in the book is the absence of what could loosely be called Buddhist saints (apart from Shinran, pp. 102, 104, whose ideas W. plays with), a sign perhaps that the author does not wish to recognise that the Dharma's practice leads to the evolution of wonderful people. No mention is made of Milarepa, for instance, or other great practitioners. According to him 'saints', I suppose, must be Christian and preferably recognised by the Catholic church.

Though W refers to his Going-for-Refuge and names his Gelugs Geshe as his teacher for this and though he was subsequently a Buddhist for twenty years, it does not seem that he was heart-stirred by the Dharma. His attraction to it was mostly to its philosophy, views and logic. It seems as though whatever meditation he was taught never took root in this dryness and so produced no fruits of practice.

Views and concepts after all, whether Buddhist or Catholic, are just collections of words to be used only as props – from Buddhist understanding – until the liberating experience of the way things really are dawns. Attachment to views (how many times the Buddha has referred to this in the *Sutta-nipāta* or *Majjhima-nikāya*!) is so popular though it leads only to aridity. 'I – or we – believe' is after all a central feature in many religious systems, but when they are regarded comparatively it would be hard to justify why one believes in this but not in that. Beliefs are without end, while changing from one to the other depends upon conditioned factors in this life and, as the Buddha demonstrates, from past lives. But whatever is believed, Christian or Buddhist, that is not known. Believers only believe, they do not know from their own experience what is true everywhere and at all times. The Dharma points to this which is beyond all views and beliefs. Though one may have faith in a certain set of beliefs, the various Christian creeds for instance, or the various qualities of the Three Jewels, this faith does not guarantee truth. Only wisdom, *prajñā*, can do that. We find, looking around this world, an astonishing array of beliefs, all proclaimed as true by their upholders, many of whose views contradict the beliefs of others. The end result of this tangle of beliefs is bigotry, persecution and oceans of blood shed. This is certainly true of the Christian sects, including RC, who have been responsible for much human suffering, all in the name of 'true' religion. It is interesting that Buddhists, by contrast, who do not encourage adherence to unverifiable dogmas, have been largely free from the tendency to persecute those of other opinions. They have not fomented any religious wars (Crusades, Jihad), in fact they have welcomed Christians who went to preach in Buddhist lands. For example, during the reign of King Narai of Siam (1657-88), French Catholic priests arrived there with a diplomatic mission and were welcomed by the king and given permission to preach. But just imagine, if Buddhist monks had accompanied the Thai mission to Paris during the same king's reign – what sort of reception would they have encountered in France, a country only recently 'pacified' by the king and the RC church after the persecution of Protestants – which included the Massacre of St Bartholomew's Day? Would they have been invited to teach the Dharma in Paris? As W remarks elsewhere, the RC church has

not been notable for its tolerance, nor would our author think so highly of it if it had.

Turning now to other aspects of the Dharma, W's book does not reflect much understanding of the Four Noble Truths or of the Buddhist teaching on existence (*bhava*). In fact, he finds descriptions of Samsāra negative. This is not surprising in view of the usual Christian view of God's creation as 'good', a view that ignores the general bloodiness of existence and the immense sufferings which inevitably follow from the craving to exist, to be. From the Buddhist angle, Samsāra's depiction is a fair one which fits all the facts that can be observed in the human and animal realms. Buddhists make no effort to avoid the dark sides of life which Christians and Muslims, in proclaiming the goodness of creation, are loathe to see.

Nor does he show much comprehension of karma (p.82 ff.). He has made some particularly fatuous attempts with logic to destroy the teachings on karma and its results. I suppose that his book, upon his conversion to Roman Catholicism, would be an unlikely place to look for a clear exposition of the subject, though as he must be a learned person, one would hope at least for an honest presentation.

Rebirth stirs W to ire and he devotes several pages of shaky logic trying to refute it (p.198 ff.). The Buddha, after all, emphasised practice in this life. How many people know clearly about past lives and who would be able to claim, unless conceited, their future state? It is the present one that is important because the present moment is the only time in which the Dharma can be practised. W ties himself up in several knots over rebirth but at least he does mention the *na ca sa na ca anyah* (neither the same nor different) description of a 'person' between the last life and this one, or between this and the next. He expresses moral reservations that the recipient of karma's results will not be the same person as the doer of it. The Buddha has already mentioned this wrong view (an eternalist one) that the doer will be the same as the receiver. But surely this is not a problem. If we get out our photograph albums we may see there pictures of ourselves at different ages. Then if we ask whether the person represented in a certain photo taken twenty years ago is the same as myself now, or different from me, neither extreme answer will be satisfactory: there is no problem once we use the formula 'neither the same nor

different'. As Catholicism is an eternalist view we would hardly expect the converted W to be pleased with the Buddhist recognition of impermanence. (But are Catholics exempt from impermanence then?)

Buddhists, indeed anyone, if they practise the path of Dharma may at least expect excellent states of future existence. If they are more devoted and develop wisdom and compassion, they will certainly experience stages of liberation. (This W is unwilling to admit.) Of course, those humans who choose to ignore goodness and practise evil may expect painful future states. Infinite births we may have had in the past (but they have all gone) but none of us need look forward to an infinity of Samsāra in the future, though W seems to think that this is the fate of all Buddhists. This may in some minds be complicated by the bodhisattva vow to liberate all beings, an undertaking which develops loving-kindness and compassion. However, as the Sixth Patriarch of Chinese Ch'an remarks, 'all beings' are the greedy being, the hateful being and the deluded being in one's own mind, thus bringing us directly into present-moment awareness.

However, the meditative practices taught in the Dharma are devalued by W because he says they are merely manipulations of the mind or rather ego, producing only another altered state of consciousness which has, in his opinion, nothing to do with purity or enlightenment, nor has it any value in Christian mysticism. The latter is viewed by him with suspicion and even the great mystics of both Eastern and Western Christianity are criticised (see pp.55, 66). If faith/belief is required, words will be enough just to believe.

He refers at various places in the book to the fact that he reckoned himself 'a hopeless Buddhist' (p.98) and he also emphasises his sinfulness. This, of course, will fit him for entry into Christianity which tends towards depreciation of one's own efforts as well as emphasising the sinful nature of humanity. Obviously he has seen no spark of his *bodhicitta*. But one wonders what dark deeds he has done to roll around so in his puddle of muck. It appears that the emptiness of all dharmas, including the unskilful ones, had been no consolation to him, nor had he, apparently, help from Tārā and other bodhisattvas.

We come now to W's strange remarks about hell (p.97 ff.). He seems to understand that he will be reborn there (according to the Buddhists) for leaving the Dharma! But nowhere in the Pāli

tradition could such a result follow from the cause of changing religion. I doubt that it exists in Mahāyāna either, as I have never heard of such a teaching. As W has received some Tantric transmissions he is burdened with the idea of the Vajra-hell into which corrupt practitioners are said to fall, but surely he will be exempt from this as his practice was, according to him, so poor. Though the threat of Vajra-hell exists for those who use Tantric practice for their own egoistic ends, its threat could have been only a small impulse in his conversion.

His view of hell, apparently a permanent state, is defined as the absence of God or a turning away from him. As Buddhists of every persuasion have no belief in a Creator God, it seems that they should, according to this definition, be fated to hell, whatever good things they do and whatever stages of holiness in the Dharma they reach (p.160).

Finally, in this section, W makes reference to some Buddhists who say that the Buddha was an agnostic in the matter of a Creator, rather than denying such a being (p.25). W here upholds the Buddha's words and Buddhist tradition generally, which certainly does deny a Creator. No doubt W as he is now would like to smuggle a God into the Dharma and in the following section he has tried to do so. His truth, what the Buddha called a *pratyeka-satya* or individual 'truth', cannot conceive any truth where God is not, in which it is possible for human beings to wake up without reliance on a Creator. A Buddha or many Buddhas are inconceivable to those whose truth is rooted in the God-concept, nor apparently would there be any value in their Awakening experience since it does not concern God. What then of the great benefits that have manifested to millions of human beings in many cultures, of the countless awakened disciples and bodhisattvas who have dispelled suffering and brought happiness?

**CHRISTIAN** – When W speaks of his conversion as 'unexpected' it is obvious even to one who does not know him that it could be seen reasonably as expected. First, even in his present life he had a Christian upbringing in the Church of England, though a Buddhist would say that it is likely that W has Christian *vāsanā* (tendencies) from past lives. Second, the type of Buddhism he was attracted to is rather dry with much theory, logic and philosophy. So he exchanged C of E views/beliefs for Buddhist ones and later exchanged that set of *dr̥ṣṭi* (views) for the RC set which he now proclaims

to be unwaveringly true. Third, W had doubts, a common feature of the psychology of intellectuals. *Vicikitsā* is the scourge of intellectuals who like to play with views. Given all these factors, is it any surprise that he converted? It could even happen that in the future he will lose faith in the RC church and take up something else. Mind has infinite possibilities to change in this way when given the right conditions. W actually wants to be told what to think and believe. This signals that he distrusts his own mind (a dualistic phrase if ever there was one) and wishes to lean on an exterior authority which will tell him what is true and what is error. He expounds this desire, as though it were a virtue instead of a relinquishment of innate wisdom, in the section, 'Tell me what to think' (p.137, also p.146). But mind, anyone's mind, cannot be disciplined in such a way: 'You must think in this way, not that way'. Such a crude discipline must involve suppression if it is to work at all. Can truth then be arrived at by way of suppression of thoughts that one should not think? No good will come of treating the mind in this way. Even if one has learnt thoroughly a set of Thou shalt nots, still mind, due to its previously established thought-patterns (*saṃskāra*), will continue to think accordingly. A 'truth' founded upon this sort of mental 'discipline' will be only as true as everyone else's beliefs, which they also regard as 'true'. Of course, the history of the Roman church shows that it has been keen to enforce its beliefs on others. If they did not accept them then the Popes and bishops leant on the secular arm for crusades, or on their own priestly enforcers of the Inquisition. Presumably W in this day and age would not support such bloodthirsty methods. However, it is worth reflecting that his Buddhist views would not have been viewed in the past by his church with tolerance. Though now they have no powers to enforce conformity, there is no doubt that should the present liberal climate change, RC authorities, and others like them, would seek again to tell people what to think.

W spends quite a long time trying to justify such dubious ideas as 'God is perfectly merciful and just' and 'God who really cares' (p.114). Neither of these statements is obvious from the state of his supposed creation. If indeed he exists then of creation it must be said that he did a rotten job. Using words like 'just' or 'merciful' or 'really cares' of God would be meaningless unless they are equal at least to the highest and most exalted practice of them



among humans. An examination of this world, supposing it to be the creation of such a being, does not reveal justice, mercy or any trace of really caring. In writing this, I do not refer only to the human world, though that is quite a sufficient demonstration of God's non-existence, but also to animals – they suffer in ways even worse than us. When tourists around here in Australia gaze at rainforest trees with their burden of mosses, fungi, lianas and epiphytes, or when they go snorkelling and wonder at the colours and shapes of fish and corals in the Great Barrier Reef, they see mostly only the beautiful side, not the bloodstained one. Had God with his supposed virtues arranged all this, one would expect that some traces of that virtue would be visible to us. As Huxley rightly remarked of the human and animal condition: 'Nature red in tooth and claw'. Buddhist logicians have pointed out that the nature of a Creator and his Creation could not differ. Thus a compassionate Creator's work will show evidence of his compassion.

It is not surprising that W struggles to explain the problem of evil (p.43 ff.). He tries, unconvincingly, to argue that God's intention was pure in every respect of creation and that evil was and is the choice of human beings. While Buddhists would agree that individual humans choose to do evil, they would also ask why a compassionate God, who would presumably rejoice in the salvation of all his human creation, nevertheless placed obstacles in their way by giving them the possibility to choose evil. It is like a man who sets out to succeed in a business but then deliberately places circumstances in his way that will ensure that his business will collapse. Such pungent criticism can only be answered by God-believers with efforts to block further investigation, such as, 'We cannot know God's purpose' or 'The mystery of God is too profound for human minds'.

Our author, now in the RC fold, is anxious to demonstrate that his erstwhile fellow practitioners have an 'explanatory gap' (p.19) in the teachings. This strange expression is elsewhere referred to as the 'necessary being' (p.16), in other words, an attempt to smuggle God into the Dharma. This attempt appears to be quite dishonest for W knows very well that in 2,500 years of the Dharma's teaching there has been no recourse to the idea of a Creator God in the Jewish, Christian or Muslim sense. The Buddha spoke of his teachings as a 'seamless cloth' with no rents or patches, nothing needed to be added or taken away. A God

introduced into the Dharma would indeed be an unseemly patch, an unnecessary addition.

Finally, W shows from time to time a sentimental regard for English cathedrals (p.150), deploring their denudation during the Reformation and even suggesting that some of them ought to be returned to their 'rightful owners'. He has an attachment to the Great Catholic Past of Britain which is again an example of grasping at the romantically beautiful while completely disregarding the darker side of the Catholic church. Included in this is the glorification of martyrdom, which he mentions with approval in an effort to show that the Buddhist emphasis upon the promotion of happiness for oneself and for others is misguided. But it seems that the martyrdom of the Christian saints could be included in what is now called masochistic behaviour. Could the enjoyment of suffering in order to attain heaven be a good thing (p.61)? Such an attitude resembles the conduct of Jain monks who tortured themselves in order to burn away their evil karmas, an episode that evoked the Buddha's gentle and dryly humorous admonishment.

As a book it is rather 'bitty' with some sections unrelated to the rest. For instance, W draws in such varied topics as Contraception, Great Cathedrals, the Empty Tomb, More on drinking Wine, Musing on Relics, and so on, an array of subjects that could hardly be treated adequately in a text only 210 pages long. Certainly the whole work is unusual – there are few twenty-year Buddhists who would even contemplate conversion to the Roman church, let alone actually do it – but one which this reviewer does not think has been well-explored. Perhaps the worst feature of the book is the twisting of Buddhist teachings by an author who knows very well what the Buddha taught but now refuses to recognise this. Even so, for the author, I wish only happiness in his not so unexpected change.

*Laurence-Khantipalo Mills*

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